File system ops, effects on MFT records
I recently conducted some testing of different actions on a Windows 7 system, with the specific purpose of identifying artifacts within the file system (in this case, the MFT and the USN change journal), particularly within individual records. I wanted to take a look at the effects of different actions to see what they "look like" within the individual records, as well as within the USN change journal, in hopes that things would pop out that could be used during forensic exams. Once I completed my testing, I decided to share what I'd done and what I'd found, in hopes that others might find it useful.
Testing Platform: 32-bit Windows 7 Ultimate VM running in Virtual Box.
Tools: My own custom stuff. I updated the MFT parser included with WFA 4/e, and used usnj.pl to parse the USN Change Journal, and parse.pl to translate the output of the change journal parser into a timeline. This page at MS identifies that USN record v2 structure, and the reason codes, used by usnj.pl.
Methodology: I started by writing down and outlining all of the tests that I wanted to perform. I had a total of 5 tests that I wanted to run in order to see what the effects of each individual action was on the MFT, and individual records within the MFT. I picked 5 different files within the VM to use in each test, respectively. Once that was done, I added the VM to FTK Imager as an evidence item and extracted the MFT; this was my "before" sample. Then, I launched the VM, performed all of the tests, logged out and shut down the VM, and extracted the MFT (my "after" sample) and the USN change journal.
All testing occurred on 17 July 2014. In all of the tests, I've changed the font color for items of interest to red.
Test 1 - Renaming a file
This was a simple test, but something I hadn't specifically looked at before. All I did with this one was open a command prompt, change to the directory in question, and issued the command, "ren eula.txt eula30.txt".
Here's the record details from before the test was run:
44657 FILE Seq: 3 Links: 1
[FILE],[BASE RECORD]
.\tools\Eula.txt
M: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
A: Fri Jul 28 14:32:44 2006 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
B: Fri Jul 28 14:32:44 2006 Z
FN: Eula.txt Parent Ref: 44361/32
Namespace: 3
M: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
A: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
B: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
...and here are the record details after the test:
44657 FILE Seq: 3 Links: 1
[FILE],[BASE RECORD]
.\tools\eula_30.txt
M: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
A: Fri Jul 28 14:32:44 2006 Z
C: Thu Jul 17 20:38:52 2014 Z
B: Fri Jul 28 14:32:44 2006 Z
FN: eula_30.txt Parent Ref: 44361/32
Namespace: 3
M: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
A: Fri Jul 28 14:32:44 2006 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
B: Fri Jul 28 14:32:44 2006 Z
Again, this was an atomic action; that is to say, all I did with respect to this file was run the ren command. I honestly have no idea why the last accessed (A) and creation (B) dates from the $STANDARD_INFORMATION attribute would be copied into the corresponding time stamps of the $FILE_NAME attribute for a rename operation. However, notice that very little else about the record changed; the record number (from the DWORD at offset 0x2C within the record header), the sequence number, and the parent file reference number remained the same, which is to be expected.
Here are the changes recorded in the USN change journal:
eula_30.txt: Rename_New_Name FileRef: 44657/3 ParentRef: 44361/32
eula_30.txt: Rename_New_Name,Close FileRef: 44657/3 ParentRef: 44361/32
Eula.txt: Rename_Old_Name FileRef: 44657/3 ParentRef: 44361/32
Now, these changes are not in the specific order in which they occurred...they're listed in a timeline, so they occurred within the same second. But it is interesting that there is rename_old_name and rename_new_name identifiers for the actions that took place. Perhaps because a good deal of the analysis work that I do comes from corporate environments, I've been seeing a lot of Windows 7 systems with VSCs disabled in the Registry; as such, I haven't had access to an older version of the MFT via a VSC in order to compare record contents, on a per-record basis. By incorporating the USN change journal into my analysis, I can get some additional context with respect to what I'm seeing.
The use of the USN change journal can also be useful in identifying activity that occurs during a malware infection. For example, in some cases, malware may create a downloader, use that to download another bit of malware, and then delete the original downloader. The USN change journal can help you identify that activity, even if the MFT record for the original downloader has been reused and overwritten.
