Several members of the Islamic State Khorasan Provinces’ “central council” as well as other senior and mid-level leaders based in the eastern Afghan province of Nangarhar have broken their oath to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi and have rejoined the Taliban. The defections are the latest in a series of moves by the Afghan Taliban to close its ranks after the death of its founder and first emir was announced last summer.

The defection of two central council members, a member of the judicial council, the leader of prisoners council, four “group leaders,” several other sub-group commanders and other officials, and “all their fighters” was announced on the Taliban’s official website, Voice of Jihad.

The defectors explained they originally left the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan,” the official name of the Afghan Taliban, due to “some issues and challenges obstructing consolidation of unity, establishment and development of the Islamic Emirate as well as misunderstanding, mistrust and distance with the brothers.”

The Islamic State deserters issued a common complaint that has been leveled against the group – that its ideological rigidity and ultra-violent actions are alienating even radicals such as the Taliban:

But due to the ambiguous blind policies of Daesh, their wanton killing, beating, persecution, looting, burning, and usurping land and property of the oppressed Afghans, their displacement, treachery with their elders, depriving them of schools, clinics, public welfare projects and development, heedless towards general Muslim interests, adoption of extremism over leniency, prohibiting vice in fashion which produces corruption, Takfiri (excommunication) views of most members, improper establishment of religion, and having no reasonable, legal and regular way of fixing these problems; in short not having a remedy for the wounds of the Afghans.

The defectors returned to the Taliban fold “due to the efforts of some sincere brothers from the Islamic Emirate as well as positive, fruitful interaction and understanding nature and agreement with the Islamic Emirate.”

The former Islamic State leaders then broke their pledge to Baghdadi, and swore allegiance to Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, who was named to replace Mullah Omar in July 2015.

“Therefore in the radiant light of Muhammadi Shariah we – as the representatives of all of our Mujahideen – break our oath with the leader of Daesh or Islamic State and for the continuation of sacred duty of jihad in our motherland and for the establishment of a true Islamic government, we whole heartedly pledge our allegiance to the new Amir of Islamic Emirate, the esteemed Amir ul Mumineen Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansoor (may Allah safeguard him) and promise our comprehensive cooperation, untiring efforts and respects to him,” the statement concluded.

The deserters, who are named at the end of the statement, did not leave the Islamic State lightly. The breaking of an oath to an emir is considered to be a serious religious infraction in Islam. And since the commanders have been named, the Islamic State, which has dealt with those who disagree with it ruthlessly in the past, may be targeted for reprisal.

The defections spell problems for the Islamic State, which has struggled to gain a foothold in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Taliban has defeated Islamic State-aligned groups in Zabul, Helmand, and other areas of the country. Nangarhar is considered to be the main stronghold for the Islamic State, and its ranks have been depleted with the loss of key leaders and their followers.

For the Taliban, the reunion with old members in Nangarhar is a further strengthening of the group, which suffered losses after rifts within the movement arose in the wake of the announcement of Mullah Omar’s death and the appointment of Mullah Mansour as his successor. Mullah Zakir, who remained a member of the Taliban’s Quetta Shura, or executive council, finally swore allegiance to Mansour at the end of March. Mullahs Manan and Yacoub, Omar’s brother and eldest son, initials opposed Mansour, but swore allegiance to him and were given key leadership positions in the Taliban hierarchy.

Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of The Long War Journal.

Tags: Afghanistan, Islamic State, Khorasan province, Pakistan, Taliban

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The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the official name of the Taliban, issued a statement denying that senior leader and former Guantanamo Bay detainee Mullah Adbul Qayoum Zakir has called for negotiations with the Afghan government and the West. The Taliban has been consistent in stating publicly that it would not negotiate with the West or the Afghan government, and has insisted that only the return of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the imposition of its harsh brand of sharia, or Islamic law, and the withdrawal of all Western forces is acceptable.

The statement, which cannot be independently verified by The Long War Journal, was released on the Taliban’s official website, Voice of Jihad, on April 10.

“Some media outlets claimed that member of the Leadership Council of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the respected Hafiz Mullah Abdul Qayyum Zakir has proposed holding negotiations with America and the Kabul administration,” the statement began. “Today respected Zakir Sahib while talking to Al Emarah website [an official Taliban media outlet] rejected these reports.”

Voice of Jihad then directly quoted Zakir.

“I have never proposed holding negotiations and neither do I believe in these deceiving negotiation processes,” Zakir purportedly said. “We are all struggling for the establishment of a pure Islamic government.”

The Taliban was responding to reports in several media outlets, including Al Jazeera, that claimed that Zakir issued a “12-point proposal” which “includes negotiating with the Kabul administration and foreign governments on the implementation of Islamic law, and improving military strategy and coordination within the group.”

The Taliban have sought to rebut reports of dissension within the highest ranks of the organization since it announced the death of Mullah Mohammed Omar, the groups founder and first emir, in July 2015, and publicly named Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour as his replacement. The Taliban hid Omar’s death for more than two years, which led to disputes over the appointment of the new emir.

Mullah Abdul Manan Akhund, a brother of Mullah Omar and Omar’s eldest son, initially disputed Mansour’s legitimacy, but swore allegiance to him in September 2015. Last month, the two were rewarded with senior positions within the group. Manan was named the leader of the Preaching and Guidance Commission, which is responsible for spreading the Taliban’s message. Mullah Mohammad Yaqoub, Omar’s son, was given a seat on the executive council, which is better known as the Quetta Shura, “as well as the military chief of 15 provinces” within the structure of the Taliban’s Military Commission.

Zakir is also rumored to have been at the center of the leadership dispute, but the Taliban have insisted that he remained in the fold.

Zakir is a former detainee at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility who was transferred by the US in December 2007 to Afghan custody. He was released shortly thereafter by the Afghan government and quickly rejoined the Taliban.

The Taliban immediately welcomed Zakir back into its ranks, and he was appointed the leader of the Gerdi Jangal Regional Military Shura, a regional military command that oversees operations in Helmand and Nimroz provinces.

