Your AI overlords demand to be recognized...

Oh, inventorship and AI. As much as Crispr has been preoccupying the IP agendas of IP conferences the last couple of years, inventorship and AI looks to be taking its place. The IPKat has also been a fan of the topic (see Kat posts here). For the AmeriKat's part, she thinks that, for the time-being, AI inventorship is (for the most part) a non-event, but not everyone agrees.  Indeed some issue warnings about not recognizing the role of AI in inventorship.

"Last week the European Patent Office stated that an inventor must be a ‘natural person’. This provides the basis for the EPO’s decision in December to reject two patent applications which had named the artificially intelligent system Dabus as the sole inventor. The patent applications were made by Dr Thaler’s team at Surrey University and described a flashing beacon light and plastic food container.

Dr Thaler’s failed ‘AI inventor’ applications have raised an important question - can AI be inventive? However, in this article, I shall not dwell on the specific merits of Dr Thaler’s applications but instead focus on Google DeepMind’s artificially intelligent system AlphaGo.

In 2016, AlphaGo was capable of reading and understanding the prior art of the game Go, finding novel and inventive solutions to defeat its opponent Lee Sedol (the world champion) 4 games to 5 and effectively communicating that solution to Aja Haung, the DeepMind team member who placed stones on AlphaGo’s behalf. However, the technology behind AlphaGo is not limited to board games, it also extends to sectors with patentable subject matter such as telecommunications and pharmaceuticals.

This article argues that AI can be inventive, that AI differs from other platform technologies and for the sake of transparency, AI inventorship should be recognised.

AlphaGo

In 1997, Garry Kasparov became the first chess world champion to lose a match to a computer which had been programmed by expert chess players. In 2016, Lee Sedol became the first Go world champion to lose to a computer that had taught itself - AlphaGo.

Prior to Sedol’s defeat it was thought that humans would retain the upper hand in Go because in any one position there are 200 possible moves, whilst in chess there are 20. To put this into perspective the number of possible configurations of a Go board is greater than the number of atoms in the universe. In fact, even if you took all the computers in the world and ran them for a million years, this would still not be enough computing power to calculate all the possible variations. Therefore, AlphaGo cannot simply compute every possible move, it must rely on something else – intuition.

In the second game AlphaGo made Move 37 and gave us a glimpse of a future shaped by computer intuition and inventiveness. However, Move 37 appeared at first to be a mistake because no competent human player would have made it. In fact, AlphaGo knew that there was only a 1 in 10,000 chance a human would have made Move 37, yet despite this, it ignored the games received wisdom or prior art and made an inventive move.

Post-match analysis concluded that Move 37 was the pivot on which the game had turned in AlphaGo’s favour. Lee Sedol later described it as a “really creative and beautiful” move. The lessons that AlphaGo has taught and continues to teach human Go players amounts to an improvement in the game’s prior art and if Move 37 were patentable, it would be an inventive step.

How AI differs from other platform technologies e.g. mouse models

Aja Haung was the DeepMind team member who placed stones on the Go board for AlphaGo in its victory over Lee Sedol. However, it is unreasonable to suggest that Haung was the creative mind behind Move 37 because at no point did he exercise choice. Move 37 would have occurred irrespective of whether it was Haung or this author placing the stones.

Mouse models on the other hand still require scientists to exercise choice either when selecting the antigenic challenge or in determining which antibody therapeutics may be suitable for use in humans. The scientist in making these choices must rely on their experience and intelligence, which is why the scientist rather than the mouse is the named inventor. A useful antibody therapeutic would not exist irrespective of whether a scientist skilled in the art or this author were conducting the experiment.

I have used AlphaGo as an example because the human operator is an automaton but mouse models do pose an interesting problem; namely making a choice based on a menu of limited options does not appear particularly inventive. Is there a difference between a mouse model and an artificially intelligent system that still requires the human operator to exercise choice?

The difference is that the immune system of a mouse is static, in that it does not get better over time at identifying antibody therapeutics for use in humans. Artificially intelligent systems on the other hand are dynamic in that over time they do get better at their given task. For example, DeepMind went onto develop AlphaGo Zero in 2017, which with no prior knowledge of the game Go and only the basic rules as an input had at three days surpassed the abilities of AlphaGo Lee, the version discussed above. It had achieved this entirely from self-play, without human intervention or historical data. In just a few weeks AlphaGo Zero had accumulated thousands of years of human knowledge but it had also discovered new knowledge. It developed unconventional strategies and creative new moves that echoed and surpassed Move 37. Mouse models will always require an intelligent human scientist but artificially intelligent systems will over time make their human operators increasingly redundant. How will we know when humans have become redundant in the inventive process if an AI cannot be named as an inventor?