Test 2 - Adding an ADS to a file
For this test, I added an ADS to a file by typing echo "This is an ADS" > procmon.chm:ads.txt at the command prompt. Now, this file is the ProcMon help file that is included when you download the ProcMon archive from SysInternals, and as such, it already had a Zone.Identifier ADS associated with the file.
The "before" record:
44401 FILE Seq: 11 Links: 1
[FILE],[BASE RECORD]
.\tools\procmon.chm
M: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
A: Mon Nov 28 16:46:42 2011 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
B: Mon Nov 28 16:46:42 2011 Z
FN: procmon.chm Parent Ref: 44361/32
Namespace: 3
M: Fri Nov 8 15:17:16 2013 Z
A: Fri Nov 8 15:17:16 2013 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 15:17:16 2013 Z
B: Fri Nov 8 15:17:16 2013 Z
**ADS: Zone.Identifier
...and the "after" record:
44401 FILE Seq: 11 Links: 1
[FILE],[BASE RECORD]
.\tools\procmon.chm
M: Thu Jul 17 20:39:22 2014 Z
A: Mon Nov 28 16:46:42 2011 Z
C: Thu Jul 17 20:39:22 2014 Z
B: Mon Nov 28 16:46:42 2011 Z
FN: procmon.chm Parent Ref: 44361/32
Namespace: 3
M: Fri Nov 8 15:17:16 2013 Z
A: Fri Nov 8 15:17:16 2013 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 15:17:16 2013 Z
B: Fri Nov 8 15:17:16 2013 Z
**ADS: ads.txt
**ADS: Zone.Identifier
In this case, you'll notice that only the M (modified) and C (MFT entry change) times in the $STANDARD_INFORMATION attribute have changed. I would expect that the C (entry changed) time stamp would change, as the addition of an ADS constitutes a change to the MFT record itself, but the M (last modified) time stamp changed, also.
From the USN change journal:
procmon.chm: Stream_Change FileRef: 44401/11 ParentRef: 44361/32
procmon.chm: Named_Data_Extend,Close,Stream_Change FileRef: 44401/11 ParentRef: 44361/32
procmon.chm: Named_Data_Extend,Stream_Change FileRef: 44401/11 ParentRef: 44361/32
So now, if an ADS is suspected, a good place to look for indications of when the ADS was added to a file (or folder) would be to parse the USN change journal and look for stream_change entries. This can be valuable during an examination because an ADS does not have any unique time stamps associated with it within the MFT record. An ADS is a $DATA attribute within the MFT record, and as such, does not have a unique $STANDARD_INFORMATION or $FILE_NAME attribute associated with it.
Test 3 - File system tunneling
In this test, I created a batch file named "tunnel.bat" in the C:\Tools folder, with the following contents:
del procmon.exe
echo "This is a test file" > procmon.exe
For this test, I ran the batch file, which deletes procmon.exe and then creates a new file named procmon.exe in the same folder, in relatively short order. In fact, for file system tunneling to take effect, the entire process has to happen within 15 seconds (by default; the time can be changed, or file system tunneling itself disabled, via the Registry). As we'll see, the entire process took place within a second.
The original MFT record appears as follows:
44631 FILE Seq: 4 Links: 1
[FILE],[BASE RECORD]
.\tools\Procmon.exe
M: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
A: Fri May 31 20:54:54 2013 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
B: Fri May 31 20:54:54 2013 Z
FN: Procmon.exe Parent Ref: 44361/32
Namespace: 3
M: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
A: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
B: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
**ADS: Zone.Identifier
After the test was run, the MFT record appeared as follows:
44631 FILE Seq: 5 Links: 1
[FILE],[DELETED],[BASE RECORD]
M: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
A: Fri May 31 20:54:54 2013 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
B: Fri May 31 20:54:54 2013 Z
FN: Procmon.exe Parent Ref: 44361/32
Namespace: 3
M: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
A: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
B: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
**ADS: Zone.Identifier
Here's the new file record for the file:
22977 FILE Seq: 12 Links: 1
[FILE],[BASE RECORD]
.\tools\procmon.exe
M: Thu Jul 17 20:40:35 2014 Z
A: Thu Jul 17 20:40:35 2014 Z
C: Thu Jul 17 20:40:35 2014 Z
B: Fri May 31 20:54:54 2013 Z
FN: procmon.exe Parent Ref: 44361/32
Namespace: 3
M: Thu Jul 17 20:40:35 2014 Z
A: Thu Jul 17 20:40:35 2014 Z
C: Thu Jul 17 20:40:35 2014 Z
B: Fri May 31 20:54:54 2013 Z
[RESIDENT]
Notice that the only difference between the two 44631 records is the sequence number, and that the original file record is now marked "DELETED". What this illustrates is that the MFT record itself is NOT reused during file system tunneling on NTFS, and that a new record is created during the operation. This was something I'd wondered about for some time, and now I can see the effect of file system tunneling.