The Taliban designated Zakir as their “surge commander” in 2010. In this role, he was assigned the task of countering the Coalition and Afghan surge of forces and the change of strategy to deny the Taliban safe haven in the southern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar. Zakir is considered to be one of the Afghan Taliban’s fiercest and most committed commanders. He is also one of several senior Taliban leaders who are closely linked to al Qaeda. [See LWJ reports, The Taliban’s surge commander was Gitmo detainee and Former Gitmo detainee leads top Taliban council, for more information on Zakir.]

Zakir resigned as the head of the Taliban’s military commission in April 2014 “due to his prolonged battle with ill health,” the Taliban claimed. But it was rumored at the time that Zakir and Mansour were at odds over Taliban strategy and negotiations with the Afghan government. Although Zakir resigned as the Taliban’s military commander, he is still “a member of the Leadership Council of Islamic Emirate and is busy working in other important Jihadi works which are comparatively easier,” the Taliban said. [See LWJ report, Head of Taliban’s military commission resigns due to ‘ill health’.]

After Mansour was named as Omar’s successor, the Taliban immediate issued a statement claiming that Zakir remained a member of the Quetta Shura and did not oppose the new emir, as was rumored in the press.

Zakir formally swore allegiance to Mansour late last month. On March 31, the Taliban issued a letter on Voice of Jihad in Arabic from Mansour where he pledged to the Taliban’s new emir.

Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of The Long War Journal.

Tags: Afghanistan, Al Qaeda, Taliban

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The US military said it killed two Swedish nationals who were part of the Islamic State’s “cadre of foreign fighters” in separate airstrikes. One of the two Swedes killed in the strikes served as the deputy emir of the Islamic State’s “Anwar Awlaki brigade.” Swedish jihadists have played key roles in al Qaeda in the past.

The deaths of Swedish nationals Khalid Ostman Timayare and Harris Cary Saneen was announced yesterday during a briefing by Colonel Steve Warren, the spokesman for Operation Inherent Resolve, the US led military Coalition that operates in Iraq and Syria. The exact date of the airstrikes was not disclosed. Warren said the two Swedish Islamic State fighters were killed “recently.”

Timayare, who was killed in an airstrike near Ar Ragnina, served as “ISIL’s [Islamic State] deputy emir of the Anwar Awlaki brigade,” according to Warren. The Anwar Awlaki brigade is composed of English-speaking Islamic State fighters and operates throughout Iraq and Syria.

Timayare had “many links to Western fighters,” Warren claimed, and “was also a known associate of Omar al Shishani,” a top Islamic State military commander who the US said it killed in an airstrike on March 4. Shishani, an ethnic Chechen from Georgia, led an elite team of foreign and local fighters who have spearheaded Islamic State assaults in Iraq and Syria.

Saneen, who is also known as Abu Zubari al Basni (the Bosnian, as he is an ethnic Bosnian), was killed in an airstrike near Bajar. He was “a trusted member of the cadre of foreign fighters,” Warren stated.

“Both of these strikes deprive ISIL of motivated foreign fighters who have displayed leadership aptitude,” Warren stated.

The Islamic State has no shortage of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria. More than 27,000 foreign fighters are estimated to have entered Iraq and Syria since Syria’s civil war began in 2011, according to The Telegraph. Of those, more than 6,000 are believed to have come from Europe. While all of these foreign fighters haven’t joined the Islamic State, some join other radical Islamist groups such as the Al Nusrah Front, al Qaeda’s official branch in Syria, or Ahrar al Sham, its ally.

The threat of foreign jihadists returning to their home countries and conducting terror attacks is significant, especially in Europe. Over the past six months, Islamic State fighters launched two major attacks, one in Paris, France, and another in Brussels, Belgium. More than 160 people were killed as Islamic State fighters used suicide bombers and assault teams to target civilians public places.

Sweden, like all European countries, has grappled with a jihadist problem. In 2010, before the beginning of Syrian civil war and the rise of the Islamic State, Taimour Abdulwahab, an Iraqi-born Swedish citizen, detonated a car bomb and then a suicide bomb in Stockholm. Two people were wounded in the attack. In an email sent to Swedish authorities just minutes before the failed attack, Abdulwahab admitted to traveling to the Middle East to train “for Jihad.” An Iraqi counterterrorism official said that Abdulwahab trained in Mosul. [See LWJ report, Swedish suicide bomber trained in Mosul: Iraqi official.]

Swedish jihadists are known to have played key roles within al Qaeda’s organization. In 2008, the US military killed Abu Qaswarah al Skani (the Swede), a naturalized Swedish citizen who was wanted by United States and whose real name is Mohamed Moumou, during a raid on an al Qaeda command center in Mosul. He trained in the al Qaeda-run Khalden terrorist training camp in Afghanistan and was designated as a terrorist by the US. He was closely connected to Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the slain leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, and commanded al Qaeda forces in northern Iraq before being appointed second in command. [See LWJ report, Al Qaeda in Iraq’s second in command was a Swedish citizen.]

Yasin Ali Baynah, a dual Somali and Swedish citizen, served as a senior leader in Hizbul Islam, a jihadist alliance which was formed in Somalia in 2008. The United Nations, which listed Baynah as a threat to Somalia in 2010 along with Shabaab and other terrorist groups, said he “incited attacks” against the government and “mobilized support and raised funds” for Hizbul Islam.

Since the beginning of Syria’s civil war, more than 300 Swedish Muslims are thought to have traveled to Iraq and Syria to fight. An estimated 120 of these jihadists are said to have originated from the city of Gothenburg, according to The Local.

Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of The Long War Journal.

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The short bearded man standing in the middle is Rifai Ahmed Taha Musa, who was killed in an airstrike this week. The second man to his left (the reader’s right) is Mohammed Islambouli.

The US struck senior al Qaeda leaders in Syria twice this week. “These airstrikes were focused on targeting key Al Qaeda leaders who pose a threat to the US, our allies and our national security interests,” CENTCOM announced today. CENTCOM added that the slain jihadists were “core” al Qaeda members.

The first airstrike killed Abu Firas al Suri, a longtime al Qaeda veteran who served on Al Nusrah Front’s shura (advisory) council and was also the group’s spokesman for a time.

