Cybercrime and Espionage
I recently finished reading through Cybercrime and Espionage: An Analysis of Subversive Multi-Vector Threats, by John Pirc and Will Gragido, and wanted to share my thoughts on the book.
First, a couple of points of clarification. For one, I'm reading the ebook on a Kindle. I don't have the book-book version, so I can't compare the formatting...but I do have a copy of Windows Registry Forensics on the Kindle, so I can make something of a comparison there. Also, I wasn't sent a copy of the book to review...I'm writing this review entirely on my own accord, and because I think that are some very interesting statements in and thoughts generated by this book. Having a new book out myself right now, I think that this is something of a distinction.
The authors do a very good job of laying the groundwork early in the book, in particular pointing out that there is a lot about cybercrime that isn't new, but has instead been around for centuries. Wanting what others have, and securing it for one's own profit are age-old desires/motivators, and bits and bytes are simply the new medium.
I am somewhat familiar with most of the compliance standards that the authors discuss, such as the PCI Data Security Standard (I spent three years as a QSA-certified PCI examiner, part of a QIRA team), HIPAA, and others (the credit union NCUA wasn't mentioned by the authors, but would have fit within the chapter nicely).
The authors also spend considerable time in the cyber-realm, particularly in developing and describing their Subversive Multi-Vector Threat (SMT) taxonomy, in which they include the APT and even Spc. Manning. The authors build up to their taxonomy and provide examples, and then take the time to go beyond that and provide descriptions of intelligence gathering processes, as well as means that can be used to attempt to protect organizations.
Throughout the book, the authors provide considerable background and definitions; I think that this is helpful, as it provides both the uninitiated reader, as well as the more experienced (in the subject matter being addressed) with a common, level playing field. Through this development of background and supporting definitions, the reader should easily see where things such as insider threats come from, for example. In chapter 6, the authors spend considerable time explaining different avenues for gathering information and developing intelligence. At one point, the issue of "trust" is brought up; wouldn't it be easy for an operative (in search of, say, corporate intelligence) to single out a disgruntled employee and earn their "trust"?
This is not a technical book, but it's definitely something that will get you to think about what's really going on in the world around you. This should apply to the CIO, CISO, IT Director, even to the IT admin who's wondering if they've been "hacked". Books that provide solutions are good, but so are books that challenge your thinking and (as the authors describe in the MOSAIC process) base assumptions about your surroundings.
Thoughts
What I really liked about the book, in addition to what the authors presented, was the thoughts that reading that material generated. The following are thoughts that I had based on my reading, and viewing that material through the lens of my own experience, and are not things that you'll necessarily find stated specifically in the book.
What is deemed "adequate and reasonable" security is often decided by those with budgeting concerns/constraints, but with little understanding of the risk or the threat.
Compliance comes down to the auditor versus the attacker, with the target infrastructure as the stage. The attacker is not constrained a specific compliance "standard"; in fact, the attacker may actually use that "standard" and compliance to it against the infrastructure itself.
Auditors are often not technical, and they do not see across the various domains of the "standard" to which they are auditing, and are not able to bring other factors into consideration (i.e., corporate culture, economics, business models, etc.). Auditing is a point-in-time assessment and usually based on a checklist of some kind; do you have a firewall, yes/no; do you have IDS/IPS, yes/no. While requiring an organization to meet a compliance standard will likely raise their level of "security", it's often a small step that's coming too late. "Compliance" is more of a band-aid, and an attempt to modify the corporate culture to take the threats seriously.
First, a couple of points of clarification. For one, I'm reading the ebook on a Kindle. I don't have the book-book version, so I can't compare the formatting...but I do have a copy of Windows Registry Forensics on the Kindle, so I can make something of a comparison there. Also, I wasn't sent a copy of the book to review...I'm writing this review entirely on my own accord, and because I think that are some very interesting statements in and thoughts generated by this book. Having a new book out myself right now, I think that this is something of a distinction.
The authors do a very good job of laying the groundwork early in the book, in particular pointing out that there is a lot about cybercrime that isn't new, but has instead been around for centuries. Wanting what others have, and securing it for one's own profit are age-old desires/motivators, and bits and bytes are simply the new medium.
I am somewhat familiar with most of the compliance standards that the authors discuss, such as the PCI Data Security Standard (I spent three years as a QSA-certified PCI examiner, part of a QIRA team), HIPAA, and others (the credit union NCUA wasn't mentioned by the authors, but would have fit within the chapter nicely).
The authors also spend considerable time in the cyber-realm, particularly in developing and describing their Subversive Multi-Vector Threat (SMT) taxonomy, in which they include the APT and even Spc. Manning. The authors build up to their taxonomy and provide examples, and then take the time to go beyond that and provide descriptions of intelligence gathering processes, as well as means that can be used to attempt to protect organizations.
Throughout the book, the authors provide considerable background and definitions; I think that this is helpful, as it provides both the uninitiated reader, as well as the more experienced (in the subject matter being addressed) with a common, level playing field. Through this development of background and supporting definitions, the reader should easily see where things such as insider threats come from, for example. In chapter 6, the authors spend considerable time explaining different avenues for gathering information and developing intelligence. At one point, the issue of "trust" is brought up; wouldn't it be easy for an operative (in search of, say, corporate intelligence) to single out a disgruntled employee and earn their "trust"?
This is not a technical book, but it's definitely something that will get you to think about what's really going on in the world around you. This should apply to the CIO, CISO, IT Director, even to the IT admin who's wondering if they've been "hacked". Books that provide solutions are good, but so are books that challenge your thinking and (as the authors describe in the MOSAIC process) base assumptions about your surroundings.
Thoughts
What I really liked about the book, in addition to what the authors presented, was the thoughts that reading that material generated. The following are thoughts that I had based on my reading, and viewing that material through the lens of my own experience, and are not things that you'll necessarily find stated specifically in the book.
What is deemed "adequate and reasonable" security is often decided by those with budgeting concerns/constraints, but with little understanding of the risk or the threat.
Compliance comes down to the auditor versus the attacker, with the target infrastructure as the stage. The attacker is not constrained a specific compliance "standard"; in fact, the attacker may actually use that "standard" and compliance to it against the infrastructure itself.
Auditors are often not technical, and they do not see across the various domains of the "standard" to which they are auditing, and are not able to bring other factors into consideration (i.e., corporate culture, economics, business models, etc.). Auditing is a point-in-time assessment and usually based on a checklist of some kind; do you have a firewall, yes/no; do you have IDS/IPS, yes/no. While requiring an organization to meet a compliance standard will likely raise their level of "security", it's often a small step that's coming too late. "Compliance" is more of a band-aid, and an attempt to modify the corporate culture to take the threats seriously.