We can see in this case that the MAC times for the new file are all for the date of the testing, and that the B (creation) date is from the original file record. Also, notice the $FILE_NAME attribute time stamps of the new file...very interesting.
Also, because the file went from being a PE file to a string, the resulting file is now resident; I didn't include the hex dump of the file contents, extracted from the MFT record.
This blog post (from 2005) explains why tunneling exists at all.
From the USN change journal:
procmon.exe: Data_Extend,Close,File_Create FileRef: 22977/12 ParentRef: 44361/32
procmon.exe: Data_Extend,File_Create FileRef: 22977/12 ParentRef: 44361/32
procmon.exe: File_Create FileRef: 22977/12 ParentRef: 44361/32
Procmon.exe: File_Delete,Close FileRef: 44631/4 ParentRef: 44361/32
When I first read about file system tunneling, I was curious as to whether the original MFT record for the deleted file was simply reused, and this test clearly illustrates that is not the case.
Additional Resources:
- Here's a jIIr post from Corey Harrell in which he discusses the use of the USN change journal and file system tunneling
- Eric Huber's blog post on file system tunneling
- Blazer Catzen discussed some file system tunneling testing he'd done on David Cowen's Forensic Lunch podcast, and posted the presentation he'd put together on the subject.
Test 4 - Copy a file to another location in the same volume
In this test, I copied C:\Windows\Logs\IE9_NR_setup.log to C:\Users\IE9_NR_setup.log, using drag-n-drop via the Windows Explorer shell.
From "before" MFT:
96296 FILE Seq: 3 Links: 2
[FILE],[BASE RECORD]
.\Windows\Logs\IE9_NR_Setup.log
M: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
A: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
B: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
FN: IE9_NR~1.LOG Parent Ref: 1966/1
Namespace: 2
M: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
A: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
B: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
FN: IE9_NR_Setup.log Parent Ref: 1966/1
Namespace: 1
M: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
A: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
B: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
From the "after" MFT, the original file:
96296 FILE Seq: 3 Links: 2
[FILE],[BASE RECORD]
.\Windows\Logs\IE9_NR_Setup.log
M: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
A: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
B: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
FN: IE9_NR~1.LOG Parent Ref: 1966/1
Namespace: 2
M: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
A: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
B: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
FN: IE9_NR_Setup.log Parent Ref: 1966/1
Namespace: 1
M: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
A: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
B: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
...and the resulting file:
22987 FILE Seq: 12 Links: 2
[FILE],[BASE RECORD]
.\Users\IE9_NR_Setup.log
M: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
A: Thu Jul 17 20:41:39 2014 Z
C: Thu Jul 17 20:41:39 2014 Z
B: Thu Jul 17 20:41:39 2014 Z
FN: IE9_NR~1.LOG Parent Ref: 486/1
Namespace: 2
M: Thu Jul 17 20:41:39 2014 Z
A: Thu Jul 17 20:41:39 2014 Z
C: Thu Jul 17 20:41:39 2014 Z
B: Thu Jul 17 20:41:39 2014 Z
FN: IE9_NR_Setup.log Parent Ref: 486/1
Namespace: 1
M: Thu Jul 17 20:41:39 2014 Z
A: Thu Jul 17 20:41:39 2014 Z
C: Thu Jul 17 20:41:39 2014 Z
B: Thu Jul 17 20:41:39 2014 Z
Now, one question you might have is that if I dragged-and-dropped the file, shouldn't the record show indications of the file having been accessed? Well, we have to remember that as of Vista, the NtfsDisableLastAccessUpdate value is enabled by default, meaning that "normal" user actions won't cause the