Jihadists on social media identified one of those killed in the second bombing as Rifai Ahmed Taha Musa, a veteran Egyptian jihadist who first worked with Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri in the 1980s and 1990s. Musa was released in the wake of the Egyptian uprising that overthrew President Hosni Mubarak. He eventually fled Egypt, making his way to Turkey and Syria.

The photo seen above was posted on social media by a supporter who mourned Musa’s loss. Another jihadist seen in the image, which was first tweeted in July 2015, is Mohammed Islambouli.

US intelligence officials have identified both Musa and Islambouli as leaders in al Qaeda’s so-called “Khorasan Group.”

Mohammed Islambouli is the brother of Anwar Sadat’s assassin, Khalid Islamobuli. He is the equivalent of royalty within al Qaeda because of his jihadist pedigree and longtime commitment to jihad. The UN mysteriously removed Islambouli from its al Qaeda sanctions list in October 2015, but he is still one of the US government’s designated terrorists.

Islambouli’s role in al Qaeda’s so-called “Khorasan Group” was reported by NPR in October 2014. NPR said that US officials were “concerned” he “might be directing the” Khorasan Group. NPR also explained that Islambouli “is very close to” al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri.

Several US intelligence officials contacted by The Long War Journal subsequently confirmed Islambouli’s leadership role in what al Qaeda calls the “Khorasan Shura.” (This is the same body that is commonly referred to as the “Khorasan Group” in the press.)

The Khorasan Shura is an elite body within al Qaeda that is charged with overseeing multiple aspects of the jihadist group’s global operations. Plotting against the West is just one part of the Khorasan Shura’s mission. In al Qaeda’s hierarchy, the Khorasan Shura sits above al Qaeda’s regional branches and is responsible for overseeing various aspects of the jihadists’ paramilitary operations, especially in Syria.

Islambouli lived in Iran for years after the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. While living in Iran, he led a contingent of jihadists in Gamaa Islamiya (IG) who formally merged with al Qaeda. Musa was once one of the IG’s most senior officials as well.

Declassified files recovered in Osama bin Laden’s Abbottabad, Pakistan compound demonstrate Islambouli’s importance within al Qaeda. In one document, dated Oct. 20, 2010, bin Laden stressed the importance of protecting Islambouli, who had apparently evacuated northern Pakistan, after leaving Iran, for Kunar, Afghanistan. Bin Laden wanted to make sure that Islambouli was not killed in the American drone campaign.

“He [Islambouli] should be informed of the nature of work and he should be consulted on things that are being discussed,” bin Laden wrote, in reference to some ongoing projects.

Following the uprising that dethroned Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, Islambouli relocated to Egypt, where the longstanding terror-related charges against him were dropped. Once back in his native Egypt, Islambouli joined other jihadist figures in proselytizing for their cause. One of his companions was an old ally: Musa, who had been freed from an Egyptian prison.

Islambouli and Musa left Egypt shortly after Mohamed Morsi’s Islamist regime was deposed from power. They enjoyed a hospitable environment in Morsi’s Egypt, but under President Abdel Fattah el Sisi’s rule they would have risked becoming wanted men once again. Press reports place the pair in several countries after their departure from Egypt in 2013, but they reportedly landed in Turkey.

Indeed, some of the Khorasan Shura’s most important leaders, including Musa and Islambouli, have been based in Turkey. They are also known to travel into Syria, where Musa was killed.

Foreign Policy first reported that the US targeted the Khorasan Group (or Shura) in Idlib, Syria this week. In its account, Foreign Policy also linked to a video produced by the pro-jihadist On the Ground News showing the wreckage of a vehicle that was blown to pieces while carrying several al Qaeda members.

Social media accounts that track the jihadists’ in Syria have identified another one of the casualties as a Belgian fighter known as Abu Sulayman al Belgiki.

Attempt to “unify the ranks”

On his Facebook page, Gamaa Islamiya (Islamic Group, or IG) leader Assem Abdel Maged wrote that Musa was in Syria as part of “a mission to unify the ranks of Al Nusrah Front and Ahrar al Sham.”

Al Nusrah is al Qaeda’s official branch in Syria, whereas Ahrar is a jihadist group that has been seeded with al Qaeda veterans. Some of al Qaeda’s veteran operatives in Syria have tried to hide their presence in Ahrar al Sham’s senior leadership.

While still being close jihadist allies, Al Nusrah and Ahrar have differed on some tactical questions. They have also bickered in recent weeks.

In January, Al Nusrah and Ahrar discussed a potential merger. Abu Muhammad al Julani, Al Nusrah’s emir, reportedly proposed a unity plan. But some Ahrar figures decided to reject it, arguing that it wouldn’t work unless the combined entity could publicly distance itself from al Qaeda. [See LWJ report, Al Nusrah Front chief proposed rebel unity plan.]

This does not mean that Ahrar al Sham is opposed to al Qaeda or anything of the sort. The jihadists seek to maximize the support they receive from throughout the Middle East and elsewhere in order to better coordinate the insurgency against Bashar al Assad and his allies. The jihadists long ago realized that the al Qaeda brand name can act as a hindrance when trying to achieve their objectives.

For example, bin Laden’s letters reveal that he told Shabaab, which became a formal branch of al Qaeda in 2012, to keep its al Qaeda ties secret. Bin Laden calculated that Shabaab would be more successful in acquiring external support from throughout the Gulf if people and governments didn’t recognize it as part of al Qaeda’s global network. Ayman al Zawahiri instructed Al Nusrah Front, which initially was not branded as an al Qaeda group, to keep quiet on its al Qaeda status as well. Zawahiri’s reasoning was the same as bin Laden’s: Al Nusrah’s prospects for success in Syria were better if it avoided the international scrutiny that comes with the al Qaeda brand name. Al Qaeda also embedded veterans in other jihadist organizations, such as Ahrar al Sham, as part of its effort to hide its influence in the insurgency.

Musa may have been involved in arbitrating recent disputes between Ahrar and Al Nusrah. But he was also likely involved in the unification discussions. One proposal would have required the jihadists to announce that they are not tied to any external actors. This would allow the jihadists to portray their cause as a purely Syrian endeavor and avoid the same issues that bin Laden and Zawahiri sought to avoid. Musa may have even been in favor of this proposal.

Long hunted by American authorities

Musa was first hunted by American authorities in the 1990s.

Musa’s al Qaeda ties were publicly recognized by the US government as early as 1998. In February of that year, he was included as a signatory on al Qaeda’s infamous fatwa justifying terrorist attacks against American civilians. Some sources would later claim that Musa didn’t really sign the fatwa, but his relationship with al Qaeda was well-established.

The Clinton administration’s November 1998 indictment of Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda members responsible for the Aug. 7, 1998 embassy bombings noted that al Qaeda has “functioned both on its own and through some of the terrorist organizations that operated under its umbrella.” The indictment then named the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), headed by Ayman al Zawahiri, and the IG, which was headed by Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman and Musa, as two groups that fall under al Qaeda’s “umbrella.” Rahman, the IG’s longtime spiritual leader, was already imprisoned in the US at the time for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and follow-on plots against New York City landmarks.

Musa was specifically named by Clinton-era federal prosecutors as an unindicted co-conspirator in al Qaeda’s terror.

In the months that followed the US government’s indictment, the CIA gathered intelligence suggesting that Musa was directly involved in anti-American terrorist plots.

On Sept. 13, 2000, the FBI recorded a conversation between Musa and an IG member residing in the US named Ahmed Sattar. An American court would later convict Sattar of passing messages from Sheikh Rahman to his followers.

Citing a senior US attorney, the New York Daily News described the conversation between Musa and Sattar in an article published in April 2002. The pair “discussed planned terrorist attacks similar to Luxor” and Musa mentioned “a second Luxor.” (The IG massacred dozens of tourists at an archaeological site near Luxor, Egypt in 1997.) They used the code word “weddings” to describe future operations. Additional conversations between Musa and Sattar were also documented in the US government’s federal indictment of Sattar.

On Sept. 21, 2000, just over one week after the FBI recorded the conversation between Musa and Sattar, Al Jazeera aired a video showing bin Laden and Zawahiri demanding the release of Sheikh Rahman. Sitting between the two al Qaeda masters was Musa. “By God, we all have a duty toward” Rahman “to free him,” Musa said. Al Qaeda’s dynamic duo agreed.

Less than one month later, on Oct. 10, 2000, al Qaeda bombed the USS Cole. Musa released a statement praising the attack.

“Our officers and soldiers, and the sons of our people in Egypt, should learn the lesson of the US destroyer in Aden,” Musa said, “they have the Suez Canal through which dozens of US and Jewish ships pass.”

Musa continued to advocate for terrorism in the months that followed.

“In early 2001,” the State Department reported in its Patterns of Global Terrorism for 2001, “IG leader Rifa’i Ahmad Taha Musa published a book in which he attempted to justify terrorist attacks that result in mass civilian casualties.” Foggy Bottom warned that while some IG members had renounced violence, Musa led a “faction” of the IG that remained committed to terrorism. While the group’s “[p]rimary goal is to overthrow the Egyptian Government and replace it with an Islamic state,” Foggy Bottom reported, “disaffected IG members, such as those potentially inspired by Taha Musa or [Sheikh Rahman], may be interested in carrying out attacks against US and Israeli interests.”

Musa disappeared after authoring the book, but the CIA was on his trail.

In his autobiography, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA, former Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet explains that Musa was tied to pre-9/11 terrorist plots against Americans.

Tenet wrote that “intelligence assessments painted a picture of a plot to kidnap Americans in India, Turkey, and Indonesia.” The plot “was said to be the work of” Musa, who was “then living in Damascus.” Musa ended up in Syria after reportedly being “expelled from Iran,” but the Syrians arrested him after the US provided a “tip” concerning his whereabouts in late 2001. Other reports confirm that Musa was deported from Syria to Egypt.

Musa “had put out numerous fatwas against the United States in the several months prior to his arrest,” Tenet wrote. The former CIA head explained that the CIA kept “a photograph of [Musa] seated right between the two of them,” referring to the appearance by bin Laden, Zawahiri, and Musa on Al Jazeera in September 2000.

“Talk about Toxic Trio,” Tenet wrote.

Anti-American, pro-al Qaeda protest in Cairo on Sept. 11, 2012

Musa publicly reappeared during the Sept. 11, 2012 protest in front of the US Embassy in Cairo. In a video produced by a jihadist media group known as Al Farouq, Musa called on followers to rise up in protest against the trailer for a previously obscure anti-Islam film, Innocence of Muslims. A screen shot of Musa at the protest can be seen on the right.

“We call on Muslim youth in the world to respond in a practical way,” Musa said during the protest at the US Embassy in Cairo, according to a translation of the video by SITE Intelligence Group. “There are a billion Muslims worldwide, and if they were strong and honorable we would have defended the honor of the Prophet, Allah’s peace and prayer be upon him, and America wouldn’t have gotten to this way.”

Musa was not the only al Qaeda-linked jihadist to attend the US embassy protest in Cairo. [See LWJ report, Al Qaeda-linked jihadists helped incite 9/11 Cairo protest.]

Mohammed al Zawahiri, the brother of al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri, admittedly helped stage the protest. He said that he called upon members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), a designated terrorist organization that merged with al Qaeda, to attend. The younger Zawahiri has been imprisoned in Egypt multiple times, but was recently released once again.

Less than two weeks after the embassy protest in Cairo, Musa was interviewed by Asharq Al-Awsat. He was asked about the “the Anti-Islam film which insults the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, and the subsequent attack on the American embassy in Cairo.” Musa did not comment on the embassy assault, but branded the film “a criminal act” and called on the Egyptian government to “sever diplomatic ties with the United States and expel the US ambassador, if only for a short period of time.”

Musa added: “As for the United States, we treat it as an enemy, and we do not consider it a friend of the Arabs and Muslims.”

As for al Qaeda, Musa admitted his organization has had a relationship with the group. “Yes, there was a relationship between al Qaeda and the Islamic Group, but it was not in the form of a common organizational framework,” Musa claimed. “It was similar to a relationship between any two political parties. There were exchanged benefits.”

Those benefits include collusion on terrorist plots. Asharq Al-Awsat asked Musa about his role in the 1995 assassination attempt against Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Ethiopia. Musa did not deny having a role in the plot, saying only that the “Islamic Group attempted to assassinate Mubarak in many locations, including Addis Ababa” and the “arrangements for this operation were made (by Islamist leaders) abroad.”

Osama bin Laden himself had a hand in the IG’s 1995 assassination plot against Mubarak. The 9/11 Commission found that Mubarak’s “would-be killers, who came from the Egyptian Islamic Group, had been sheltered in Sudan and helped by Bin Laden.”

Top jihadists are often coy about their real role in al Qaeda’s operations. Given Musa’s reported meetings with Ahrar al Sham, which has spread disinformation about its al Qaeda ties, it is likely that some will try to distance Musa from al Qaeda.

However, the US has strict rules of engagement concerning which parts of al Qaeda can be targeted in Syria. For instance, the US military often draw a misleading line between al Qaeda’s Khorasan Group and Al Nusrah Front. In general, only those al Qaeda terrorists known to pose a threat to the West are targeted. And America’s target list this week included Musa.

Thomas Joscelyn is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Senior Editor for The Long War Journal.

Tags: Ahrar al Sham, Al Nusrah Front, Al Qaeda, Khorasan Group, Mohammed Islambouli, Rifai Ahmed Taha Musa, Syria, Turkey

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Al Nusrah Front confirmed today that Abu Firas al Suri, a veteran jihadist who served al Qaeda since the 1980s, was killed in an American airstrike on Apr. 3. The group eulogized Abu Firas in a statement released online that was translated by the SITE Intelligence Group.

The al Qaeda arm says that Abu Firas was killed along with a “group from the best of our brothers” in a “Crusader airstrike carried out by the Crusader-Arab coalition led by America.”

The jihadists portray the airstrike as a service to Bashar al Assad’s regime.

“America has blatantly helped the Nusayri [a pejorative used to describe Alawites and Bashar al Assad’s government] regime, where it bombed a camp that was preparing to graduate a class of mujahideen to fill their role in defending their religion and people, the people of al Sham [Syria], against the hordes of the enemy that gathered against them, including the Nusayris, Rafidha [Shiites], and Crusaders,” the statement reads, according to SITE’s translation.

The camp’s “class of heroes” was from the same “group” of jihadists that overran the village of Talat al-‘Iss two days earlier, according to Al Nusrah. In other words, the al Qaeda group claims that those killed in the airstrike are the same as those jihadists fighting Assad and his allies.

Al Nusrah is a regional branch of al Qaeda’s global organization

The Department of Defense confirmed on Apr. 4 that Abu Firas was targeted in a US airstrike. Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook said that “al Qaida members meeting in northwestern Syria” were the target, but he did not say anything about the training camp Al Nusrah claims was hit.

Cook acknowledged Abu Firas’ longstanding membership in al Qaeda, noting that he began working for Osama bin Laden in the 1980s. But Cook’s description of Al Nusrah made its al Qaeda affiliation sound weaker than it really is.

In light of the fact that an American airstrike targeted Abu Firas, a reporter asked Cook if Al Nusrah’s leaders are a “legitimate target.” The Pentagon Press Secretary replied: “We have always considered al Qaeda leaders to be legitimate targets. Of course, Al Nusrah has its ties to al Qaeda. And that is something that we’ve been very upfront about for years. And [this] continues to be an ongoing, active part of our efforts, will be to target al Qaeda leadership.”

However, Al Nusrah doesn’t just have “ties” to al Qaeda. Al Nusrah is one of al Qaeda’s several regional branches. The others are: Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), Al Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM), and Shabaab. Still other organizations are also part of al Qaeda’s network. [For more on al Qaeda’s regional branches, see LWJ report, Analysis: Al Nusrah Front ‘committed’ to Ayman al Zawahiri’s ‘orders’.]

As a regional branch of al Qaeda, Al Nusrah is responsible for waging jihad in its designated geographical area, the Levant. Like other regional heads of al Qaeda’s global organization, Al Nusrah emir Abu Muhammad al Julani has sworn an oath of allegiance (bayat) to al Qaeda chieftain Ayman al Zawahiri. And Julani is openly loyal to Zawahiri to this day.

During a two-part interview that aired on Al Jazeera in late May and early June 2015, Julani explained the he is “committed to the orders of Dr. Ayman [al Zawahiri]” and follows the “directives that come to us from” the al Qaeda master.

“By the grace of Allah,” Julani said, “we have inherited this banner and this jihad.” The “al Qaeda organization or the Afghan jihad renewed the jihad,” leading it to be “extended to Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, Mali, Algeria, and…the Levant.” With the exception of Iraq, al Qaeda’s official branches openly operate in all of the areas mentioned by Julani. (It is possible that al Qaeda is clandestinely working inside Iraq as well.)

In another interview, aired on Orient TV in December of last year, Julani refused to break from Zawahiri. He also explained how al Qaeda works. Nusrah “at this stage is only interested in fighting Bashar al Assad and Hezbollah,” he said. Julani elaborated by explaining that the al Qaeda organization “has various roles divided among various parties” and “not everyone has the same role.” Al Qaeda may have “people who are fighting the United States and operating in Europe,” but that is not Al Nusrah’s task.

“We have people whose hair had gone gray in the mountains of Afghanistan and elsewhere,” Julani continued. “They had been involved in war against the [Assad] regime in the Levant the 1980s” and went on “to Afghanistan and were involved in the war against the Russians, then the war between the factions there and the Taliban government, and then the American war, before returning to the Levant to fight the [Assad] regime.”

Although Julani did not name any of these jihadist veterans, he clearly had men such as Abu Firas al Suri in mind. Abu Firas’ life followed almost precisely the same path outlined by Julani.

Abu Firas first waged jihad against the Assad regime in the 1970s and 1980s and then against the Russians in Afghanistan. He fought on the side of the Taliban government in the 1990s, before relocating to Yemen in the early 2000s. He returned to Syria in late 2012 or early 2013 to fight the Assad regime once again. Abu Firas was part of a cadre of al Qaeda veterans who were sent to Syria to help lead Al Nusrah.

