Tails is a live operating system, that you can start on almost any computer from a DVD, USB stick, or SD card. It aims at preserving your privacy and anonymity, and helps you to:

Changes
Notable user-visible changes include:

• Major new features
  • Install (most of) the Tor Browser, replacing our previous Iceweasel-based browser. The version installed is from TBB 4.0 and is based on Firefox 31.2.0esr. This fixes the POODLE vulnerability.
  • Upgrade Tor to 0.2.5.8-rc.
  • Confine several important applications with AppArmor.
• Bugfixes
  • Install Linux 3.16-3 (version 3.16.5-1).
• Minor improvements
  • Upgrade I2P to 0.9.15, and isolate I2P traffic from the Tor Browser by adding a dedicated I2P Browser. Also, start I2P automatically upon network connection, when the i2p boot option is added.
  • Make it clear that TrueCrypt will be removed in Tails 1.2.1 (ticket #7739), and document how to open TrueCrypt volumes with cryptsetup.
  • Enable VirtualBox guest additions by default (ticket #5730). In particular this enables VirtualBox's display management service.
  • Make the OTR status in Pidgin clearer thanks to the formatting toolbar (ticket #7356).
  • Upgrade syslinux to 6.03-pre20, which should fix UEFI boot on some hardware.

See the online Changelog for technical details.

Tails is a live operating system, that you can start on almost any computer from a DVD, USB stick, or SD card. It aims at preserving your privacy and anonymity, and helps you to:

Tails, The Amnesic Incognito Live System,  is a live system that aims to preserve your privacy and anonymity. It helps you to use the Internet anonymously and circumvent censorship almost anywhere you go and on any computer but leaving no trace unless you ask it to explicitly.

Web applications rely on servers to store and process confidential information. However, anyone who gains access to the server (e.g., an attacker, a curious administrator, or a government) can obtain all of the data stored there. Mylar protects data confidentiality even when an attacker gets full access to servers. Mylar stores only encrypted data on the server, and decrypts data only in users' browsers. Simply encrypting each user's data with a user key does not suffice, and Mylar addresses three challenges in making this approach work. First, Mylar allows the server to perform keyword search over encrypted documents, even if the documents are encrypted with different keys. Second, Mylar allows users to share keys and data securely in the presence of an active adversary. Finally, Mylar ensures that client-side application code is authentic, even if the server is malicious. Results with a prototype of Mylar built on top of the Meteor framework are promising: porting 6 applications required changing just 35 lines of code on average, and the performance overheads are modest, amounting to a 17% throughput loss and a 50 msec latency increase for sending a message in a chat application.

A few weeks have passed and we’ve had an overwhelmingly positive response from the community for the Aviator Beta. As you can probably expect, the vast majority of comments we received were around building a Windows version or a Linux version. But in the mean time, we wanted to make sure we continued iterating on some of the bugs that have floated in. Aviator version 1.2 has the following changes: