On Mar. 17, Al Nusrah Front leader Abu Muhammad al Julani released a statement commemorating the fifth anniversary of the uprising against Bashar al Assad’s regime. “We congratulate the people of al Sham [Syria] and the Islamic Ummah [worldwide community of Muslims] on the pass[ing] of five years of their blessed revolution and their blessed jihad,” Julani wrote, according to a translation by SITE Intelligence Group.

Julani concluded by arguing that the jihadists are one with the Syrian people. “For we are from the people of al Sham and al Sham is from us, nothing can separate us…from its people except death, Allah willing,” Julani claimed.

The success or failure of al Qaeda’s project in Syria hinges, to a large degree, on whether Julani is right. Al Nusrah, which easily has thousands of fighters, is al Qaeda’s official branch in Syria.

The available evidence suggests Al Nusrah is widely respected on the ground five years into the rebellion. There are pockets of resistance, but the West has no real strategy for harnessing this discontent and diminishing al Qaeda’s influence in the rebellion. Perhaps that is not even currently possible.

Still, the events of the past two weeks highlight a liability al Qaeda has long sought to minimize in Syria. Protesters took to the streets in some areas to denounce Al Nusrah. It is does not appear that the protests were widespread, but they were noteworthy.

Earlier this month, Al Nusrah clashed with the 13th Division, a Free Syrian Army (FSA) faction based in Maarrat al Nu’man, a town in the northwestern Idlib province. During the days that followed, protesters rallied against Al Nusrah and Jund al Aqsa, another al Qaeda-affiliated group. The two jihadist organizations had raided the 13th Division’s headquarters and bases in Maarrat al Nu’man in mid-March, capturing FSA fighters and their weapons in the process.

A Twitter feed (@JAN_Violations) that documents Al Nusrah’s transgressions posted photos and videos of a protest in Maarrat al Nu’man on Mar. 18, the day after Julani’s statement was published online.

Some of the images purportedly show Al Nusra and Jund al Aqsa fighters looking on from nearby rooftops as civilians denounced them. It is impossible, using social media alone, to gauge how significant the protests in Maarrat al Nu’man really are. But the photos and videos indicate that there is at least some discontent with al Qaeda’s guerrilla army in areas where other fighting factions have a reasonably strong presence.

Not to be outdone, Al Nusrah organized its own protests on the anniversary of the revolution. Al Nusrah’s official Twitter feeds posted images of rallies in Idlib, Aleppo and elsewhere during which al Qaeda’s black banner was flown, often alongside the nationalist Syrian flag. The photos were intended to reinforce the perception that Al Nusrah remains an integral part of the rebellion. Indeed, this was al Qaeda’s intention all along.

Al Qaeda’s popular revolutionary model

As The Long War Journal has reported on multiple occasions, al Qaeda seeks to inculcate its Salafi-jihadist ideology within the Syrian population. It is using the conflict to build a broader and deeper base of popular support for its cause. Like the Islamic State, Al Nusrah seeks to enforce a harsh version of sharia law and build an Islamic emirate. However, al Qaeda and the Islamic State follow two different strategies for achieving these goals.

The Islamic State is a top-down authoritarian organization. Abu Bakr al Baghdadi’s men want to convince Muslims that they have already resurrected the caliphate, which was formally dissolved in 1924. The Islamic State explicitly markets its graphic executions and punishments under sharia law, arguing they are divinely justified. From the Islamic State’s perspective, Muslims who do not accept its legitimacy as a caliphate are to be terrorized into submission. Muslims who oppose the Islamic State, including even other jihadists, are deemed apostates or infidels.

In contrast, al Qaeda adheres to a bottom-up strategy, seeking to become popular with the people. From al Qaeda’s perspective, Bashar al Assad’s regime must fall before it can build a stable Islamic state. Al Qaeda’s representatives have begun to lay the groundwork for governance in the areas controlled by Al Nusrah and its closest allies. But al Qaeda will not publicly declare that an Islamic emirate exists in Syria until it is reasonably certain that such a state can survive.

Unlike the Islamic State, Al Nusrah has embedded itself deep within the insurgency against Assad and his allies. This makes it difficult to untangle al Qaeda from the less extreme factions. Al Nusrah often cooperates with other groups that share only part of its agenda.

Al Nusrah also does not produce propaganda highlighting its enforcement of sharia’s harshest penalties because it does not want to offend Muslims who may be appalled by such draconian methods. Abu Firas al Suri, a veteran al Qaeda operative who is a member of Al Nusrah’s management team, has explained that Al Nusrah even enters into agreements with other factions concerning the laws that will be implemented in the areas “liberated” from the Assad regime. In al Qaeda’s view, many Muslims have lived in countries where the supposedly true version of Islam has not existed for many decades. Therefore, al Qaeda seeks to educate the public concerning its version of sharia before forcing people to adhere to it.

The Islamic State achieved significant success after breaking from al Qaeda in 2013 and 2014 and following its own top-down model for waging jihad and governing territory. But al Qaeda’s presence in Syria has also been underestimated. In addition to its own battlefield prowess, al Qaeda has successfully harnessed the resources of other groups to achieve victories, particularly in northwestern Syria. And rebel groups that have dared to oppose it have been quickly annihilated. Meanwhile, the jihadist ideology has spread throughout Syria, which is exactly what al Qaeda wants.

It is unlikely that any rebel factions can roll back Al Nusrah. Even the 13th Division, which fought with Al Nusrah earlier this month, cooperated with al Qaeda’s Syrian arm before the two sides finally came to blows. And the 13th Division, which has received support from the US and its allies, proved to be no match for al Qaeda’s men once a firefight ensued.

Five years into the Syrian war the West does not have a strategy for defeating Al Nusrah. In fact, Western-backed groups often fight alongside al Qaeda’s paramilitary fighters.

As a result, there is much truth in Julani’s statement. The jihadists are “from the people” in many areas of Syria. This is not true everywhere, but it doesn’t have to be. Nearly 15 years after the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, al Qaeda has raised a guerrilla army in Syria. Thousands of jihadists now claim to represent the people.

Thomas Joscelyn is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Senior Editor for The Long War Journal.

Tags: 13th Division, Abu Firas al Suri, Abu Muhammad al Julani, Al Nusrah Front, Al Qaeda, Division 13

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Al Qaeda’s North African branch has claimed a rocket attack on a gas plant in the southern Algerian desert near the town of In Salah. The rocket barrage, which was directed at a joint BP-Norwegian Statoil facility, somehow left the gas plant unharmed and no one was injured yesterday.

