By September 5, 2014, members of NATO were pledging to gradually increase their military investment levels upward in an effort to meet the Alliance’s requirement that a minimum of 2 percent of annual GDP be allocated toward defense within a decade. According to Forecast International research, the Wales Summit Declaration marked the point where splits within European defense funding commitments became readily apparent.

The immediate result has been a sharp divergence between the newer NATO nations along Europe’s eastern periphery and the older European NATO nations in terms of how government funding has been redirected toward their respective militaries.

For instance, the military “backbone” members of the European NATO establishment – countries such as Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the U.K. – experienced flat year-to-year defense allocations in 2015.

From 2013 to 2015, defense earmarks for these nations were either negligible, as in France and the Netherlands (up by 0.3 and 0.5 percent, respectively), or continued to shrink – most markedly in Spain (down 6 percent over the past two fiscal years) and Italy (a 14 percent net reduction). Though several nations have detailed outyear spending plans that will see their topline figures cumulatively rise through 2019 (by more than 6 percent in the case of Germany), most are set to experience only marginal growth in 2016.

Meanwhile, the trend among former Warsaw Pact countries and Soviet satellites has been the reverse, with demonstrably upward defense investment over the past two years. The three Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – greatly alarmed by Russia’s actions in Ukraine – have substantially bolstered their consolidated military spending totals (Lithuania by 53 percent between 2013 and 2015), while the Czech Republic and Poland have followed suit.

The reality of the European defense funding landscape at present is that those countries closer to Russia’s borders, with fears of Kremlin designs on their sovereignty and determination to influence their policy-making approaches, are naturally worried by what they have seen in Ukraine. Their predisposed anxieties toward Russia are naturally heightened by Moscow’s support for Russian-speaking populations living outside Russia’s own borders, a willingness to support separatist elements, and Russian military exercises simulating strikes on neighboring countries.

While NATO has attempted to assuage the fears of the smaller Baltic nations, these tiny countries are nonetheless moving to strengthen their own limited capabilities. Estonia’s military expenditures, for instance, rose by 21 percent in real terms between 2013 and 2015, while Latvia’s rose by 13 percent. For 2016, both are opting to increase their defense budgets by 9 and 38 percent, respectively.

For their part, the Czechs and the Poles increased defense spending by roughly 10 and 9 percent, respectively. These allocation bumps also paralleled increased tensions between Russia and NATO.

Despite some upticks in defense allocations in Central and Eastern Europe, overall the environment for European defense remains much the same as it has been since the double-dip Eurozone recession of 2012, with flat or falling nominal budgets.

The combined defense expenditures of the European-NATO nations in 2015 amounted to roughly $209 billion, a 4.5 percent nominal decline from one year earlier and an 11 percent slide from 2011. Forecast International expects the combined defense spending of these countries to nudge upward over the near term, adjusting at an annual 1-1.4 percent on a nominal basis through 2020 – a reversal, but hardly an extreme one, from the sharp military investment decline that followed the 2008 financial crisis.

Forecast International’s research also highlights the five-year drop in total military spending among the 28 members of the European Union (EU28) – both as a percentage of GDP and as a consolidated expenditure – between 2010 and 2014. In 2010, for instance, the combined military spending of all EU member states represented 1.43 percent of total GDP and 2.8 percent of all expenditures.

By 2014, these totals had dropped to 1.25 percent and 2.59 percent, respectively. Perhaps even more telling is that consolidated real-term defense spending by the European Union partners dropped by EUR13.53 billion – or 7.74 percent – between 2010 and 2014.

The decline in military investment parallels the rise in EU28 government debt, which has risen from 62.5 percent of GDP in 2008, when the global financial crisis erupted, to 93 percent by March 2016. This indicates that across much of the EU landscape, significantly higher military spending would place too great a burden on the financial well-being of states already facing sovereign debt worries. And in any case, higher spending is unlikely to be absorbed efficiently to net positive effect.

As for the defense budget spikes occurring in Central and Eastern Europe, these appear more significant on paper than in reality because they start from a very low base. It is one thing to show commitment toward one’s own defense, which is what is being displayed in the Baltics, but another thing altogether to derive much in terms of capability from budgets totaling less than $500 million.

For instance, the U.S. Department of Defense fiscal year 2017 funding request for the European Reassurance Initiative is $3.4 billion – almost three times the combined military investment by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania last year. Thus these nations will continue to seek assurances from Alliance partners that help underwrite their security.

Furthermore, while the upward budgetary trend in Central and Eastern Europe certainly demonstrates a re-prioritization of defense within government spending plans, the question moving forward is whether it represents a brief fillip or a real, long-term commitment toward bolstering overall military capability. Should tensions between Russia and NATO nations subside, where will be the political willpower to follow through on the pledges made at the September 2014 NATO summit in Wales?

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Military experts said that America's new-type stealth bomber is "tailored" for the Asia Pacific battlefield. As the first steal bomber developed by the U.S. in the 21st century, what are B-21's technical characteristics and is it capable of air defense penetration against major military powers around the world?

Targeting Asia Pacific and dealing with challenges from great powers

Three types of strategic bombers are currently serving in the U.S. military, named the B-52H, the B-1B and the B-2A.