Furthermore, Google recently announced that its Sycamore quantum processor had performed a specific task in 200 seconds that would have taken the world’s best supercomputer 10,000 years to complete. One of the major applications of quantum computing is in artificial intelligence and if successfully applied will make AlphaGo Zero appear prehistoric in comparison.

The dual purpose of patents - ownership and transparency

In return for the grant of a twenty-year monopoly society demands transparency from the owners of patents. But in denying the existence of ‘AI inventors’ society risks losing this transparency because it encourages human inventors to either down play the extent of AI assistance in a patent application or alternatively to rely on trade secrets. In either scenario transparency is lost but does this matter?

The creative outputs of both Aja Haung and AlphaGo are owned by Google but that ownership should not make it irrelevant which of the two’s creativity was responsible for defeating Lee Sedol. Without the legal fiction of AI inventorship we are headed for a society in which Aja Haung became the Go world champion in 2016. "

For the past couple of weeks, the patent news has been saturated with reports and commentaries on the Board of Appeal decision in the CRISPR hearing (T 844/18). Many readers may not have the time and/or enthusiasm to read all of these articles. However, what this Kat lacks in time she makes up for in enthusiasm, and provides your post-hearing highlights:

First, a case refresh...

A picture may speak a thousand words, but how many of those words are clear and unambiguous? In a recently published Board of Appeal decision (T 1943/15), the Board considered the circumstances under which a disclosure of a component's dimension may be derived solely from the patent drawings, either by eye or by measurement. 

The Board of Appeal in the CRISPR hearing has found the Broad Institute's patent to lack priority and dismissed the appeal (T 0844/18). George Schlich (Opponent 1) in the CRISPR appeal has just told IPKat: "After nearly 4 days at the Board of Appeal, this was a hard fought case. We now know for absolute certain - appeal dismissed. Patent revoked."

After yesterday's hints from the Board of Appeal that they intended to refer the issue of priority to the Enlarged Board of Appeal, many were predicting that the Board of Appeal would go ahead with the referral (see IPKat's report on Day 1, and Days 2-3). However, it seems that the Board of Appeal were convinced by the arguments from the opponents that the referral was not necessary. After hearing 3 days of arguments on the issue of priority, the Board felt confident that they could decide on the point of law and dismissed the appeal. The Board of Appeal agreed with the opposition division that the priority claim was invalid.

End of the road for EP2771468

The Board of Appeal (3.3.08) finished hearing submissions on priority from the parties this morning. Proceedings were then adjourned until the afternoon whilst the Board conferred. The parties undoubtedly had a tense lunch. The Board was either going to decide on the issue of priority or refer the issue to the EBA for clarification. There was a strong feeling following the comments made by the Board of Appeal on Day 3 that a referral to the EBA was likely. However, news came soon after recommencement of the proceedings that the Board of Appeal was to dismiss the appeal. [In a classic fake news saga, Merpel watched with bemusement today the ongoing proliferation of reports that the Board of Appeal had referred the matter to the EBA].

The immediate impact of the referral would have been to prolong the dispute. Even if the EBA had accepted the referral (far from certain), any decision from the EBA would not have been the end of the matter. The EBA is there to provide clarity on points of law. After a EBA decision, the case would then have had to be sent back to the Board of Appeal. Those wishing for legal clarity will welcome the Board of Appeal's decision to settle the matter today.

On the other hand, a fact easily forgotten amidst the all the excitement over this week's appeal hearing, is that the patent in dispute, EP2771468, is far from being the Broad Institute only patent relating to CRISPR. Whilst today is the end of the road for EP2771468, there are 5 divisional applications in the same family as the patent in dispute: EP2784162, EP2896697, EP2940140, EP2921557, EP3144390.

EP2784162 and EP2896697 were revoked in opposition earlier last year. The appeals are pending. EP2940140  and EP2921557 have been opposed. EP3144390 has been accepted by the Examining Division, but not yet granted. In other words, despite the dismissal of the appeal today, we may see the dispute rumble on. However, presumably, should the other cases in the family reach the Board of Appeal, with the same issues at stake, the appeals would be dealt with in the same way as the one today.

The patent family of EP2771468 is also, of course, not the only family relating to CRISPR. There are many other patents relating to aspects of CRISPR technology, owned by the Broad Institute and other parties, most notably University California Berkeley.

We now await publication of the minutes of oral proceedings and the written decision. Thanks again to all our Katfriends for their faithful reporting.

