March 15, 2016: The security services, especially the army, are putting more personnel on the Libyan border, given the increased activity there are more Islamic terrorists try to get themselves or shipments of weapons into Algeria. So far this year the security forces have kept the Islamic terrorists on the run and unable to launch any major attacks in Algeria. The major threat is the large number of Islamic terrorists in neighboring Libya and their attempts to get into Algeria. So far Tunisia, Egypt and Algeria have all refused to even send their warplanes against any targets in Libya and instead reinforce their border security and internal counter-terrorist operations. This has worked for these nations so far and they don’t want to get involved in a neighbor’s civil war. The neighbors do not oppose other nations (especially Western) from bombing Islamic terrorists in Libya. These Arab nations will assist in preventing ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) from smuggling any captured oil out of Libya. ISIL has made it clear that it will continue trying to capture Libyan oil fields and export ports intact and use them. ISIL is also apparently trying to make money by smuggling weapons into Algeria. Most of those attempts have been thwarted, so far.

Algeria is also having money problems. In January the value of oil exports fell 24 percent to $1.8 billion. However the trade deficit ($1.8 billion a month) remained the same as it was in January 2105. At the end of 2015 foreign exchange reserves (needed to pay for imports, especially food) fell 22 percent to $143 billion. The government has been controlling the use of these reserves, which stood at about $200 billion before the oil prices began plunging in 2013. The foreign exchange reserves can be drawn on for another six to eight years. After that severe cuts will have to be made and there will be much unrest. Algeria. Like most other oil exporters is pressuring Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf oil states to ease up on their use of oil over production to drive the price of oil down and weaken Iran. .

March 13, 2016: West of the capital (Gouraya Province) troops cornered and killed Mouloud Baal, a veteran Islamic terrorist leader. Baal started out in the GIA during the 1990s then joined al Qaeda after 2003. In 2015 he switched to ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant).

March 12, 2016: About a hundred kilometers east of the capital (Tizi Ouzou) soldiers killed one Islamic terrorists and captured another. Weapons and equipment were seized.

March 11, 2016: In the east (Oued Province) near the Tunisian border troops killed three Islamic terrorists who were apparently coming from Libya. The men were transporting weapons including twenty assault rifles, three RPG launchers, two suicide bomb vests and six shoulder fired anti-aircraft missiles of the type known to have been taken from Libyan military warehouses during the 2011 rebellion.

March 10, 2016: In the east (Oued Province) near the Tunisian border troops found a machine-gun, a shot gun and 17 TPG propellant charges in two different caches.

March 7, 2016: Next door in in Tunisia, a large force of ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) men attacked the town of Ben Guerdane near the Libyan border. The attack was repulsed with at least 36 Islamic terrorists killed, along with a soldier, ten policemen and an armed customs official. Seven civilians also died during several hours of fighting. Over the next few days Tunisian troops hunted down and killed ten more ISIL men in the area but most of the surviving attackers appear to have fled back into Libya. Tunisia has so far kept ISIL from establishing itself in Tunisia but the Islamic terrorist group keeps trying. This is in large part because most Tunisians want nothing to do with Islamic terrorist groups. This came as a big surprise the ISIL men involved in the Ben Guerdane operation because ISIL leaders said the local civilians would welcome ISIL, not side with the security forces.

March 1, 2016: East of the capital troops had success against Islamic terrorists in three different areas during the last 48 hours. Near Bouria troops tracked down and killed two Islamic terrorists. Ammunition, three assault rifles, four bombs, three crude shelters, documents and some equipment were also seized. In Skikda troops found a bomb and two locally made guns. In Tizi Ouzou troops found an Islamic terrorists hideout that contained some explosives.

February 24, 2016: In Medea (90 kilometers south of the capital) troops found and destroyed nine bunkers built by Islamic terrorists to store and hide equipment. Also found were bomb components and a power generator.

February 22, 2016: West of the capital (Tipaza province) troops searching a remote area found and destroyed fifteen bunkers built by Islamic terrorists.

February 20, 2016: In the southeast (Illizi Province) troops killed two Islamic terrorists and captured two others. Weapons, ammo, cash and bomb making components were seized.

February 17, 2016: In Boumerdes (50 kilometers east of the capital) soldiers clashed with two Islamic terrorists, killed them and seized two assault rifles, documents and some equipment. Nearby troops found a Islamic terrorist bunker containing ammo, equipment and more documents.

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March 15, 2016: In early 2016 Russia announced that it was abandoning plans to increase its airborne force. The main problem was obtaining sufficient new recruits. It would cost more in additional pay (to attract suitable recruits), training, bases and equipment than Russia could afford. Moreover Russia has been rebuilding its airborne force since the late 1990s and Russian military planners believe the current force is sufficient and the cost of maintaining these airborne units at a high state of readiness and combat capability remains expensive. The generals with combat experience advised that it was better to keep current airborne troops well equipped and trained than to cut back on that just to add more paratroopers.