In a statement released online and translated by the SITE Intelligence Group, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) said the barrage was in response to Algeria’s “scandalous involvement with France in the war against the Muslims in northern Mali.” The jihadist group also said it intentionally tried to spare Muslim lives by not using “more powerful capabilities” in the attack, but that Muslims should stay away from such facilities in the future.

Additionally, AQIM said it sent a warning to Western oil companies operating in Algeria, stating they were targeting the facilities themselves and not their civilian workers. “We announce to all Western companies investing in shale gas that we will target you in a direct way, and we will use all our capabilities to deter you from these projects that are harmful to our environment and are rejected by our society,” AQIM said in the statement. But, AQIM noted that it will take the safety of Muslim employees and personnel into consideration. “If you want safety for your companies and personnel, then the matter is negotiable,” the statement read, “taking into consideration our dignity and the dignity of our Muslim people and their rights.”

AQIM said both BP and Statoil were warned of an impending barrage via phone calls before launching the rockets.

Al Qaeda has targeted gas and oil facilities in Algeria in the past. In early 2013, Al Murabitoon, which is led by veteran al Qaeda-loyalist Mokhtar Belmokhtar and is now part of AQIM, launched an attack on the Tigantourine gas facility near In Amenas, Algeria. Hundreds of people were taken hostage and 38 people were killed in the assault. That operation was led by a Nigerien jihadist, Abdul Rahman al Nigeri. (See Threat Matrix report, Algerian troops end siege at In Amenas gas facility and LWJ reports, Al Qaeda-linked group claims credit for kidnappings in Algeria and Nigerien jihadist identified as commander of Algerian hostage operation for more information.)

With the rocket barrage in Algeria, AQIM has now claimed or conducted attacks in four different countries in the span of a week. On March 11, suspected al Qaeda gunmen assaulted a Malian military checkpoint near the central city of Sevare. Two days later, AQIM killed 18 people in an attack on a beach resort popular with locals and tourists in southern Ivory Coast. And just two days ago, three Nigerien gendarmes were killed near Niger’s borders with Mali and Burkina Faso. Local media has blamed this raid on a Fulani brigade of Al Murabitoon. (See this map of al Qaeda-linked attacks in Mali and neighboring countries since 2014 by The Long War Journal for more information.)

Caleb Weiss is an intern at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a contributor to The Long War Journal.

Tags: Algeria, AQIM, Ivory Coast, Mali, Murabitoon, Niger

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John Cantlie, a British journalist who has been held hostage by the Islamic State since 2012, is featured in a newly released video. The short production, which is three and a half minutes long, shows Cantlie standing in the alleged ruins of an Islamic State media kiosk in Mosul, Iraq.

Abu Bakr al Baghdadi’s organization uses Cantlie to question the efficacy of the American-led bombing campaign, arguing that the media kiosks are hardly worthy targets. But earlier this month the Islamic State itself trumpeted the media kiosks as “one of the cornerstones” of its “internal media.”

“As the war between the Islamic State and the US-led coalition continues, the Americans have launched a surprising new tactic against the mujahideen,” Cantlie says. “Using their $13 million dollar F-18s and hundred thousand dollar missile systems, they’ve begun targeting not tanks, not trucks, not even the mujahideen, but Islamic State media kiosks.”

“This used to be one such media kiosk, targeted and destroyed the other day on this busy high street,” Cantlie continues. “Kiosks are used to distribute pamphlets and information regarding the Islamic State and serve to expose some of the lies and propaganda the Western media continues to peddle in their never-ending mission to tarnish the image of the Islamic State.”

Cantlie claims “it costs about $50 to build” one of the kiosks and he taunts the “collective might of the American war machine” because it strikes such inexpensive facilities. The British correspondent asks why the US bothers to bomb such locations: “Is it a ruse somehow by the CIA to undermine the Islamic State’s message to the Muslims of Mosul and, therefore, somehow diminish their control of the city? Is it perhaps to strike fear into the hearts of the mujahideen by abandoning any ideas to build another dozen kiosks to replace this one?”

“No,” Cantlie says, answering his own questions. “It’s because the Americans are so bankrupt of intelligence that this is all they have left to target.” He claims that the airstrikes are evidence of the “failed strategy of the US air campaign” and only risk the lives of civilians who are nearby.

“If this is what [President] Obama meant when he talked about degrading and ultimately destroying ISIS, clearly he’s got a long way to go yet,” Cantlie argues.

Amaq News Agency, a propaganda outlet affiliated with the Islamic State, released Cantlie’s video via social media and other web sites yesterday. It is his first appearance in months.

Contrary to what Cantlie is forced to argue, the US-led coalition frequently targets the Islamic State’s tanks, trucks, fighters and leaders. In what amounts to a response to the Cantlie’s appearance, the Defense Department released an infographic (seen on the right) earlier today that summarizes the types of targets bombed to date. Fighting positions account for 7,118 of the 22,779 targets bombed thus far, according to CENTCOM’s data. Tanks, Humvees, buildings, staging areas and the Islamic State’s oil infrastructure are all regularly attacked.

Media kiosks are “one of the cornerstones” of the caliphate’s “internal media”

Although the video of Cantlie is intended to downplay the importance of the media kiosks, the Islamic State recently highlighted them as being an essential part of its media strategy for the areas under its control.

The 21st edition of the Islamic State’s Al Naba newsletter, which was released on Mar. 8, included an article entitled, “An Inside Look at the Media of the Islamic State.” Al Naba interviewed a jihadist known as Abu Umar al Muhajir, who has been with the media kiosk “project” from its inception.

Abu Umar explained that the Islamic State had been distributing its propaganda using CDs, but this strategy was “weak” because there were relatively few computers in the Levant. The proliferation of smart phones also made the “caliphate” rethink its messaging plans. The media kiosks are part of the propagandists’ solution and are intended “to be the conduit of communication between the people and the media of the Islamic State,” he said.

Abu Umar elaborated on the history of the media kiosks project, saying the Islamic State’s Wilayat Halab (Aleppo province) first experimented with them, but the effort initially faltered. The idea didn’t really take off until the release of the fourth episode of “The Clanging of the Swords,” an ongoing series that glorifies the “caliphate’s” war. The Aleppo media office announced the video in the media kiosks and this was “great advertising” for them. After that, all of the other wilayat (provinces) “requested the project” and it has been implemented in Raqqa and elsewhere.

The media kiosks “project has become one of the cornerstones of the internal media in the different wilayat of the caliphate,” Abu Umar emphasized, according to a translation obtained by The Long War Journal.

Al Naba cited another Islamic State official, identified as Abu Fatimah al Ansari, as saying that the first kiosks in Iraq were placed in Mosul. There are “more than 60 media kiosks” in Iraq today, Al Naba added. The plan is “to convert these kiosks into comprehensive media centers, releasing urgent and daily news on widescreen TVs at all times, placed on the outside of the media kiosk,” Abu Fatimah told the newsletter. This is intended to counter the enemy’s “false and fabricated news.”

Al Naba also emphasized the importance of the media kiosks for the Islamic State’s recruiting, as “many” of the provinces’ residents started down the “path of jihad after learning of the truth through these platforms.” This led to a “large demand” for more kiosks. The newsletter identified fighters who allegedly joined the “caliphate’s” cause after viewing propaganda in the facilities.

According to a jihadist known as Abu Ayyah, the kiosks “attract many of the residents” beginning around “eight in the morning” and are open until the nighttime prayer. Abu Ayyah explained that [m]any of the Islamic State’s new believers “have been affected by the media” shown at the kiosks and this means more needed to built.

Still another Islamic State media operative, known as Abu al Bara al Furati, explained to Al Naba that the six media kiosks in Raqqa, Syria are not enough to keep up with demand and so they are building more. Abu al Bara noted that the kiosks distribute propaganda in several different languages.

Therefore, less than two weeks before Cantlie’s latest video was released, the Islamic State itself explained to followers the importance of media kiosks in its overall media strategy.

Thomas Joscelyn is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Senior Editor for The Long War Journal.

Tags: ISIS, Islamic State, John Cantlie, media kiosks, Mosul, Operation Inherent Resolve

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Mohammed al Zawahiri, the younger brother of al Qaeda’s emir, was released from an Egyptian prison on Mar. 17. He had been charged with establishing a terrorist group linked to al Qaeda and plotting attacks against various targets inside Egypt, but a court dropped the charges and let him go.

“My father has been released. He reached home early this morning [Mar. 18],” Abdelrahman Zawahiri, Mohammed’s son, told Agence France-Presse in an interview.

Jihadists celebrated in February when an Egyptian court ordered Mohammed freed. In the 6th issue of its Al Masra newsletter, which was posted online on Mar. 5, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) published a short blurb highlighting Mohammed’s pending release. (A screen shot of the notice in Al Masra can be seen on the right.)

Mohammed al Zawahiri was imprisoned in Egypt in 1999, after first being detained in the United Arab Emirates. During the 1990s, he served as a senior figure in Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), which was headed by his brother and merged with Osama bin Laden’s organization prior to the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.

Mohammed was released from prison following the Egyptian uprisings in 2011. He quickly became a prolific advocate for al Qaeda’s jihadist ideology. He publicly denounced Western democracy and espoused al Qaeda’s supposed virtues while preaching in Tahrir Square, as well as during appearances on Egyptian television and radio programs. He also did interviews with Western journalists.

Mohammed’s activities garnered additional scrutiny following the protest outside of the US Embassy in Cairo on Sept. 11, 2012. The previous day, Sept. 10, Ayman al Zawahiri released a video that included a clip of Mohammed proselytizing in Egypt. The al Qaeda emir also called on Libyan jihadists to avenge the death of Abu Yahya al Libi, who was killed in a US drone strike in June 2012.

Mohammed and several other al Qaeda-linked jihadists helped instigate the protest outside the US Embassy in Cairo the following day. It was a pro-al Qaeda event from the first and led to the embassy’s walls being breached. The American flag was torn down and replaced with an al Qaeda-style black banner as protesters chanted, “Obama, Obama, we’re all Osama [bin Laden]!” Several al Qaeda groups, including Ansar al Sharia Libya, raided the State Department’s Mission and the CIA’s Annex in Benghazi, Libya hours later. Four Americans, including US Ambassador Christopher Stevens, were killed during the assault.

In January 2013, Mohammed orchestrated a less eventful protest outside of the French Embassy in Cairo. Banners of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri were flown outside of the embassy as protesters objected to France’s intervention in Mali. The younger Zawahiri brother repeatedly threatened France and the West during the rally.

Despite his overt support for al Qaeda, Mohammed claimed he was not really a member of his brother’s organization. Evidence collected by Western intelligence officials told a different story. US intelligence officials connected him to jihadists across al Qaeda’s international network, and he reportedly helped Egyptian terrorists contact his older brother. One of his followers was also killed during an attack on Malian soldiers in May 2013.

During his time free from prison, Mohammed was a prominent speaker at events hosted by Ansar al Sharia Egypt, an organization that advocated the imposition of al Qaeda-style sharia law. Ansar al Sharia Egypt was founded by a longtime comrade of the Zawahiri brothers.

Mohammed was rearrested by Egyptian authorities in August 2013. But he continued to be referenced in al Qaeda propaganda in the years since.

In October 2014, for instance, AQAP released a short biography for Mustafa Ali (a.k.a. Humam al Masri), a jihadist who served in the group’s media department before he was killed in a US drone strike in late 2013.

AQAP’s biography of Ali contained an interesting note concerning his imprisonment in Egypt. “He invested his time in prison in seeking knowledge and meeting with the experienced mujahideen such as sheikhs Mohammed al Zawahiri and Abdul Hakim Hasaan, may Allah preserve both of them and release them,” according to a translation by SITE Intelligence Group.

Mohammed was a leading figure in Ansar al Sharia Egypt. Therefore, it is not surprising that Mustafa Ali would be drawn to Ansar al Sharia in Yemen, where al Qaeda first used the Ansar al Sharia brand in the post-Arab Spring world.

Egypt has changed drastically since President Mohamed Morsi was overthrown in 2013. Mohammed al Zawahiri enjoyed a relatively permissive environment during Morsi’s reign. It remains to be seen what the longtime jihadist does now.

Thomas Joscelyn is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Senior Editor for The Long War Journal.

Tags: Al Qaeda, Ansar al Sharia Egypt, Ansar al Sharia Libya, Ansar al Sharia Yemen, AQAP, Ayman al Zawahiri, Mohammed al Zawahiri, Mohammed Jamal Network

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The 21st issue of the Islamic State’s weekly Al Naba newsletter, which was released earlier this month, contains an infographic (seen below) that says much about the organization’s operations inside Libya. The image purportedly summarizes “the most important military operations” against the “apostate Awakenings and the Libyan Army” in the city of Derna during a three-month period that ended Feb. 29, 2016.

A map at the top of the infographic highlights four key cities along the Mediterranean coast. From west to east they are: Sirte, Benghazi, Derna and Tobruk. Sirte has fallen to the “caliphate’s” fighters, who also control the neighboring towns of Nawfaliyah and Bin Jawad. In Benghazi, the Islamic State’s arm most likely cooperates, tacitly or otherwise, with other jihadists against General Khalifa Haftar’s forces in the Libyan National Army.

But the story in the eastern city of Derna has been different. Abu Bakr al Baghdadi’s followers have repeatedly fought their jihadist rivals in the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC) and other aligned factions since last year. The MSC has received the backing of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and has noteworthy ties to al Qaeda’s international organization.

The Islamic State refers to the MSC and allied organizations as the “apostate Awakenings.” The term “Awakenings” was once reserved for the Islamic State’s tribal opponents in Iraq, but the “caliphate” has broadened the meaning of the term to include even those organizations affiliated with al Qaeda.

Al Naba notes that the entirety of Derna falls under the jurisdiction of the Wilayat Barqah (or its eastern Cyrenaica Province). But the Islamic State’s “soldiers” are based in Al Fatayih (an area in the eastern part of the city) and its surrounding areas, as opposed to the heart of Derna. This is due to the group’s battles with the MSC last year. The Islamic State’s men were forced to abandon their strongholds in Derna’s center for the outlying neighborhoods.

According to the statistics in Al Naba’s infographic, however, the Islamic State continues to battle its jihadist foes. Its snipers targeted the “apostate Awakenings” 15 times and the group also detonated 32 improvised explosive devices against them as well. The “caliphate’s” soldiers launched 7 commando operations.

In sum, Al Naba’s editors claim that 250 members of the “Awakenings” and the Libyan Army were killed or wounded, 4 tanks and 18 other military vehicles were destroyed, and 5 military outposts were overrun. In addition, several vehicles were captured, along with a variety of other weapons and ammunition. The Islamic State does not break these figures down further, so there is no way to tell how the alleged casualties were distributed between the “Awakenings” and Haftar’s forces.

These statistics cannot be independently verified, but Al Naba’s infographic highlights the ongoing fighting between the Islamic State’s Libyan arm and its jihadist foes.

Thomas Joscelyn is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Senior Editor for The Long War Journal.

Tags: Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, AQIM, derna, Islamic State, Libya, MSC, Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna, Wilayat Barqah

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Hashem al Musawi, the official spokesman for Harakat al Nujaba, issued a statement on the group’s official website on March 13 that defended Hezbollah from the terrorist designation by both the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League earlier this month.

Musawi also indicated that Hezbollah actively fought inside Iraq and took casualties there, presumably during the US occupation as well as during the current fighting against the Islamic State.

“The blood of Hezbollah which flowed in the land of Iraq is our responsibility for so long as we exist,” Musawi said at the opening of his statement.

“Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah [Hezbollah’s Secretary General] will remain as the fear that plagues the hearts of the Princes of Petrol [Gulf countries] and the Zionists [Israel], wherever they may go,” Musawi continued. “Hezbollah and the Nujaba’ movement [Harakat al Nujaba] are the twins of resistance that cannot ever be loosened or separated.”

Musawi then accused the Gulf countries or cowardice and said the Popular Mobilization Front, the Iraqi government-sanctioned organization that is dominated by Iranian-backed militias, including Harakat al Nujaba, must teach them “the meaning of bravery and sacrifice.” He also accused the Gulf nations of being American puppets.

“The Princes of Petrol have to learn the meaning of bravery and sacrifice from the sons of the Hashed al Shaabi [Popular Mobilization Front], without whom there would not be a trace of these people worth mentioning,” Musawai said. “The conspiring statelets of the Gulf will never be liberated so long as America moves them however it pleases.”

Links with Hezbollah

Harakat al Nujaba has close ties with Lebanese Hezbollah. The two groups have coordinated activities as Iraqi militia fighters entered Syria to battle rebels and jihadists. The militia was established to funnel fighters from two other Iranian-backed militias, Hezbollah Brigades and Asaib Ahl al Haq, into Syria. It has been spotted on several battlefields in Syria, including in Aleppo.

Harakat al Nujaba is led by Akram Abbas al Kabi, who previously served as a senior commander in both the Mahdi Army and Asaib Ahl al Haq. Kabi was listed by the US as a global terrorist in September 2008 for aiding the Iraqi insurgency. He was listed along with Abdul Reza Shahlai, a deputy commander in Iran’s Qods Force.

Kabi has close ties with Iran. Last year, Kabi was photographed with Qods Force leader Qassem Soliemani during a battlefield tour in Aleppo, Syria. Photographs of the two commanders were published on Harakat Nujaba’s website.

Harakat al Nujaba also touts its relationship with Hezbollah. On its website, the group published a picture of Kabi holding hands with Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah. The two met in 2015 to discuss the security situation in Iraq.

Cooperation between the two groups and their leaders goes back more than a decade, when Iran’s Qods Force directed Hezbollah to aide in the establishment and training of what US military commanders used to call the “Special Groups.” Qods Force leader Qassem Soliemani, who is frequently seen on Syria and Iraq’s battlefields coordinating with Shiite militias against the Islamic State, and commanders such as Abdul Reza Shahlai were instrumental in establishing the Mahdi Army, Hezbollah Brigades, and offshoots such as the Asaib Ahl al Haq.

Hezbollah also aided in the formation of the Special Groups. Musa Ali Daqduq, a top Hezbollah operative who served as the chief of Nasrallah’s bodyguards as well as the head of the terror group’s special operations branch, was ordered to help establish Shia groups in Iraq along the lines of Lebanese Hezbollah, according to the US government.

The US captured Daqduq in Basrah, Iraq in March 2007. Daqduq was released to Iraqi custody in December 2011 as the US withdrew from Iraq with the promise that he would be tried for his war crimes. But in 2012, he was freed by the Iraqi government and immediately traveled to Lebanon. After his release, US intelligence officials contacted by The Long War Journal said that Daqduq was involved with supporting Iraqi militias fighting in Syria.

In its designation of Daqduq as a global terrorist in November 2012, the US Treasury Department said that sometime in 2005, “Iran asked Hezbollah to form a group to train Iraqis to fight Coalition Forces in Iraq.” The designation stated: “In response, Hassan Nasrallah established a covert Hezbollah unit to train and advise Iraqi militants in Jaish al Mahdi (JAM) [or Mahdi Army] and JAM Special Groups, now known as Asaib Ahl al Haq [the League of the Righteous],” a Mahdi Army faction.

“As of 2006, Daqduq had been ordered by Hezbollah to work with IRGC-QF [Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods Force] to provide training and equipment to JAM Special Groups to augment their ability to inflict damage against US troops,” Treasury noted.

Thus, Musawai’s statements that Harakat al Nujaba and Hezbollah “are the twins of resistance that cannot ever be loosened or separated,” and “the blood of Hezbollah which flowed in the land of Iraq is our responsibility” are accurate.

Tags: Harakat al Nujaba, hezbollah, Iran, Iraq, Syria

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Gear purportedly from a killed Russian soldier at Palmyra

As fighting between the Islamic State and Syrian regime forces continue around the ancient city of Palmyra (or Tadmur in Arabic), the jihadist group’s Aamaq News Agency has claimed that five Russian soldiers were executed in recent days. To prove this, the news outlet has posted photos from one of the slain Russian soldier’s phones. Aamaq News is linked to the Islamic State and often provides reliable information about the group’s local and international operations.

The photos show the soldier posing in various places in Syria, both by himself and with other members of his unit. In a video released earlier today, Aamaq News shows a killed Russian soldier and his gear. The camera then zooms in on the soldier’s equipment, which includes Russian markings. In addition to the five Russians, Aamaq also claims Islamic State fighters executed several members of Hezbollah and “other Shiite militias.”

The Islamic State took full control of the city after a week-long offensive last May. At least 462 civilians, 241 government troops, and 150 Islamic State fighters were killed in the fighting in and around Palmyra over a three week period after May 13, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. The jihadist group also took over several nearby towns and the Jazal oil field. [For more on this, see LWJ report, Islamic State seizes Syrian city of Palmyra.]

The Islamic State is not the first jihadist group to claim to have battled Russian troops in Syria. In November, a Chechen al Qaeda-ally, Ajnad Kavkaz, claimed to have captured “spoils” from Russian troops after battles in the northwestern province of Latakia. (See Threat Matrix report, Chechen group says it took ‘spoils’ from Russian forces in Syria.)

Photos allegedly from the slain Russian soldier’s phone:

Caleb Weiss is an intern at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a contributor to The Long War Journal.

Tags: Palmyra, russia, Syria

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A screen shot of Shaybat al Hukama’s Twitter feed.

An al Qaeda media operative known as Shaybat al Hukama returned to Twitter on Feb. 15. Hukama’s account has been shuttered several times, only to reappear under a new handle after each suspension. Hukama has used his social media accounts to provide new information about al Qaeda’s operations in the past. And this occasion has been no different.

Hukama has tweeted clues concerning the whereabouts of Saif al Adel, a senior al Qaeda leader who has long been wanted by the US government for his alleged role in the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.

On Feb. 25, Hukama wrote that Al Adel (seen on the right) will be one of the reasons why Russia is defeated, just as Khattab helped cause the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Khattab is a legendary Saudi jihadist who was backed by al Qaeda and organized Chechen jihadists to commit attacks in Russia.

Hukama did not explicitly say that Al Adel is in Syria, but that was the clear implication of his tweet. Al Nusrah Front, al Qaeda’s official branch in Syria, is battling Bashar al Assad’s regime, which is backed by Russian forces. President Vladimir Putin deployed Russian soldiers to Syria last year and he recently announced that they will begin to withdraw.

Al Qaeda has sent a number of veteran figures to Syria to help lead Al Nusrah in its fight against Assad. If Hukama’s tweet is accurate, then Al Adel is one of them. Other published reports have similarly placed Al Adel in Syria.

Al Adel and four other al Qaeda leaders were reportedly released from custody in Iran last year. The details are murky, but press accounts indicated that the five jihadists were exchanged for an Iranian diplomat who had been kidnapped in Yemen. [See LWJ report, Senior al Qaeda leaders reportedly released from custody in Iran.]

Al Qaeda released several publications by Al Adel last year. The writings were apparently intended to reintroduce Al Adel to al Qaeda’s rank and file. One of the works that was posted online deals with guerrilla warfare and revolutions. Al Adel has a reputation in jihadist circles as a sharp military strategist, and the release of the pamphlet was likely intended to expose his thinking to a wider audience.

Unlike the Islamic State, al Qaeda has pooled its resources with other rebel groups in the fight against Assad’s regime. Early last year, Al Nusrah and another al Qaeda-linked group, Ahrar al Sham, cofounded the Jaysh al Fath (“Army of Conquest”) alliance, which quickly overran the northwestern Idlib province. It is possible that Al Adel is now helping to guide Al Nusrah’s guerrilla warfare strategy, including al Qaeda’s relations with other Syrian rebel organizations.

In late August 2015, Al Adel’s eulogy of Abu Khalid al Suri, an al Qaeda veteran who served as both a senior figure in Ahrar al Sham and as Ayman al Zawahiri’s representative in Syria, was also released. Al Suri was killed in February 2014 by fighters dispatched by the Islamic State, al Qaeda’s jihadist rival. Al Suri was assigned by Zawahiri to broker a truce between Abu Bakr al Baghdadi’s organization and Al Nusrah Front, but his efforts failed. Al Suri was one of the Islamic State’s harshest critics at the time of his demise.

In his eulogy, Al Adel described al Suri as the “lion of Jihad Wahl,” a training camp in pre-9/11 Afghanistan. Al Adel remembered al Suri’s time training the “youths,” helping them to “build their bodies” and “teaching them target practice.” Al Adel also reminisced about al Suri’s time yelling at the new recruits with his peculiar voice. Years later, al Suri would serve the same role in Ahrar al Sham, training the organization’s new members. A video released by Ahrar al Sham in July 2015 included a short snippet of al Suri instructing Ahrar’s recruits. And Ahrar al Sham’s own eulogy in 2014 confirmed that al Suri “supervised” its “training camps.”

Al Adel’s eulogy contained an implicit criticism of the Islamic State, as he wondered who could possibly dare “to kill a sheikh among the sheikhs of the mujahideen,” meaning al Suri. Al Adel described al Suri’s killers as having “twisted” and “perverted” thoughts.

Other leadership details

Shaybat al Hukama is a nom de guerre meaning “the eldest of the wise.” The alias is likely a tribute to Ayman al Zawahiri, as al Qaeda’s overall leader is often referred to as the “wise man” of the Muslim nation. The pseudonym is also intended to convey the jihadist’s familiarity with al Qaeda’s thinking at the highest levels. [For more on Shaybat al Hukama see LWJ report, Well-connected jihadist tweets, then deletes, explanation of al Qaeda’s oath to Mullah Omar.]

Indeed, Hukama has tweeted statements attributed to Zawahiri. On Feb. 21, for instance, he posted a letter by Zawahiri discussing the appointment of Abu Ubaydah Ahmad Umar as the emir of Shabaab, al Qaeda’s branch in East Africa. Abu Ubaydah became Shabaab’s emir in September 2014. Hukama said the letter included the “recommendations of the wise man,” meaning Zawahiri, to “the mujahideen’s emir in Somalia” (Abu Ubaydah).

In the letter, Zawahiri approved of Abu Ubaydah’s appointment, saying he is now “in charge of preaching and jihad” in East Africa. Zawahiri urged Ubaydah “to establish the sharia court system and enforce its rule over all” and to “use shura [consultation] as the basis and foundation of his work.”

Contrary to the widespread belief that al Qaeda doesn’t seek to conquer territory, Zawahiri referred to Ubaydah’s duties as a ruler in East Africa.

Ubaydah “should exercise patience and forgiveness, since both are great supports to the emir and wali [governor] in their respective territories,” Zawahiri wrote. The al Qaeda leader also enumerated Abu Ubaydah’s duties, explaining that he should “strive” to provide for the “mujahideen brothers…and their families,” care for the “widows and orphans of martyrs and prisoners,” ensure that the schools are strongholds for the jihadist ideology, and make certain that the “preachers and scholars” have “decent” lives so they can focus on proselytizing.

In other posts, Hukama has underscored the close relationship between Taliban emir Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour and al Qaeda’s senior leaders. For example, one of his tweets included a passage in which Mansour praised Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the founder of al Qaeda in Iraq, for their opposition to the West.

Hukama has also explained that al Qaeda’s leadership is no longer confined to South Asia, as the group now has senior operatives in the Khorasan (meaning Afghanistan and Pakistan), Yemen and Syria. Zawahiri’s man noted that this makes it more difficult for the US to hunt them down, a fact he was all too happy to trumpet on social media.

Thomas Joscelyn is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Senior Editor for The Long War Journal.

Tags: Abu Ubaydah Ahmad Umar, Al Nusrah Front, Ayman al Zawahiri, Saif al Adel, Shabaab, Shaybat al Hukama, Syria

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The Islamic State West Africa (ISWA), which is formerly known as Boko Haram, killed more than 20 people in a double suicide attack at a mosque in northern Nigeria. Both suicide bombers were women. ISWA has used women in 105 suicide attacks in Nigeria and neighboring countries since June 2014, according to data compiled by The Long War Journal.

Today’s suicide bombings took place in the village of Ummarari near the city of Maiduguri in northern Nigeria, where ISWA’s insurgency has raged for more than a half a decade. According to the Nigerian Army, the first female suicide bomber entered a mosque and detonated her explosives. The second suicide bomber triggered her bomb about 50 meters outside of the mosque just minutes after the first explosion, Vanguard reported.

The second suicide attack likely was targeting first responders rendering aid to those wounded in the initial blast. This is a tactic that is frequently used by jihadist groups, including the Islamic State and al Qaeda, throughout the world. Officials said that 22 people were killed and 18 more were wounded in the suicide assault.

ISWA suicide bombers have targeted a wide range of civilian targets that includes mosques, schools, refugee camps, markets, and government buildings, as well as military installations and security checkpoints.

Despite a coordinated military offensive by Nigeria, Chad, and Cameroon – which has targeted ISWA strongholds in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region – the jihadist group has maintained the ability to launch coordinated attacks and assaults throughout the region. Many of these include the use of women and/or girls as suicide bombers.

According to data compiled by The Long War Journal, ISWA has utilized at least 105 women and girls as suicide bombers in Nigeria, Cameroon, and in Chad since June 2014.

The majority of the suicide attacks involving women have occurred in Nigeria. At least 11 have occurred in neighboring Cameroon, though, and three or more took place in southern Chad in the Lake Chad region.

The ISWA’s deployment of women and girls as suicide bombers is a common tactic in Nigeria over the past two years. The group’s first known instance of using a female suicide bomber was on June 8, 2014, when a middle-aged woman on a motorcycle detonated near a Nigerian military barracks in Gombe, killing one policeman. In one of the deadliest attacks, on Nov. 27, 2014, two women killed 78 people and wounded scores more at a market in Maiduguri.

The use of women make it easier for jihadist groups to carry out suicide attacks, as explosives are often easier to hide, and men are less likely to search women due to cultural sensitivities. The ages of the bombers have ranged from just nine-years-old to middle-aged. Many of the women and girls used in these bombings are likely forced into committing the attacks, however, some could be the widows or daughters of killed fighters. In Russia’s southern Caucasus region, several widows of killed fighters, dubbed “Black Widows,” have conducted various suicide bombings in the region. Despite efforts by regional countries to make it harder for ISWA to use females, like the banning of the niqab (face veil), the jihadist group will likely continue to exploit females in its attacks in West Africa.

Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of The Long War Journal. Caleb Weiss is an intern at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a contributor to The Long War Journal.

Tags: Boko Haram, Islamic State West Africa, Nigeria

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Ivorian troops responding to the attack. (Photo: Abidjan.net)

Gunmen from Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) targeted a popular beach resort in southern Ivory Coast today, killing at least 14 civilians and two soldiers according to local media. The beach resort, which is in the city of Grand Bassam, is located only 25 miles east of Ivory Coast’s largest city of Abidjan.

According to the AFP, the gunmen “roamed the beach firing shots” before targeting the L’Etoile du Sud and two other nearby hotels. Local media has reported that the three hotels are popular with Westerners and other expatriates, which is likely why the hotels were attacked. The Ivorian government responded to the assault by deploying military personnel to the resort and quickly “neutralized” the gunmen, which is usually a euphemism for killed. Graphic photos from the scene appear to show several bodies strewn across the beach, as well as weapons recovered by the military, but are too graphic to be published at The Long War Journal.

The government’s statement says that “six terrorists” were killed, however, in AQIM’s short claim of responsibility released online, the jihadist group states only three of its fighters were involved in the assault.  “Three heroes from the knights of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb were able to break into the tourist resort city of Grand Bassam,” the jihadists said indicating a larger statement will be released soon. The Mauritanian news site Al Akhbar has reported that sources within AQIM told the site that its Sahara Emirate and its Katibat al Murabitoon, which is led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, were behind the offensive. Al Qaeda has yet to release a larger statement confirming this.

However, these two al Qaeda groups have been responsible for other similar hotel attacks in the region. In January, the Katibat al Murabitoon killed 20 after assaulting the Splendid Hotel in Burkina Faso’s capital of Ouagadougou with two car bombs before breaching the perimeter and entering the hotel. In addition to hitting the hotel, a nearby restaurant was also targeted. Over 30 hostages were freed before the situation was contained. (See Threat Matrix report, Al Qaeda attacks hotel in Burkina Faso.)

Before that, the Sahara Emirate and Al Murabitoon attacked Mali’s capital of Bamako in November. In that offensive, the jihadists stormed the Radisson Blue in Bamako, killing 22 civilians and taking more than 100 people hostage before being killed in a joint raid led by Malian forces. Al Murabitoon said it was responsible in conjunction with the “Sahara Emirate” of AQIM, according to a statement sent to Al Jazeera. In August, Al Murabitoon attacked a hotel in the central Malian town of Sevare, killing 12. (See LWJ report, Al Qaeda group claims credit for attack on hotel in Mali’s capital.)

The Bamako assault heralded the reintigration of Al Murabitoon into AQIM. On Dec. 4, AQIM’s Al Andalus Media released an audio statement from Abdelmalek Droukdel, the emir of AQIM, announcing the merger of Al Murabitoon into its ranks. The same statement also said that the Bamako raid was the first joint assault carried out by the two.

Al Murabitoon is led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a veteran African jihadist who is openly loyal to Ayman al Zawahiri and has denounced the Islamic State. Belmokhtar was originally a commander in AQIM before splitting with the group over personal disagreements with Droukdel and other leaders. Belmokhtar and his followers have been behind several spectacular attacks in West Africa over the past several years, including the January 2013 suicide assault on the In Amenas gas facility in southeastern Algeria, and the May 2013 suicide assaults in Niger which targeted a military barracks and uranium mine.

The Sahara Emirate of AQIM is led by Yahya Abu Hammam, who is listed by the US as a specially designated global terrorist for playing a “key role in the group’s ongoing terrorist activities in North Africa and Mali.” It is based in northern Mali, but is able to strike in far reaching places within the Sahel. The reintegration of Al Murabitoon further strengthens its abilities in the region.

Caleb Weiss is an intern at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a contributor to The Long War Journal.

Tags: AQIM, Ivory Coast, Mali

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Hisham Ali Ashmawi, as pictured in a new message released on March 3.

Hisham Ali Ashmawi, a former Egyptian special forces officer who is openly loyal to al Qaeda, released an audio message earlier this month in which he called on scholars to support the jihadists’ cause.

Ashmawi, also known as Abu Umar al Muhajir, is the leader of Al Murabitoon, an al Qaeda-linked group that operates in the Sinai and elsewhere in North Africa.

Egyptian Muslims are experiencing a “tragedy” under President Abdel Fattah El Sisi’s rule, Ashmawi claimed. The “ulema” (Islamic scholars) should “incite the youth and remind them it is now our duty to expel the invaders from the abode of Islam and wage jihad against the criminal El Sisi, his soldiers, and supporters,” he added, according to a translation obtained by The Long War Journal.

Ashmawi argued that the mujahideen cannot be victorious unless the “ulema” and sheikhs support them. The jihadists’ “battles…to settle the conflict between truth and falsehood will not continue, nor be successful,” without the scholars’ help in mobilizing the people.

Ashmawi’s 23-minute audio statement, which was disseminated via social media on March 3, is likely intended to influence Egyptian clerics and rally them to al Qaeda’s cause in the Sinai and elsewhere. His message is accompanied by a still photo of him dressed in military garb with his face obscured.

Al Murabitoon attempted to tie Ashmawi’s latest message to the jihadists’ conflict with Israel. Images from Jerusalem are shown at the end of production. (A screen shot can be seen on the right.) And the words, “O Aqsa, we are coming,” are flashed on the screen. This is a reference to the Al Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem.

The first message attributed to Ashmawi was released in July 2015, when he announced that his leadership role in Al Murabitoon. [See LWJ report, Former Egyptian special forces officer leads Al Murabitoon.]

It is not entirely clear how Ashmawi’s group fits into al Qaeda’s network as another al Qaeda-linked organization, led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, also calls itself Al Murabitoon and operates in North Africa. Ashmawi is likely responsible for at least some of al Qaeda’s efforts inside Egypt, and he may be al Qaeda’s overall emir inside the country. The US targeted Belmokhtar in an airstrike last June, but his fate remains uncertain. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Al Murabitoon, and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula have all issued statements denying that Belmokhtar was killed.

Ashmawi was once a leading figure in Ansar Bayt al Maqdis (ABM), which swore allegiance to the Islamic State’s Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. ABM was subsequently rebranded as the Islamic State’s Sinai “province” and is waging a prolific campaign against Egyptian security forces. The arm of the Islamic State also claimed responsibility downing a Russian airliner last October.

Unlike his comrades in ABM, however, Ashmawi did not join the Islamic State’s expanding global network. Instead, he remained faithful to al Qaeda.

In August 2015, the Islamic State’s supporters claimed that Ashmawi was in Libya and assisting the “caliphate’s” jihadists rivals. Baghdadi’s loyalists even released a “wanted dead” poster for the former Egyptian military officer, underscoring the Islamic State’s enmity for him. [See LWJ report, The Islamic State’s ‘wanted dead’ list in Libya.]

Egyptian officials have accused Ashmawi of being involved in a string of high-profile attacks since he left the military and joined the jihadists.