From the USN change journal:
IE9_NR_Setup.log: Data_Extend,Data_Overwrite,File_Create FileRef: 22987/12 ParentRef: 486/1
IE9_NR_Setup.log: File_Create FileRef: 22987/12 ParentRef: 486/1
IE9_NR_Setup.log: Data_Extend,File_Create FileRef: 22987/12 ParentRef: 486/1
CONSENT.EXE-531BD9EA.pf: Data_Extend,Data_Truncation,Close FileRef: 1582/11 ParentRef: 59062/1
CONSENT.EXE-531BD9EA.pf: Data_Truncation FileRef: 1582/11 ParentRef: 59062/1
CONSENT.EXE-531BD9EA.pf: Data_Extend,Data_Truncation FileRef: 1582/11 ParentRef: 59062/1
IE9_NR_Setup.log: Data_Extend,Data_Overwrite,Close,File_Create FileRef: 22987/12 ParentRef: 486/1
From the USN change journal, we see a reference to consent.exe being run; this is the dialog that pops up when you drag-and-drop a file between folders, asking if you want to copy or move the file, or cancel the operation.
Test 5 - Move a file to another location in the same volume
Moved C:\Windows\Logs\IE10_NR_setup.log to C:\Temp\IE10_NR_setup.log (drag-n-drop, via the Windows Explorer shell)
The "before" record:
16420 FILE Seq: 15 Links: 2
[FILE],[BASE RECORD]
.\Windows\Logs\IE10_NR_Setup.log
M: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
A: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
B: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
FN: IE10_N~1.LOG Parent Ref: 1966/1
Namespace: 2
M: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
A: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
B: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
FN: IE10_NR_Setup.log Parent Ref: 1966/1
Namespace: 1
M: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
A: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
B: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
...and the "after" record:
16420 FILE Seq: 15 Links: 2
[FILE],[BASE RECORD]
.\temp\IE10_NR_Setup.log
M: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
A: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
C: Thu Jul 17 20:41:58 2014 Z
B: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
FN: IE10_N~1.LOG Parent Ref: 44311/7
Namespace: 2
M: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
A: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
B: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
FN: IE10_NR_Setup.log Parent Ref: 44311/7
Namespace: 1
M: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
A: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
B: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
Okay, the file was moved (copy + delete operations), but we might expect to see some changes in the time stamps...shouldn't we? Well, in this case, we cannot tell if the $FILE_NAME attribute time stamps had been changed, because for this file, all of the time stamps, in all of the available attributes, were the same. We do, however, see that the C (entry modified) time in the $STANDARD_INFORMATION attribute changed (as expected) and that the parent file reference number changed.
From the USN change journal:
IE10_NR_Setup.log: Security_Change FileRef: 16420/15 ParentRef: 44311/7
IE10_NR_Setup.log: Rename_New_Name,Close FileRef: 16420/15 ParentRef: 44311/7
IE10_NR_Setup.log: Rename_New_Name FileRef: 16420/15 ParentRef: 44311/7
IE10_NR_Setup.log: Security_Change,Close FileRef: 16420/15 ParentRef: 44311/7
IE10_NR_Setup.log: Rename_Old_Name FileRef: 16420/15 ParentRef: 1966/1
CONSENT.EXE-531BD9EA.pf: Data_Extend,Data_Truncation,Close FileRef: 1582/11 ParentRef: 59062/1
CONSENT.EXE-531BD9EA.pf: Data_Truncation FileRef: 1582/11 ParentRef: 59062/1
CONSENT.EXE-531BD9EA.pf: Data_Extend,Data_Truncation FileRef: 1582/11 ParentRef: 59062/1
Again, we see a reference to consent.exe having been launched. I'm not entirely sure why the "Security_change" reason code in the USN change journal was generated for a move operation.
Both tests 4 and 5 validate what's described in MS KB article 299648, keeping in mind that the article only discusses time stamps from the $STANDARD_INFORMATION attribute.
Summary
Again, I ran these tests as a means for determining what different file operations look like in the MFT and USN change journal, and what the effects are on individual records. This information can be helpful in a variety of investigation types, such as malware detection, and finding indications of historical activity and data (i.e., files that are no longer on the system).
Future Efforts
For the future, I'll need to look at copy and move file operations performed at the command line, using the copy and move commands, respectively.
Testing Platform: 32-bit Windows 7 Ultimate VM running in Virtual Box.
Tools: My own custom stuff. I updated the MFT parser included with WFA 4/e, and used usnj.pl to parse the USN Change Journal, and parse.pl to translate the output of the change journal parser into a timeline. This page at MS identifies that USN record v2 structure, and the reason codes, used by usnj.pl.
Methodology: I started by writing down and outlining all of the tests that I wanted to perform. I had a total of 5 tests that I wanted to run in order to see what the effects of each individual action was on the MFT, and individual records within the MFT. I picked 5 different files within the VM to use in each test, respectively. Once that was done, I added the VM to FTK Imager as an evidence item and extracted the MFT; this was my "before" sample. Then, I launched the VM, performed all of the tests, logged out and shut down the VM, and extracted the MFT (my "after" sample) and the USN change journal.
All testing occurred on 17 July 2014. In all of the tests, I've changed the font color for items of interest to red.
Test 1 - Renaming a file
This was a simple test, but something I hadn't specifically looked at before. All I did with this one was open a command prompt, change to the directory in question, and issued the command, "ren eula.txt eula30.txt".
Here's the record details from before the test was run:
44657 FILE Seq: 3 Links: 1
[FILE],[BASE RECORD]
.\tools\Eula.txt
M: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
A: Fri Jul 28 14:32:44 2006 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
B: Fri Jul 28 14:32:44 2006 Z
FN: Eula.txt Parent Ref: 44361/32
Namespace: 3
M: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
A: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
B: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
...and here are the record details after the test:
44657 FILE Seq: 3 Links: 1
[FILE],[BASE RECORD]
.\tools\eula_30.txt
M: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
A: Fri Jul 28 14:32:44 2006 Z
C: Thu Jul 17 20:38:52 2014 Z
B: Fri Jul 28 14:32:44 2006 Z
FN: eula_30.txt Parent Ref: 44361/32
Namespace: 3
M: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
A: Fri Jul 28 14:32:44 2006 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
B: Fri Jul 28 14:32:44 2006 Z
Here are the changes recorded in the USN change journal:
eula_30.txt: Rename_New_Name FileRef: 44657/3 ParentRef: 44361/32
eula_30.txt: Rename_New_Name,Close FileRef: 44657/3 ParentRef: 44361/32
Eula.txt: Rename_Old_Name FileRef: 44657/3 ParentRef: 44361/32
Now, these changes are not in the specific order in which they occurred...they're listed in a timeline, so they occurred within the same second. But it is interesting that there is rename_old_name and rename_new_name identifiers for the actions that took place. Perhaps because a good deal of the analysis work that I do comes from corporate environments, I've been seeing a lot of Windows 7 systems with VSCs disabled in the Registry; as such, I haven't had access to an older version of the MFT via a VSC in order to compare record contents, on a per-record basis. By incorporating the USN change journal into my analysis, I can get some additional context with respect to what I'm seeing.
The use of the USN change journal can also be useful in identifying activity that occurs during a malware infection. For example, in some cases, malware may create a downloader, use that to download another bit of malware, and then delete the original downloader. The USN change journal can help you identify that activity, even if the MFT record for the original downloader has been reused and overwritten.
Test 2 - Adding an ADS to a file
For this test, I added an ADS to a file by typing echo "This is an ADS" > procmon.chm:ads.txt at the command prompt. Now, this file is the ProcMon help file that is included when you download the ProcMon archive from SysInternals, and as such, it already had a Zone.Identifier ADS associated with the file.