Largely unnoticed by the rest of the world, since 2006 the Russian army has gone through a series of reforms, trying to transform the force that lost the Cold War into one that could win the next one. One element of the army, the airborne force has remained largely unchanged. Despite a recent reorganization that made the brigade, not the division the main combat unit, the airborne force still has divisions. The paratroopers are still all volunteers although money shortages have led to the use of more conscript volunteers in the last few years. Only about a third of airborne troops are career professionals ("contract soldiers"), yet the allure of the airborne is such that there are always qualified conscript volunteers. Alas, the conscripts leave after a year, so by the time you train them to a useful level they are gone. Still, if there is a national emergency that requires loyal, stalwart troops, the paratroopers are the ones you call. The airborne troops are one of the few bright spots in Russian military developments since the 1980s.

After the Cold War ended in 1991 the Russian army began to rapidly shrink. It was believed that the eight airborne divisions would shrink along with rest of the army. But that was not the case. Airborne commanders made a convincing case that their elite troops would remain professional and increasingly be among the few combat troops that could really be depended on. Thus the airborne force did not shrink as much as other ground troops. This decision was vindicated in 1999 when Russian troops were sent back into rebellious Chechnya and defeated the separatist rebels there. In the first three years of fighting in Chechnya, over 12,000 paratroopers served there and were the most effective troops. This success led to the temporary expansion of the airborne force from 40,000 troops to 45,000 troops.

This validated the claims that paratroopers were one of the first "special operations" forces to appear in the early 20th century. While no longer needed for mass jumps, the paratroopers are still popular as elite infantry. Thus airborne units tend to survive reorganizations or downsizing of military forces. This has been especially true in Russia and that the paratroopers proved their worth.

Although the last paratroopers withdrew from Chechnya in 2006, largely replaced by interior ministry paramilitary forces, it was believed that this force would soon come in handy again. In 2008 paratroopers again proved their professionalism and effectiveness when they led the invasion of Georgia, just south of Chechnya. By 2012 the airborne force consisted of about 35,000 troops (organized into four small divisions plus an independent brigade and an independent regiment). All that recent battlefield success justified the cost of expanding the force to its current 45,000 troops.

Throughout the post-Cold War period, most (about 60 percent) of paratroopers have been conscripts. But that is changing as conscription fades away in Russia. The paratroopers were supposed to be among the first components of the army to be all-volunteer. That did not work out because to get sufficient high-quality recruits turned out to cost more than expected. By 2014 there were added problems because of low oil prices and economic sanctions that put a stop to increasing the defense budget.

Russian paratroopers have been around since the 1930s. So far over 2.3 million troops have served in the airborne forces. These have always been the boldest and most reliable Russian troops available, and those currently serving as paratroopers are no different. Despite their good qualities, Russian paratroopers are no guarantee of success. That's because for most of their history the paratroopers were not used as paratroopers but as elite infantry and even then the airborne were often asked to do the impossible.

Russia pioneered the development of airborne forces in the 1930s, and by 1941 had five "airborne corps" (each with about 10,000 troops, equivalent to an American airborne division). These units were not fully equipped and the purges of the late 1930s had eliminated some of the best airborne officers. Then when the Germans invaded in June, 1941, the Russian air force was quickly destroyed. Lacking air transports, and with the Germans rapidly advancing on the ground, the five airborne corps were sent in as ground troops. Most of these paratroopers were killed before the end of the year, thus destroying the airborne force Russia had spent the last nine years building up. They did not die in vain, however, as the Germans had a tough time whenever they encountered the Russian paratroopers. But by early 1942, only two of the three airborne corps was intact and suffering from heavy losses. But the Germans now knew to be careful whenever they encountered Russian paratroopers.

Before the pre-war Russian paratroopers were destroyed some of them did get a chance to use their parachuting skills. Between December 1941 and March 1942, 3,500 paratroopers were dropped behind German lines to assist the growing number of guerilla units being formed. Another 7,000 troops were brought in via gliders (as were supplies for the guerillas). This activity caught the attention of the Germans and they eventually wiped out nearly all of these troops.

Undismayed, the surviving Russian paratroopers were used to train more airborne troops and five more airborne corps were quickly formed. All ten airborne corps saw a lot of combat during early 1942. There were some small parachute drops but none had much impact on the fighting. In mid-1942 the ten airborne corps, and five independent airborne brigades were turned into regular infantry units and sent south to fight in the battles that led to the German defeat at Stalingrad in early 1943. But even before this campaign was over paratroopers were pulled out of their infantry jobs at the end of 1942 and used to organize ten Guards Airborne Divisions (basically the same as the previous Airborne Corps). But again an emergency arose that kept the paratroopers on the ground. The Germans launched another major offensive in early 1943, and the paratroopers were once more sent in as ground troops and most of them were lost.