Twitter was awash today with news that the Board of Appeal in the CRISPR appeal case had referred questions on priority to the Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBA). However, these reports proved premature. None-the-less, there seems no doubt that the Board of Appeal are leaning towards a referral. The European patent community is advised to adopt the brace position.

Today is the third day of the proceedings in the CRISPR appeal case (See IPKat's report on Day 1 for full background to the case: the Broad Institute's CRISPR patent appeal hearing: Day 1, Setting the Stage).

Image source: a Katfriend

In brief summary, the Broad Institute's CRISPR patent was revoked by the opposition division for lacking a valid priority claim under the well-established EPO approach to priority, based on mountains of Boards of Appeal case law. The Patentee's argument on appeal is that the EPO approach to priority is wrong because it is not in line with the Paris Convention or a proper interpretation of Article 87 EPC. There are three threads to the Patentee's argument: (I) Entitlement to priority should not be assessed by the EPO, (II) the EPO incorrectly interprets the phrase “any person” in Article 87 EPC and Article 4 Paris Convention, and (III) US law should govern the interpretation of “any person” in Article 87 EPC when the priority application is a US provisional.

Today was Day 1 of the Board of Appeal hearing on the validity of one of the Broad Institute’s patents relating to fundamental aspects of CRISPR technology. The simple question at the heart of the dispute between the Broad Institute and the opponents was summarised with admirable succinctness by the Board of Appeal in their preliminary opinion:

“A and B are applicants for the priority application. A alone is the applicant of the subsequent application. Is this priority claim valid even without any assignment of priority right from B to A? The appellants say that the answer is ‘yes’ and the respondents that the answer is ‘no’”.

Attentive readers will be aware that today is the first day of the CRISPR Board of Appeal hearing at the EPO on the issue of priority. For readers unlucky enough not to be in attendance (and who also do not want to spend the day glued to twitter), IPKat will be providing a handy summary of any significant developments. To keep readers entertained in the meantime, IPKat considers another controversial aspect of EPO case law, selection inventions. 

As even only occasional readers of IPKat will be aware, last year saw a flurry of referrals to the Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBA) (see: The Year of the Pepper: 2019 Enlarged Board of Appeal Year in Review). Over on DeltaPatents, there was also a report on "the EBA referral that never happened". The issue in question was selection inventions. Selection inventions are those directed to a sub-division of the known art. Examples of selection inventions include a sub-range of a known range, or the use of a known therapeutic to treat a sub-category of disease.  Roel van Woudenberg of DeltaPatents reported that, despite what some see as the ongoing lack of clarity regarding how the novelty of selection inventions should be assessed, the President of the EPO refused a requestfrom the European Patent Institute (EPI) (the Institute of Professional Representatives before the EPO) to refer this issue to the EBA.

Slicing up the prior art

In the second of IPKat's 2019 Patent Year in Reviews, we provide a break-down of some of the important Board of Appeal cases published this year . The end of 2019 comes too early for the most highly anticipated appeal case of the times (the Board Institute's CRISPR appeal), for which oral proceedings are being held in January. However, the discerning EPO case law enthusiast can still find plenty to interest them in the Boards of Appeal cases published this year. Highlights include a new approach from a Board of Appeal on the novelty of purity inventions (T 1085/13), a couple of cases on the burden of proof (T 2037/18, T 1299/15) and a foreshadowing of the type of arguments expected to become more common following introduction of the revised Rule of Procedure of the Boards of Appeal (RPBA) on 1 January 2020 (T0688/16). See also the IPKat 2019 Enlarged Board of Appeal Year in Review.

Celebrating the end of 2019

Priority

The European patent community is eagerly awaiting the outcome of oral proceedings in the high-profile CRISPR case. The exceedingly long written submissions (and occasional impassioned rhetoric) are a mark of the cases's importance: "Should everyone else change, or just the Patentee?": Progress of the Broad's CRISPR appeal. The Board of Appeal (3.3.08) has already issued its preliminary opinion: BREAKING: Board of Appeal provides some initial thoughts on the Broad Institute’s CRISPR appeal (T0844/18). It is widely expected that the Board of Appeal will dismiss the appeal. In a straw poll of the audience of the recent 2019 CIPA life science conference delegates, not one hand was raised to indicate an expectation of a positive outcome for the patentee. A decision in favour of the patentee would send a shock-wave through the European patent community.

However, the issue at stake in the CRISPR case is not the only game in town when it comes to priority at the EPO. There is growing appreciation that another issue of the EPO's approach to priority needs consideration by the Boards of Appeal. The EPO's approach to co-applicants when assessing a priority claim is one that is growing in prominence. It is hoped that the Board of Appeals will soon consider this issue and provide some much needed clarity for applicants: Clarity is needed from the Boards of Appeal on the EPO's "co-applicant approach" to priority.