An American airstrike finally ended Abu Firas’ decades-lone career.

For more on Abu Firas al Suri, see LWJ reports:

Al Qaeda veteran appears in Al Nusrah Front video, criticizes rival (Mar. 20, 2014)

Al Nusrah Front spokesman explains differences with Islamic State in video appearance (Aug. 13, 2014)

Al Qaeda veteran takes on a more prominent role as spokesman in Syria (Sept. 6, 2014)

New Al Nusrah Front video features interview with leader, military gains in Syria (Feb. 13, 2015)

Al Nusrah Front celebrates 9/11 attacks in new video (June 29, 2015)

Jihadists say airstrike killed veteran al Qaeda leader in Syria (Apr. 3, 2016)

Pentagon confirms US targeted veteran al Qaeda leader in Syria (Apr. 4, 2016)

Note: The spellings of Al Nusrah and al Qaeda have been standardized throughout this article, including in the quotes from Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook.

Thomas Joscelyn is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Senior Editor for The Long War Journal.

Tags: Abu Firas al Suri, Abu Muhammad al Julani, Al Nusrah Front, Al Qaeda, Ayman al Zawahiri, Syria

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The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the official name of the Taliban, appointed Mullah Omar’s brother and eldest son to key leadership positions in the jihadist group’s executive council. Mullah Omar’s kin had previously opposed the appointment of Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour as emir of the Taliban after Omar’s death was disclosed in the summer of 2015, but quickly changed their mind and swore allegiance to Mansour.

The Taliban announced yesterday that Mullah Abdul Manan Akhund, a brother of Mullah Omar, was named “the head of Dawat wal Irshad,” or the Preaching and Guidance Commission. Mullah Mohammad Yaqoub, Omar’s eldest son, was given a seat on the executive council, which is better known as the Quetta Shura, “as well as the military chief of 15 provinces” within the structure of the Taliban’s Military Commission.

The Taliban made the announcement in an English-language statement on Voice of Jihad, its official website.

“Both of the new officials of Islamic Emirate were given advise [sic] by the Amir ul Mumineen [the Commander of the Faithful, the title for Mullah Mansour] who later prayed to Allah Almighty for their success in their current duties,” the statement concluded.

According to the Taliban, Manan and Yacoub received their new positions at “a special meeting” that “was convened by the Islamic Emirate in which the leader, council members, high ranking officials and military heads participated.”

While the statement did not indicate where the meeting was held, it likely took place in Quetta, the Pakistani city where the Taliban’s top leaders are known to be based.

Both Manan and Yacoub accepted senior level positions within the Taliban. The Preaching and Guidance Commission is considered by the Taliban to be one of its most important committees, as it is tasked with spreading “the goals of Islamic Emirate and illegality and aims of the invaders and their stooges,” or the Afghan government. The Military Commission is the Taliban’s largest and most influential structure, and Yacoub now assumes control of military operations in 15 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces.

The appointment of Manan and Yacoub to high level positions within the Taliban’s leadership hierarchy may indicate that they are in line to succeed Mansour. However, they would face stiff competition from Sirajuddin Haqqani, one of Mansour’s two deputies. Siraj is the Taliban’s overall military commander and also leads the Haqqani Network, which is closely linked to al Qaeda and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate and military.

Manan and Yacoub initially opposed Mansour’s appointment as Amir ul Mumineen after Mullah Omar’s death was announced on July 31, 2015. Omar died at a hospital in Karachi in April 2013, and the Taliban and Omar’s family concealed his death as they feared it would cause divisions at a crucial time, when US forces began to withdraw from Afghanistan.

Reports from the region indicated that Manan and Yacoub initially did not approve of the way that Mansour was chosen to lead the Taliban. Yacoub is rumored to have sought to replace his father as the emir of the group.

But by mid-September 2015, Manan and Yacoub reconciled with Mansour and swore allegiance to him. This closed a major rift that existed within the Taliban’s ranks, but others still exist.

Mansour still faces a challenge from Mullah Rasul, who leads a breakaway Taliban faction. Clashes between supporters of the two groups break out occasionally, but there are some indications that the factions wish to reconcile. The Islamic State also has a small presence in Afghanistan, however it does not pose a direct threat to Mansour’s leadership.

Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of The Long War Journal.

Tags: Afghanistan, Al Qaeda, Taliban

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Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook confirmed today that the US targeted Abu Firas al Suri, a senior al Qaeda leader and member of Al Nusrah Front’s elite shura (advisory) council, in an airstrike in Syria.

“The US military conducted an airstrike on a senior al Qaeda operational meeting in northwest Syria on Sunday [Apr. 3], resulting in several enemy [sic] killed,” Cook told reporters during a briefing. “We assess that al Qaeda senior leader Abu Firas al Suri was in that meeting and we are working to confirm his death.”

Cook described al Suri as a “legacy al Qaeda member” who “fought in Afghanistan in the 80s and 90s and worked with Osama bin Laden and other founding al Qaeda members to train terrorists and conduct attacks globally.”

As The Long War Journal reported yesterday, well-connected jihadists on social media quickly claimed that Abu Firas had been killed. [See LWJ report: Jihadists say airstrike killed veteran al Qaeda leader in Syria.]

According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), Abu Firas’ son “and at least 20 members” of Jund al Aqsa (an al Qaeda front group), Al Nusrah Front (al Qaeda’s official branch in Syria) and “jihadists from other factions of Uzbek nationalities” were killed in the bombings. Uzbek jihadists have long fought alongside Al Nusrah and Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad (KTJ), a predominately Uzbek group, was subsumed by the al Qaeda arm last September.

SOHR’s account indicates that there were multiple airstrikes, with one targeting Jund al Aqsa’s headquarters near the village of Kafr Jalis and two others hitting points in the “northern countryside” of the Idlib province.

