Intentional erasure
An interesting question appeared on one of the listservs a bit ago..."what is an investigator's protocol for demonstrating intentional erasure of data, ostensibly done by the user to remove evidence from a system?" This is an interesting question and since it doesn't fit neatly into one of the FAQ sections at the end of a chapter in my next book, I thought I'd address that question here in the blog.
The first thing I would look at is the level of erasure that has occurred. One of the first places to check is the Recycle Bin. Many users delete files through the Explorer shell, and they end up in the Recycle Bin...from there, some users don't bother to empty the Recycle Bin. However, this does show an intentional attempt to remove data, based on the actions that are required to move the files to the Recycle Bin.
I have seen instances in which the user has deleted files (ie, sent to the Recycle Bin) and then emptied the Recycle Bin. In such cases, the last modification time on the INFO2 file in the Recycle Bin may give you an idea of when the Recycle Bin was emptied. Again, this may show intent.
In some cases, many of the sectors for the files were then overwritten due to the limited defrag that occurs about every 3 days on a Windows XP system, making the deleted files unrecoverable.
I would also suggest checking the contents of the UserAssist keys, and on XP systems, the Prefetch folder, to see if there are any artifacts to indicate that an erasure tool of some kind was used. This may range from commercial tools to freely available VBS scripts.
One important thing to keep in mind when performing forensic analysis is that given some artifacts, we can expect to see other other artifacts. For example, if we find that auditing of logons has been enabled, and we see user profiles with MAC times (on the NTUSER.DAT files, etc.) that indicate logons, then we can expect to see some information in the SAM file, as well as the Security Event Log. By correlating these sources, we can develop information about our case. However, the absence of those artifacts that we know we should see (but don't) is itself an artifact.
The first thing I would look at is the level of erasure that has occurred. One of the first places to check is the Recycle Bin. Many users delete files through the Explorer shell, and they end up in the Recycle Bin...from there, some users don't bother to empty the Recycle Bin. However, this does show an intentional attempt to remove data, based on the actions that are required to move the files to the Recycle Bin.
I have seen instances in which the user has deleted files (ie, sent to the Recycle Bin) and then emptied the Recycle Bin. In such cases, the last modification time on the INFO2 file in the Recycle Bin may give you an idea of when the Recycle Bin was emptied. Again, this may show intent.
In some cases, many of the sectors for the files were then overwritten due to the limited defrag that occurs about every 3 days on a Windows XP system, making the deleted files unrecoverable.
I would also suggest checking the contents of the UserAssist keys, and on XP systems, the Prefetch folder, to see if there are any artifacts to indicate that an erasure tool of some kind was used. This may range from commercial tools to freely available VBS scripts.
One important thing to keep in mind when performing forensic analysis is that given some artifacts, we can expect to see other other artifacts. For example, if we find that auditing of logons has been enabled, and we see user profiles with MAC times (on the NTUSER.DAT files, etc.) that indicate logons, then we can expect to see some information in the SAM file, as well as the Security Event Log. By correlating these sources, we can develop information about our case. However, the absence of those artifacts that we know we should see (but don't) is itself an artifact.
Intentional erasure
![Intentional erasure]()
Reviewed by 0x000216
on
Tuesday, January 30, 2007
Rating: 5