The "before" record:
44401 FILE Seq: 11 Links: 1
[FILE],[BASE RECORD]
.\tools\procmon.chm
M: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
A: Mon Nov 28 16:46:42 2011 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
B: Mon Nov 28 16:46:42 2011 Z
FN: procmon.chm Parent Ref: 44361/32
Namespace: 3
M: Fri Nov 8 15:17:16 2013 Z
A: Fri Nov 8 15:17:16 2013 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 15:17:16 2013 Z
B: Fri Nov 8 15:17:16 2013 Z
**ADS: Zone.Identifier
...and the "after" record:
44401 FILE Seq: 11 Links: 1
[FILE],[BASE RECORD]
.\tools\procmon.chm
M: Thu Jul 17 20:39:22 2014 Z
A: Mon Nov 28 16:46:42 2011 Z
C: Thu Jul 17 20:39:22 2014 Z
B: Mon Nov 28 16:46:42 2011 Z
FN: procmon.chm Parent Ref: 44361/32
Namespace: 3
M: Fri Nov 8 15:17:16 2013 Z
A: Fri Nov 8 15:17:16 2013 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 15:17:16 2013 Z
B: Fri Nov 8 15:17:16 2013 Z
**ADS: ads.txt
**ADS: Zone.Identifier
In this case, you'll notice that only the M (modified) and C (MFT entry change) times in the $STANDARD_INFORMATION attribute have changed. I would expect that the C (entry changed) time stamp would change, as the addition of an ADS constitutes a change to the MFT record itself, but the M (last modified) time stamp changed, also.
From the USN change journal:
procmon.chm: Stream_Change FileRef: 44401/11 ParentRef: 44361/32
procmon.chm: Named_Data_Extend,Close,Stream_Change FileRef: 44401/11 ParentRef: 44361/32
procmon.chm: Named_Data_Extend,Stream_Change FileRef: 44401/11 ParentRef: 44361/32
Test 3 - File system tunneling
In this test, I created a batch file named "tunnel.bat" in the C:\Tools folder, with the following contents:
del procmon.exe
echo "This is a test file" > procmon.exe
For this test, I ran the batch file, which deletes procmon.exe and then creates a new file named procmon.exe in the same folder, in relatively short order. In fact, for file system tunneling to take effect, the entire process has to happen within 15 seconds (by default; the time can be changed, or file system tunneling itself disabled, via the Registry). As we'll see, the entire process took place within a second.
The original MFT record appears as follows:
44631 FILE Seq: 4 Links: 1
[FILE],[BASE RECORD]
.\tools\Procmon.exe
M: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
A: Fri May 31 20:54:54 2013 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
B: Fri May 31 20:54:54 2013 Z
FN: Procmon.exe Parent Ref: 44361/32
Namespace: 3
M: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
A: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
B: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
**ADS: Zone.Identifier
After the test was run, the MFT record appeared as follows:
44631 FILE Seq: 5 Links: 1
[FILE],[DELETED],[BASE RECORD]
M: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
A: Fri May 31 20:54:54 2013 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
B: Fri May 31 20:54:54 2013 Z
FN: Procmon.exe Parent Ref: 44361/32
Namespace: 3
M: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
A: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
B: Fri Nov 8 15:17:17 2013 Z
**ADS: Zone.Identifier
Here's the new file record for the file:
22977 FILE Seq: 12 Links: 1
[FILE],[BASE RECORD]
.\tools\procmon.exe
M: Thu Jul 17 20:40:35 2014 Z
A: Thu Jul 17 20:40:35 2014 Z
C: Thu Jul 17 20:40:35 2014 Z
B: Fri May 31 20:54:54 2013 Z
FN: procmon.exe Parent Ref: 44361/32
Namespace: 3
M: Thu Jul 17 20:40:35 2014 Z
A: Thu Jul 17 20:40:35 2014 Z
C: Thu Jul 17 20:40:35 2014 Z
B: Fri May 31 20:54:54 2013 Z
[RESIDENT]
Notice that the only difference between the two 44631 records is the sequence number, and that the original file record is now marked "DELETED". What this illustrates is that the MFT record itself is NOT reused during file system tunneling on NTFS, and that a new record is created during the operation. This was something I'd wondered about for some time, and now I can see the effect of file system tunneling.
We can see in this case that the MAC times for the new file are all for the date of the testing, and that the B (creation) date is from the original file record. Also, notice the $FILE_NAME attribute time stamps of the new file...very interesting.
Also, because the file went from being a PE file to a string, the resulting file is now resident; I didn't include the hex dump of the file contents, extracted from the MFT record.
This blog post (from 2005) explains why tunneling exists at all.
From the USN change journal:
procmon.exe: Data_Extend,Close,File_Create FileRef: 22977/12 ParentRef: 44361/32
procmon.exe: Data_Extend,File_Create FileRef: 22977/12 ParentRef: 44361/32
procmon.exe: File_Create FileRef: 22977/12 ParentRef: 44361/32
Procmon.exe: File_Delete,Close FileRef: 44631/4 ParentRef: 44361/32
When I first read about file system tunneling, I was curious as to whether the original MFT record for the deleted file was simply reused, and this test clearly illustrates that is not the case.
Additional Resources:
- Here's a jIIr post from Corey Harrell in which he discusses the use of the USN change journal and file system tunneling
- Eric Huber's blog post on file system tunneling
- Blazer Catzen discussed some file system tunneling testing he'd done on David Cowen's Forensic Lunch podcast, and posted the presentation he'd put together on the subject.
Test 4 - Copy a file to another location in the same volume
In this test, I copied C:\Windows\Logs\IE9_NR_setup.log to C:\Users\IE9_NR_setup.log, using drag-n-drop via the Windows Explorer shell.
From "before" MFT:
96296 FILE Seq: 3 Links: 2
[FILE],[BASE RECORD]
.\Windows\Logs\IE9_NR_Setup.log
M: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
A: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
B: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
FN: IE9_NR~1.LOG Parent Ref: 1966/1
Namespace: 2
M: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
A: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
B: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
FN: IE9_NR_Setup.log Parent Ref: 1966/1
Namespace: 1
M: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
A: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
B: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
From the "after" MFT, the original file:
96296 FILE Seq: 3 Links: 2
[FILE],[BASE RECORD]
.\Windows\Logs\IE9_NR_Setup.log
M: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
A: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
B: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
FN: IE9_NR~1.LOG Parent Ref: 1966/1
Namespace: 2
M: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
A: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
B: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
FN: IE9_NR_Setup.log Parent Ref: 1966/1
Namespace: 1
M: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
A: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
B: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
...and the resulting file:
22987 FILE Seq: 12 Links: 2
[FILE],[BASE RECORD]
.\Users\IE9_NR_Setup.log
M: Fri Nov 8 13:26:02 2013 Z
A: Thu Jul 17 20:41:39 2014 Z
C: Thu Jul 17 20:41:39 2014 Z
B: Thu Jul 17 20:41:39 2014 Z
FN: IE9_NR~1.LOG Parent Ref: 486/1
Namespace: 2
M: Thu Jul 17 20:41:39 2014 Z
A: Thu Jul 17 20:41:39 2014 Z
C: Thu Jul 17 20:41:39 2014 Z
B: Thu Jul 17 20:41:39 2014 Z
FN: IE9_NR_Setup.log Parent Ref: 486/1
Namespace: 1
M: Thu Jul 17 20:41:39 2014 Z
A: Thu Jul 17 20:41:39 2014 Z
C: Thu Jul 17 20:41:39 2014 Z
B: Thu Jul 17 20:41:39 2014 Z
Now, one question you might have is that if I dragged-and-dropped the file, shouldn't the record show indications of the file having been accessed? Well, we have to remember that as of Vista, the NtfsDisableLastAccessUpdate value is enabled by default, meaning that "normal" user actions won't cause the
From the USN change journal:
IE9_NR_Setup.log: Data_Extend,Data_Overwrite,File_Create FileRef: 22987/12 ParentRef: 486/1
IE9_NR_Setup.log: File_Create FileRef: 22987/12 ParentRef: 486/1
IE9_NR_Setup.log: Data_Extend,File_Create FileRef: 22987/12 ParentRef: 486/1
CONSENT.EXE-531BD9EA.pf: Data_Extend,Data_Truncation,Close FileRef: 1582/11 ParentRef: 59062/1
CONSENT.EXE-531BD9EA.pf: Data_Truncation FileRef: 1582/11 ParentRef: 59062/1
CONSENT.EXE-531BD9EA.pf: Data_Extend,Data_Truncation FileRef: 1582/11 ParentRef: 59062/1
IE9_NR_Setup.log: Data_Extend,Data_Overwrite,Close,File_Create FileRef: 22987/12 ParentRef: 486/1
From the USN change journal, we see a reference to consent.exe being run; this is the dialog that pops up when you drag-and-drop a file between folders, asking if you want to copy or move the file, or cancel the operation.