Separately, Cook confirmed that Hassan Ali Dhoore, a dual hatted al Qaeda and Shabaab leader, was killed in an airstrike in Somalia on Mar. 31. Cook said that Dhoore was “heavily involved” in Shabaab’s attack planning in Mogadishu and elsewhere. Shabaab is al Qaeda’s official branch in East Africa. [For more on Dhoore, see LWJ report: US airstrike targets senior leader of Shabaab’s security and intelligence service.]

Thomas Joscelyn is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Senior Editor for The Long War Journal.

Tags: Abu Firas al Suri, Al Nusrah Front, Al Qaeda, Hassan Ali Dhoore, Jund al Aqsa, Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad, Shabaab, Somalia, Syria, Uzbeks

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Jihadists on social media reported earlier today that Abu Firas al Suri, who served al Qaeda since the 1980s, was killed in an airstrike in Syria.

Abu Firas relocated from Yemen to Syria in late 2012 or early 2013 as part of al Qaeda’s attempt to smooth over the then simmering tensions between Al Nusrah Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS). The mediation efforts failed and ISIS grew into the Islamic State, becoming al Qaeda’s chief jihadist rival around the globe.

It is not clear which nation launched the airstrike that purportedly killed Abu Firas. His putative death has not been confirmed by any official sources. Several well-connected jihadists on Twitter announced his death, saying the US hunted him down in Kafr Jalis, which is in the northwestern province of Idlib. One of the tweets can be seen on the right.

Abu Firas made his first public appearance in March 2014, when he was featured in an Al Nusrah Front video. The al Qaeda leader testified against Abu Bakr al Baghdadi’s organization, blaming it for the jihadists’ infighting in Syria. Abu Firas also said he had warned another al Qaeda veteran, Abu Khalid al Suri, about ISIS’ intent to kill him. Abu Firas’ warning didn’t save Abu Khalid, as he was killed in a suicide attack the following day (Feb. 23, 2014).

[For an analysis of Abu Firas’ first appearance in March 2014, see LWJ report: Al Qaeda veteran appears in Al Nusrah Front video, criticizes rival.]

After the news broke of Abu Firas’ death, jihadists posted the picture on the right showing him sitting with Abu Khalid (far left) and Hassan Abboud (center). Abboud, the first emir of Ahrar al Sham, was killed in an explosion in September 2014. Abu Khalid acted as Abboud’s mentor and played a leading role in Ahrar al Sham.

The Long War Journal helped reveal Abu Khalid’s senior role in Ahrar al Sham in December 2013. Up until that time, his leadership position had not been formally acknowledged by Ahrar al Sham. Nor was it reported by Ahrar al Sham’s allies in the West.

If today’s report is in fact true, and Abu Firas perished in an airstrike, then all three of the men pictured above sitting together are now dead.

Abu Firas was a “core” al Qaeda member, under any reasonable definition of the term.

According to a biography provided by Al Nusrah, Abu Firas traveled in the early 1980s to Afghanistan, where he met with Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden. He trained both Afghans and Arabs, as well as jihadists from other countries around the world.

Abu Firas served as Osama bin Laden’s “envoy” for “mobilizing Pakistanis for jihad.” And the Pakistani jihadist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) was set up for this purpose, the Al Nusrah Front said. With Abu Firas acting as an intermediary, the LeT and another Pakistani group “were established, trained, and funded by Osama bin Laden.”

Further demonstrating Abu Firas’ seniority within al Qaeda, the Al Nusrah Front said that he worked with the group’s first two military commanders, Abu Ubaidah al Banshiri and Abu Hafs al Masri. Abu Firas also worked with Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the deceased commander of al Qaeda in Iraq.

After the 9/11 attacks, Abu Firas “secured the mujahideen families in Pakistan,” meaning that he helped al Qaeda families and others find safe haven in the country.

In 2003, he relocated to Yemen and stayed there until late 2012 or 2013, when the conflict between ISIS and Al Nusrah Front erupted. Al Qaeda’s senior leadership then dispatched Abu Firas to Syria in an attempt to help put an end to the dispute.

Al Risalah, a pro-al Qaeda and pro-Al Nusrah magazine, published an infographic with Abu Firas’ biography on it in October 2015. The biography emphasized his longstanding opposition to the Assad family, noting that he used the expertise he gained in the Syrian military to help the “Combatant Vanguard” (or “Fighting Vanguard”) fight the Syrian regime in 1976.

In more recent years, Abu Firas served as Al Nusrah’s spokesman and as a member of the al Qaeda branch’s elite Shura council. He was known to stir controversy. For example, in more recent months, he became a critique of Ahrar al Sham’s strategy for waging jihad.

Abu Firas was a proponent of the idea that some Muslim-majority countries should be turned into “erupting jihadi center[s].” He explained in a video released in June 2015 that the “concept of jihad in the Levant was absent from people’s minds” for decades.

“Nobody even heard of the word jihad,” Abu Firas continued. “In reality, the Levant is regarded [as] one of the most important centers in the Islamic world due to its close proximity to Palestine, to the Hijaz [Saudi Arabia] and being in the center of the Islamic world.” He drew on Marxist thinking to explain that the jihadists needed to spark revolutions that could change the course of the Islamic world for generations to come.

For more on Abu Firas al Suri, see LWJ reports:

Al Qaeda veteran appears in Al Nusrah Front video, criticizes rival (Mar. 20, 2014)

Al Nusrah Front spokesman explains differences with Islamic State in video appearance (Aug. 13, 2014)

Al Qaeda veteran takes on a more prominent role as spokesman in Syria (Sept. 6, 2014)

New Al Nusrah Front video features interview with leader, military gains in Syria (Feb. 13, 2015)

Al Nusrah Front celebrates 9/11 attacks in new video (June 29, 2015)

Thomas Joscelyn is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Senior Editor for The Long War Journal.

Tags: Abu Firas al Suri, Ahrar al Sham, Al Nusrah Front, Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda in Syria, Syria

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The US military targeted a senior al Qaeda leader who also serves in the Amniyat, a key security and intelligence organization within Shabaab, al Qaeda’s offical branch in Somalia, in an airstrike last week. The US military has not confirmed the death of Hassan Ali Dhoore, the dual hatted al Qaeda and Shabaab leader, who was the focus of the airstrike.