Another Board of Appeal case to consider priority this year was T 0725/14. This case was an interesting reversal of the norm in cases of invalid priority. We are used to situations in which the patentee is called on to prove an assignment of the right to priority before the filing date of an application claiming priority. In T 0725/14, the Opponent faced a different but related challenge. The priority application and the PCT application were filed in the name of the same applicant. The Opponent successfully argued that the rights to claim priority had in fact been transferred to another company before the PCT application was filed. The priority claim was therefore found invalid: Assigned or not assigned? - the tricky issue of priority right transfer (T 0725/14)

Novelty: Purity, prior use and undisclosed disclaimers

For many years the EPO considered an increase in the purity of a compound a special case with respect to novelty. The burden of proof was placed on the applicant to show that the claimed level of purity was never achieved in the prior art. However, in perhaps one of the most important Boards of Appeal decisions published last year (T 1085/13), a Board of Appeal (3.3.02) found that previous decision of the Boards of Appeal were contrary to the principle that novelty can only destroyed by a clear and unambiguous disclosure in the prior art: Purity can be unconventional, a new position for the EPO boards of appeal (T 1085/13).

The novelty of a claim may be destroyed by an accidental anticipation, i.e. your claim may, by accident, cover something entirely unrelated to your inventive concept. In such cases, the Enlarged Board of Appeal established in G 1/16 and G 1/03 that an undisclosed disclaimer may be introduced into the claims to restore novelty, but not inventive step. The Board of Appeal (3.3.02) in T 1218/14 provided an important nuance to the criteria under which an undisclosed disclaimer will be allowed. In particular, the test is not whether the previous disclosure may be considered for the purposes of inventive step. The test is a higher one than this. The disclosure must be so removed from the invention that it would never be considered for inventive step or even thought about at all in relation to the claimed invention: Nuances in the definition of accidental anticipation (T 1218/14).

Novelty may also be destroyed by the prior use of a claimed invention. Prior use was a topic considered by both the EPO Boards of Appeal and the UK court's this year: Mr Justice Nugee and the Superhose: The potentiality of disclosure. The case before the Boards of Appeal related to the prior use of a train carriage: Proving the existence of confidentiality agreements and the celestial teapot - T 2037/18. The Board of Appeal (3.2.01) considered the question of where the burden of proof should rest with regards to the existence (or not) or conditions of confidentiality.

Sufficiency of disclosure

Another case to consider burden of proof was T 1299/15. This case considered where the burden of proof should rest in cases of alleged insufficiency. An opponent arguing that an invention is insufficiently disclosed generally must provide evidence that, despite making all reasonable efforts, they were unable to put the invention into practice. However, as the Board of Appeal (3.2.05) in T 1299/15 confirmed, it is possible for the burden of proof to shift back to the patentee if "serious doubts" exist regarding whether a skilled person could carry out the invention: Burden of Proof was Shifting the burden of proof back to the patentee (T 1299/15).

Exceptions to patentability

Perfect teeth

Methods of surgery are excluded from patentability under Article 53(c) EPC. T 2699/17 was an appeal from the Examining Division on the question of whether a method of restoring dental crowns was invasive and risky enough to fall under the exclusion (as interpreted by G 1/07). The Board of Appeal found that there were substantial health risks associated with crown restoration in general, including permanent damage to the gums and teeth. However, the applicant submitted evidence that the claimed method posed far less of a risk. The Board of Appeal agreed with the appellant that the claimed method was not invasive and posed a risk that could be equated to that of tattooing and piercing. The method was therefore of low substantial risk to health. The training required by a medical profession to perform the method was also found to be minimal. The claim was therefore found not to relate to an exception to patentability.

Following EPO procedure

There were also a number of Board of Appeal decisions this year dealing with some intricacies of EPO procedure. T0688/16 foreshadowed the type of argument  that may become more common following the introduction of the new Rules of Procedure of the Boards of Appeal (RPBA) in January: Event Report: CIPA seminar on the revised Rules of Procedure of the Board of Appeal. The Board of Appeal in T0688/16 particularly had to consider "arguments about arguments". The Board of Appeal found that the Opposition Division had inappropriately used their discretion under Rule 116 EPC in not allowing submissions from the patentee in opposition oral proceedings. This was because Rule 116 EPC only applies when there has been a negative preliminary opinion from the Opposition Division. In the case considered by T0688/16 there had been a positive preliminary opinion, and so Rule 116 EPC did not apply: An inappropriate use of discretion leads to ping-pong (T0688/16).