Test 5 - Move a file to another location in the same volume
Moved C:\Windows\Logs\IE10_NR_setup.log to C:\Temp\IE10_NR_setup.log (drag-n-drop, via the Windows Explorer shell)
The "before" record:
16420 FILE Seq: 15 Links: 2
[FILE],[BASE RECORD]
.\Windows\Logs\IE10_NR_Setup.log
M: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
A: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
B: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
FN: IE10_N~1.LOG Parent Ref: 1966/1
Namespace: 2
M: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
A: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
B: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
FN: IE10_NR_Setup.log Parent Ref: 1966/1
Namespace: 1
M: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
A: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
B: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
...and the "after" record:
16420 FILE Seq: 15 Links: 2
[FILE],[BASE RECORD]
.\temp\IE10_NR_Setup.log
M: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
A: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
C: Thu Jul 17 20:41:58 2014 Z
B: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
FN: IE10_N~1.LOG Parent Ref: 44311/7
Namespace: 2
M: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
A: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
B: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
FN: IE10_NR_Setup.log Parent Ref: 44311/7
Namespace: 1
M: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
A: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
C: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
B: Fri Nov 8 14:24:59 2013 Z
Okay, the file was moved (copy + delete operations), but we might expect to see some changes in the time stamps...shouldn't we? Well, in this case, we cannot tell if the $FILE_NAME attribute time stamps had been changed, because for this file, all of the time stamps, in all of the available attributes, were the same. We do, however, see that the C (entry modified) time in the $STANDARD_INFORMATION attribute changed (as expected) and that the parent file reference number changed.
From the USN change journal:
IE10_NR_Setup.log: Security_Change FileRef: 16420/15 ParentRef: 44311/7
IE10_NR_Setup.log: Rename_New_Name,Close FileRef: 16420/15 ParentRef: 44311/7
IE10_NR_Setup.log: Rename_New_Name FileRef: 16420/15 ParentRef: 44311/7
IE10_NR_Setup.log: Security_Change,Close FileRef: 16420/15 ParentRef: 44311/7
IE10_NR_Setup.log: Rename_Old_Name FileRef: 16420/15 ParentRef: 1966/1
CONSENT.EXE-531BD9EA.pf: Data_Extend,Data_Truncation,Close FileRef: 1582/11 ParentRef: 59062/1
CONSENT.EXE-531BD9EA.pf: Data_Truncation FileRef: 1582/11 ParentRef: 59062/1
CONSENT.EXE-531BD9EA.pf: Data_Extend,Data_Truncation FileRef: 1582/11 ParentRef: 59062/1
Again, we see a reference to consent.exe having been launched. I'm not entirely sure why the "Security_change" reason code in the USN change journal was generated for a move operation.
Both tests 4 and 5 validate what's described in MS KB article 299648, keeping in mind that the article only discusses time stamps from the $STANDARD_INFORMATION attribute.
Summary
Again, I ran these tests as a means for determining what different file operations look like in the MFT and USN change journal, and what the effects are on individual records. This information can be helpful in a variety of investigation types, such as malware detection, and finding indications of historical activity and data (i.e., files that are no longer on the system).
Future Efforts
For the future, I'll need to look at copy and move file operations performed at the command line, using the copy and move commands, respectively.