The Pentagon announced that it targeted Dhoore “in cooperation with the Federal Government of Somalia, on Thursday, March 31.” Dhoore was described as “a senior leader of Shabaab, who is part of al Qaeda” and “a member of Shabaab’s Amniyat (security and intelligence) wing and was heavily involved in high profile attack planning in Mogadishu.”

Dhoore “had planned and overseen attacks resulting in the death of at least three US citizens,” the statement continued. He was directly linked to two assaults, one in December 2014 at Mogadishu’s airport, and another at a hotel in the Somali capital. Two Americans were killed in the ambushes.

Leaders and members of the Amniyat have been the focus of multiple US airstrikes. Over the past two years, the US killed the previous two leaders of the Amniyat.  The Amniyat is instrumental in executing suicide attacks inside Somalia as well as in Kenya and other African nations, conducting assassinations, providing logistics and support for operations, and integrating the group’s local and regional commands. Additionally, the Amniyat has ben instrumental in suppressing internal dissent within Shabaab as well as challenges to its primacy in Somalia from the Islamic State.

The US killed the last leader of the Amniyat, Yusuf Dheeq, on Feb. 3, 2015, and also killed his predecessor, Tahlil Abdishakur, on Dec. 29, 2014. Additionally, the US killed Ahmed Godane, the co-founder of Shabaab and its former emir, in an airstrike on Sept. 1, 2014.

Like when reporting the deaths of previous Shabaab leaders, the US military said that Dhoore’s death would be a “significant blow” to the jihadist group.

“While we are still assessing the results of this operation, removing Dhoore from the battlefield,” a euphemism for killing him, “would be a significant blow to Shabaab’s operational planning and ability to conduct attacks against the government of the Federal Republic of Somalia, its citizens, US partners in the region, and against Americans abroad,” the Pentagon stated.

Unfortunately the deaths of Godane, Dheeq, Abdishakur, and a number of senior al Qaeda and Shabaab leaders at the hands of the US has done little to disrupt Shabaab’s command or control. The jihadist group has been waging an effective insurgency and still controls territory in Somalia despite the fact that the US began targeting Shabaab’s leadership beginning in late 2006. In addition, Shabaab recently has gone on the offensive and regained control of several towns and villages in southern Somalia that have been lost over the past several years.

Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of The Long War Journal.

Tags: Al Qaeda, Somalia, Syria

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Al Nusrah Front claims to have captured a small village near the Talat al-‘Iss hill in Syria’s Aleppo province.

Al Nusrah Front and allied rebel groups launched an offensive in the countryside south of the city of Aleppo on April 1. The battle began when three Al Nusrah suicide bombers struck positions occupied by Shiite militias and Syrian regime forces near the Talat al-‘Iss hill.

The bombings cleared the way for other fighters to stream in. On one of its official Twitter accounts, Al Nusrah has released a series of images documenting the explosions caused by its trio of suicide bombers. According to jihadists on social media, one of the “martyrs” was a native of Albania.

Al Nusrah, which is an official branch of al Qaeda, claims that the operation was a success and its fighters have captured Talat al-‘Iss, as well as a small village close by.

Using a small drone to record aerial footage, the group’s propagandists produced a short video showing the area after its “liberation.” The jihadists have also released a series of images documenting their preparations for the battle and the war booty captured, including arms and vehicles. Some of these photos can be seen at the end of this article.

A Syrian regime source explained to Reuters the strategic importance of the location, which is sparsely populated. “This is the dividing line, the front position of the Syrian army in the southern (Aleppo) countryside,” a Syrian military source said. “In south Aleppo, armed groups in coordination with [Nusrah] Front attacked some military positions … in the direction of Talat al-‘Iss and the surrounding areas. Of course this is a clear breach of the truce.”

Al Nusrah is not a party to the ceasefire that the Assad regime, Russia and a number of opposition groups agreed to earlier this year. It is not clear what other rebel organizations participated in the offensive, but Al Nusrah regularly relies on manpower from closely allied jihadists and Islamists. The al Qaeda arm also frequently cooperates with Western-backed rebels.

Sheikh Abdallah Muhammad al Muhaysini, an al Qaeda-affiliated cleric, celebrated the jihadists’ success at Talat al-‘Iss by delivering a talk at a local mosque that had been controlled by Shiite fighters.

Muhaysini posted the image on the right on his personal Twitter feed. The top photo shows him speaking from the pulpit. And the image on the bottom shows a Shiite commander delivering a talk from the same spot when Hezbollah and allied Shiite militias controlled the area.

The assault on Talat al-‘Iss is part of Al Nusrah’s attempt to regain the initiative in the Syrian war. With the help of Russia’s intervention last fall, Bashar al Assad’s regime stymied the advances of the Jaysh al Fath (“Army of Conquest”) coalition, which seized the northwestern province of Idlib earlier in the year. Jaysh al Fath, which included a number of rebel organizations, was co-founded by Al Nusrah and another al Qaeda-linked jihadist group, Ahrar al Sham.

In early February, Assad’s forces, backed by Russian airstrikes, Iranian-sponsored Shiite militias and Hezbollah, launched a major offensive in the province of Aleppo. Their aim was to recapture some of the towns and villages lost to various insurgents and to break the siege imposed on Shiite-majority towns in the northern part of the province. The Syrian government and its partners claimed some success in achieving these goals. Al Nusrah redeployed hundreds of jihadists to Aleppo in advance of the fight. [See LWJ report, Jihadists reinforce other rebels during key battle in Aleppo province.]

Propaganda photos of the three suicide bombings carried out near the Talat al-‘Iss hill:

Al Nusrah’s fighters prepare for the battle:

These two images appear to show an American Humvee being used in the battle. In the first image, the vehicle can be seen in the shadows on the left:

Al Nusrah manufactures some of its own rockets and arms in advance of the fight:

Images of the war booty captured:

Thomas Joscelyn is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Senior Editor for The Long War Journal.

Tags: Al Nusrah Front, Al Qaeda, aleppo, Dr. Abdallah Muhammad al Muhaysini, Muhaysini, Syria

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