Undismayed, the Russians raised another twenty airborne brigades (about 50,000 troops), which they used to form another six airborne corps. Three of these brigades were used in the first deliberate attempt to use paratroopers to support a major attack and this turned out to be the largest Russian airborne operation to date.

On September 24th, 1943, three parachute and three air landing brigades hit ground 40 kilometers behind German lines along the Dnieper River near Kanev. It was a disaster. Hastily organized, most of the paratroopers had never jumped out of an airplane before, although most had at least jumped from a training tower in a parachute harness. The inexperienced pilots had to do the drop at night, to avoid the risk of German fighters and there was not enough transport aircraft. The Russians had also not learned how important it was to move away from their drop zones quickly and form into larger units. The small, scattered Russians were quickly run down and destroyed by the Germans. What can be said is that the distraction took some German combat units away from the front line and they did allow the oncoming Russian armor units to advance a bit farther than they otherwise would have.

Russian dictator Stalin was not happy with this, the first real test of Russian airborne forces in their designed role. While the persistent efforts to organize new airborne units recognized that the airborne capability was important, the Russian air force was never able to support airborne operations sufficiently to make them work. For the rest of the war Soviet airborne forces were kept on the back burner. It wasn't until after the war that the parachute divisions again became well trained and equipped forces, with sufficient air transports to move them into combat.

But because of changes in technology (helicopters, too many anti-aircraft weapons for transports to operate over enemy territory) the age of major parachute infantry operations had passed. Paratroopers became well trained infantry, all volunteers and eager to jump out of aircraft. Just the kind of guys you need for emergencies. After World War II Russia found their airborne divisions to be the most effective and reliable infantry they had. Paratroopers were involved in all sorts of Cold War missions, from leading roles in putting down rebellions among Eastern European “allies” (especially Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968) and posing a convincing enough threat to discourage even more such uprisings. Paratroops proved useful as an intervention threat in the Middle East and elsewhere. Finally paratroopers were among the most effective Russian infantry in Afghanistan during the 1980s. But too much of a good thing turned out to be more than Russia could afford.

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March 15, 2016: Counter-terrorism organizations have long recognized the connection between illegal drugs and Islamic terrorism. While these drugs are not forbidden in Islamic scripture, as alcohol is, most Islamic scholars and clerics condemn drug use by Moslems. Yet one of the appeals of Islamic terrorism is the tendency of these groups to point out that there is a long tradition of “Holy Warriors” (what the rest of the world calls Islamic terrorists) using these drugs in various useful ways. For example clerics who support Islamic terrorism say it is justified to manufacture and sell these drugs to infidels (non-Moslems) to raise money for the cause and weaken the enemy. It is also accepted for Islamic terrorists to use drugs to get in the proper mood to carry out suicidal attacks (and blood tests of dead terrorist first revealed this) and to unwind after some high stress combat. Some Islamic sects allow some drug use to help get into a more meditative mood and get closer to God. That practice is ancient and persists in many other religions.   

Drug use by Islamic terrorists is nothing new and it has existed at least since the 11th century. The first recorded users were the Hassassins (or "hashasheen" or users of hashish) of 11th century Iran. The training back then was similar to what many Islamic terrorists groups still use today. There was liberal use of hashish to provide a taste of paradise for new recruits.

The Hassassins began when a Iranian minor noble with a grudge and excellent organizational skills created a network of suicide assassins who were convinced they were doing God’s Will. The Hassassins thrived, and killed, for many decades until the Mongols came along and destroyed their impregnable mountain fortress. The Mongols were not afraid of suicide assassins but were annoyed by them. Back then, annoying the Mongols was almost always fatal.

The current crop of suicide terrorists do not provide a single fortress to go after, so the Mongol approach of overwhelming force applied to one objective will not work. But the fearless Mongol attitude towards terrorism should be remembered.

Hashish (cannabis, or marijuana, resin) has long been an Islamic terrorist favorite, as are more modern recreational substances like heroin, cocaine and especially amphetamine pills. The most popular form of meth is actually Captagon, which is the trade name for fenethylline, a synthetic drug that has the same effects as amphetamine but with fewer bad side effects (like increased blood pressure). Fenethylline is still pretty potent and by the 1980s most countries had either outlawed it or made it a prescription drug. Now the most common form of fenethylline is Captagon, which is widely available in the Middle East. Fenethylline is even manufactured by ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) in a captured drug factory using raw materials smuggled in from Turkey. Captagon is considered a major problem in the Middle East because there is so much illegal use of it. It is the stimulant of choice among many Syrian rebels as well as pro-government forces.

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