Appropriate EPO procedure was also at issue in T 0703/19. This case related to the topic of appeal fee payment (appeal fee payment was also the subject of the Enlarged Board of Appeal referral G 1/18: Enlarged Board of Appeal opinion on G 1/18). In T 0703/19, the Board of Appeal (3.2.08) considered the question of when a user of the EPO has a legitimate expectation to be informed of an underpayment of an appeal fee. The Board confirmed that to create such a legal expectation, the EPO must be able to recognise that the appeal fee should have been paid. The EPO should also have been able to recognise this in time for the failure to be rectified. A key fact of the case in T 0703/19 was that "legitimate expectations" had been created by the mention in the notice of appeal that the appeal fee was thereby paid: The three Rs of legitimate expectation: Recognizability, recoverability and responsibility (T 0703/19).

The prize for creative legal reasoning this year goes to the Board of Appeal in T 1003/19. This case was an appeal from the Examining Division (ED). The ED had granted an application based on a text-intended for grant in which all of the drawings showing the invention were missing. The Board of Appeal (3.3.05) found that the document provided by the ED as the text-intended for grant contained amendments that were neither requested by the applicant nor explicitly suggested by the ED. Thus, the Board of Appeal reasoned, the text provided as the text-intended for grant was not, in fact, intended for grant. The Board concluded that the applicant could therefore not be said to have approved the text for grant. The decision to grant the patent was therefore set aside: When is the “text-intended for grant” not intended for grant? (T 1003/19).

Moving on to the failure of an applicant (or their representative) to follow correct EPO procedure, the legal Board of Appeal (3.1.01) in J 05/18 considered the requirements for re-establishment (Article 122 EPC). The Board of Appeal concluded that even if a mistake results from an isolated error in a well-functioning system, the mistake may still demonstrate lack of all due care. The error in the case in question stemmed from a failure of the US attorneys to monitor a deadline for further processing (and arguably the failure of the EP representative to confirm with the US attorneys that the client did not wish to request further processing): Re-establishment: An isolated error in a well-functioning system may not be equivalent to all due care (J 05/18).

A welcome innovation of the new RPBA is that the upcoming cases of each of the Boards of Appeal are now available to view online: Annual list of cases.

Opposition and infringement

The Board of Appeal in T 0439/17 considered the circumstances under which a third party may intervene in opposition proceedings after the opposition period has expired. Article 105(1)(a) EPC provides that such an intervention may be made if infringement proceedings are brought against the third party. However, the meaning of "infringement proceedings" presents some difficulties, given the diversity of potential "patent infringement" related court proceedings in EPC member states. The Board of Appeal in T 0439/17 decided that pre-infringement evidence procurement procedures in Germany are not considered sufficient to allow a third party to intervene in opposition proceedings (even if an infringement action is subsequently brought): No benefit of hindsight: BA rejects ex tunc assessment of an intervention in opposition (T 0439/17).

Exams

To many trainee European patent attorneys, the European Qualifying Exams (EQEs) will be looking a lot closer this side of Christmas. As part of their preparation, they may wish to take note of the Disciplinary Board of Appeal's decision in D 11/18 [Warning: Paper B 2018 spoilers]. The Board of Appeal provides confirmation, if any were needed, that in the EQE candidates should take all of the information in the paper at face value. It is often necessary for candidates to ignore any specialist technical knowledge that they may have of the field of the invention. For this reason, it is often said that the EQE disadvantages candidates already familiar with the technical field to which an exam paper relates. These candidates will find it harder not to question the paper's assertions. Candidates are thus encouraged not to challenge what a EQE paper states as fact (an approach that may not come naturally to many patent attorneys...): EQEs - don't speculate beyond the content of the paper (D 11/18).
Proviso

The above review is, of course, not an exhaustive list of all the important Board of Appeal decisions published this year. On the contrary, the list merely represents this Kat's particular favourites. Readers will undoubtedly have their own preferred EPO decisions of 2019, and are invited to provide these in the comments below.

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Other decisions of interest:

T 1731/12 - Exclusions from patentability
A device that is defined by a feature that can only be produced by a surgical or therapeutic step is exempt from patenting under Article 53 (c) EPC

T 1845/14 - Unclear parameters
If a parameter in a claim is essential to solving the technical problem to be solved by the claim (according to the description), the ability of the skilled person to solve that problem is not a suitable criterion for assessing sufficiency of disclosure if the problem to be solved is not part of the claim.

T 0592/15 - Postponement of appeal decision
A request to postpone the taking of the decision on the allowability of an appeal until a divisional application was filed was refused. The Board of appeal reasoned that such a request would oblige the Board of Appeal to examine questions outside of the framework of the appeal concerned.