Hisham Barakat, Egypt’s chief prosecutor, was killed by a car bomb in Cairo in June 2015. Thus far, no jihadist group has claimed responsibility for the assassination. Egyptian authorities initially said Ashmawi was responsible. But Egypt’s interior minister, Maj. Gen. Magdi Abdel Ghaffar, alleged earlier this month that the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas were actually behind the operation. Ghaffar’s claims drew skepticism, however, as he contradicted earlier assessments offered to the public and he didn’t provide concrete evidence to back up his allegations.

Previous Egyptian press accounts have also claimed that Ashmawi is suspected of masterminding the attempted assassination of Mohammad Ibrahim, who was then Egypt’s interior minister, in September 2013. As The Long War Journal previously reported, the plot against Ibrahim revealed a number of intriguing connections between Ashmawi and al Qaeda’s global network. Walid Badr, the suicide bomber who attempted to kill Ibrahim, also once served in the Egyptian military. Both Badr and Ashmawi reportedly fought in Syria under the banner of Al Nusrah Front, an official branch of al Qaeda.

Thomas Joscelyn is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Senior Editor for The Long War Journal.

Tags: Al Murabitoon, Egypt, Hisham al Ashmawi, Libya, Sinai

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Screenshot from the video from Al Eis, Aleppo

The Caucasus Emirate in Syria, the official Syrian branch of the al Qaeda-linked Caucasus Emirate, has released two videos highlighting its role in the current fighting in the Aleppo province.

The first video shows a nighttime operation against Kurdish forces in the Aleppo neighborhood of Sheikh Maqsud. No nightvision equipment appears to have been used in the video, however, heavy fighting can be heard. The Caucasus Emirate in Syria is not the only al Qaeda-linked group fighting the Kurds in Sheikh Maqsud. Ansar al Islam, which was originally founded in Iraq in 2001, has reported its forces are fighting the Kurds in the area. Additionally, the Uzbek group Katibat Imam al Bukhari, which is loyal to the Afghan Taliban, has released a video showing its forces fighting the Kurds there as well.

The second video was reportedly recorded shortly before the battle at Al Eis in the southern Aleppo countryside. A fighter in the group, presumably a native Syrian, gives a short Arabic-language address in which he states that the Caucasus Emirate in Syria and two other al Qaeda groups, Jund al Aqsa, and the Al Nusrah Front, al Qaeda’s official branch, will fight together to “liberate the Aleppo countryside from Assad, Iran, and Satan’s dogs [referring to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias].” The jihadists later reported success at Al Eis, but the Assad regime has stated that its forces and their allies have recaptured the area.

The Caucasus Emirate in Syria was formed when the former emir of Jaish al Muhajireen wal Ansar (Army of Emigrants and Helpers), Salahuddin Shishani, was removed from his post along with his deputy, Abdul Karim Krymsky, last summer. A small group of Chechen and other North Caucasian fighters followed suit and left with Shishani. The group then released a video announcing its formation and its bayah (allegiance) to the Caucasus Emirate and its emir at the time, Abu Usman Gimrinsky . However, From Chechnya to Syria has reported that Shishani was also deposed of his leadership position of the Caucasus Emirate in Syria, and now leads another small Chechen-led group.

Caleb Weiss is an intern at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a contributor to The Long War Journal.

Tags: Al Qaeda, aleppo, Caucasus Emirate, Caucasus Emirate in Syria, Sheikh Maqsud, Syria

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Just days after the US military struck a Shabaab training camp north of Mogadishu, special operations forces and Somali troops launched a raid near the Somali capital overnight. Details are scarce, but Shabaab has reported that one of its fighters was killed in the firefight. Somali officials claimed that 19 Shabaab fighters were killed.

According to Shabaab’s military spokesman Abdulaziz Abu Musab, “foreign forces riding in two helicopters attacked the Awdigle district” of Somalia’s Lower Shabelle region. Giving more detail, he said that the foreign forces “disembarked from the two helicopters at the outskirts of the district and proceeded to the Hisbah Center (Islamic police) and violent clashes occurred around 1 am.” Abu Musab claimed that the jihadists fought off the attackers, but confirmed that one fighter from Shabaab was killed.

While Shabaab’s spokesman did not specify which nationality the “foreign forces” were in the statement, a US official confirmed to AFP on the condition of anonymity that US special operations carried out the raid with the Somali military. The official described the assault as a “partnered raid” with Somali forces, which is another term for a joint-assault. Somali officials also confirmed to AFP that the joint-assault occurred in the Awdigle district, just 30 miles west of Mogadishu.

Captain Jeff Davis, a Pentagon spokesman, later told The New York Times that the US forces involved only served in a consultative role. Specifically, he said that “it was their [Somali military] mission. We were acting in an advisory role.” It is unclear if the US soldiers left the helicopters and engaged Shabaab during the firefight. The American troops did not “go all the way to the objective,” Davis continued.

The involvement of US special operations forces in the Awdigle raid and the heavy resistance put up by Shabaab indicates that the objective was to capture a high value target. The US military typically launches drone and conventional airstrikes against Shabaab leaders and commanders when it wants to kill them.

The US military has launched similar air assaults in the past. In 2013, Shabaab said it “repelled” a nighttime raid by US special operations in Barawe. US officials later confirmed that US Navy SEALs carried out the operation to capture a “high-level Shabaab operative,” but the operation was not successful. [See LWJ report, Shabaab claims it ‘repelled’ raid by Western special operations forces.]

In one of the most high-profile raids in Somalia, US special operations forces killed Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan in Barawe in September 2009. Nabhan was one of the most sought out al Qaeda operatives in Africa. He was wanted for involvement in al Qaeda’s 1998 suicide attacks against US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Before he was killed, he served as a top leader in both Shabaab and Al Qaeda East Africa, and also was instrumental in facilitating the official merger between al Qaeda and Shabaab. Shabaab has named a military “brigade” after Nabhan.

French special operations forces have also carried out operations inside Somalia. In January 2013, French commandos launched a failed raid in the town of Bula Marer to free a French intelligence official who was captured by Shabaab in 2009. Shabaab fighters repelled the attack and captured a French commando, who later died in custody. Shabaab released photographs of the captured soldier and weapons and gear seized during the raid, and then executed the French intelligence official.

Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of The Long War Journal. Caleb Weiss is an intern at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a contributor to The Long War Journal.

Tags: Al Qaeda, Shabaab, Somalia

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