In face of enemy's advanced air defense system, the B-52H and the B-1B are very weak in air defense penetration because they have no or limited stealth capability, while only 20 B-2A stealth bombers have been commissioned so far because of the high R&D cost and difficulties in maintenance, so they mainly play a deterrent role.

Besides, B-2 is a product that was commissioned in the 1990s. Many of its technologies cannot form absolute advantage over major military powers, and it is unable to effectively penetrate the enemy's intensive air defense system.

As of the 2015 fiscal year, the "three chariots" in the U.S. Air Force were 39 years old on average and their fuselage was very old, which was why the U.S. Air Force proposed the Next Generation Long Range Strike System (NGLRS) and LRS-B projects in 2010.

In the National Defense Strategic Guideline published by the U.S. Department of Defense in 2012, new-type long-range bomber was the only equipment that was mentioned for development. The "Asia Pacific rebalancing strategy" put forth by the U.S. also pointed out that the U.S. military should shift its focus from anti-terror operations to dealing with challenges from major military powers.

According to the U.S. standard for "potential rivals", they should be countries with a large territorial size and depth and strong air-defense and anti-ship capability. That's why the U.S. should have "stronger long-range strike capability" to meet the combat requirements in "anti-access/area denial" environment, which is also the requirement of the LRS-B project.

Ashton B. Carter, U.S. Secretary of Defense, and leaders of the U.S. Air Force announced in October 2015 that Northrop Grumman beat Boeing and Lockheed Martin and won the LRS-B contract that is worth US$55 billion, which was called by Carter the U.S. military's "strategic investment for the next 50 years". U.S. Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James also noted that the bomber will enable the Air Force to deal with "high-level threats in the future".

Small aircraft with higher technological level

The U.S. Air Force has kept quiet about the specific performance indicators of B-21, and we could only make a primary conjecture based on information released by various parties. On appearance, B-21 is like a mini B-2A with smaller size and payload than the latter, but its technological level and the number of equipment is considerably superior to the latter.

On one hand, B-21 and B-2A have similar "standard configurations" for high-altitude stealth aircraft, such as flying wing tailless configuration, S-shaped inlet, embedded weapon cabin, integrated nozzle and fuselage, and pointed wing leading edge.

On the other hand, the aircraft uses advanced multi-function stealth materials that are capable of stealth performance against radar/infrared/visible light. It may also overcome electromagnetic interference from the enemy and its better infrared stealth performance can largely reduce the infrared radiation of B-21, thus improving the air defense penetration capability.

Considering America's technical accumulation for stealth fighter jets, it is sure to arm the B-21 with intelligent tactical stealth capability. Relevant data show that B-21 will be equipped with cutting-edge task sensors so that aircraft, either independently or in cooperation with other aircraft, can perceive and judge the battlefield threat more comprehensively and make tactical plans in a real-time way to enhance the strike capability.

Moreover, the U.S. military will make B-21 stronger in capability expansion. The general embedded weapon cabin can hold multiple types of regular guided missile bombs, cruise missiles, earth penetrators and next-generation air-launched cruise missiles that can carry nuclear warheads. It is said that this aircraft will have two types, manned and unmanned, the latter able to carry out operations in the more dangerous and sensitive hinterland of the enemy.

The U.S. Air Force believed that B-21 will ensure effective deterrence against the "strongest potential rival" at least before 2040.

Worrisome air defense penetration capability in face of military powers

At present, B-21 is in the engineering and manufacturing stage. The U.S. military plans to purchase more than 100 of it, but some of its officials are discussing the possibility of increasing the purchase to 200 given the need for "warfare in the Asia Pacific".

Some experts said that if the U.S. military deploys B-21 in the Asia Pacific, it will exert major impacts on the regional security and even trigger a new round of arms race.

But does B-21 have overwhelming advantage over major military powers around the world? The answer is negative.

It is learnt that when B-21 was in the demonstration stage, the U.S. military, based on intelligence about and its judgment of "potential rivals", believed the aircraft was able to penetrate the enemy's future air defense system, launch precision strike on it and maintain standby coverage for more than an hour, but that sounds a little "self-bragging".

On one hand, both stealth and anti-stealth technologies are in the period of high-speed development, and new and better concepts and technologies keep showing up. B-21 cannot be commissioned on a large scale until after 2030, and its stealth capability is to be tested in face of the multi-layer 3D air defense systems, especially the multiple new detection equipment such as anti-stealth radar, adopted by major military powers.

On the other hand, B-21, like other strategic bombers, needs well developed supportive functions and a fixed airport, but fixed facilities are the top targets in the enemy's first round of attack, so B-21's airport will be more "fragile" than B-21 itself when faced with powerful winged missiles and strategic ballistic missiles. As a result, B-21 may find it difficult to assure durable combat capability.

Although the B-21 bomber is not a revolutionary aircraft with absolute deterrent force like B-2A, it will still display asymmetrical advantages in most cases when the enemy's long/medium/short-range detection system and interception system has one or more weak links.

In sum, stealth capability remains the focus of weapons and equipment research in the new age. B-21 that stresses the adoption of relatively mature technology and reduction of development and manufacturing cycle also needs to have state-of-the-art omni-directional broadband stealth capability. Therefore, the game between stealth and anti-stealth performance remains one of the themes of future warfare.

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