“I Don’t Fix Timelines But I Am Definitely Interested In Finishing [Rafale Deal] As Early As Possible:” Manohar Parrikar (excerpt)
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Source:- Times of India

An incomplete version of what would be the ninth version of the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) was released by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) on 28 March 2016 to coincide with the opening of DefExpo 2016 in Goa. The document is incomplete because the chapter containing the revised standard contract document as well as various annexures and appendices have not been released. These are to be notified shortly. In addition, a new chapter on ‘strategic partners’ will also be notified separately.
The new DPP will be applicable to all cases that come up for Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) on or after 01 April 2016. Further, the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) may permit its application to past cases also.
The document starts with a brief explanation of how the DPP has evolved over the years and a preamble which is clearly intended to reflect the thrust of the changes made in the procurement policy and procedures.
Chapters in DPP 2016
The first chapter of DPP 2016 has been carved out of Chapter I of DPP 2013. The most notable feature of this chapter is the introduction of a new procurement category: ‘Buy (Indian Designed, Developed and Manufactured)’, or Buy (IDDM).
This category refers to procurement from Indian vendors of products that are indigenously designed, developed and manufactured and have at least 40 per cent indigenous content. If the product is not designed and developed indigenously, it will have to have 60 per cent indigenous content.
This is bound to clash with the ‘Buy (Indian)’ category in which the product to be procured from Indian vendors will also now be required to have an indigenous content of 40 per cent, instead of 30 per cent as has been the case so far.
Be that as it may, it can only be hoped that ‘Buy (IDDM)’ will encourage indigenous design and development of products, which is what it is intended for. It replaces ‘Buy (Indian)’ as the most preferred category in the hierarchy of six procurement categories, the others being ‘Buy and Make (Indian)’, ‘Buy and Make’, Buy (Global)’, and ‘Make’.
The first chapter also defines ‘Indian vendor’ as an entity that is compliant with industrial licensing and other regulatory requirements as per Indian law. It does not, however, answer the question whether wholly-owned subsidiaries of foreign companies would qualify as Indian Offset Partners (IOPs).
The second chapter begins with a narration of the stages through which a procurement proposal must move from the stage of initiation until the award of contract. The acquisition cycle, envisaged in DPP 2016, comprises 12 stages, one more than the 11 stages envisaged in DPP 2013. The number of stages has gone up only because DPP 2016 lists Request for Information (RFI) as the first stage while DPP 2013 mentioned it as only one of the requirements rather than listing it as one of the stages in procurement.
Some other decisions announced by the MoD in January have also been incorporated in this chapter. Services Qualitative Requirements (SQRs) will be split into two categories, essential and desirable, though these will be formally known as Essential Parameters A and Essential Parameters B. Contracts will be signed based on Essential Parameters A and the vendor will be permitted to develop Essential Parameters B after the award of the contract.
RFPs (requests for proposals) will also contain Enhanced Performance Parameters. These are additional capabilities over and above the essential parameters. Vendors meeting these additional parameters will get weightage of up to 10 per cent in price for determination of the lowest bid.
The threshold for offsets has been raised from INR 300 crore to 2,000 crore but the detailed offset guidelines, which appear as one of the appendices in the DPP, have not yet been notified.
Apart from these expected changes, Chapter II also contains some other interesting features. One, the Services Equipment Policy Committees (SEPCs), which are responsible for finalising SQRs, will now be able to seek the assistance of experts. This should help in formulation of more realistic SQRs. Two, a procedure has been laid down to deal with instances of change in the name of a vendor at any stage during the process of procurement due to change in business strategy, merger and acquisitions, or any other reason.
And three, an enabling provision has been made for the adoption of the ‘Avro-replacement’ model in ‘Buy and Make’ cases. This will save the MoD the trouble of nominating an Indian Production Agency (IPA) from the private sector, should it decide not to nominate a Defence Public Sector Undertaking (DPSU), by leaving it to the foreign vendor to select an IPA of its choice. But this could lead to several foreign vendors tying up with a single IPA.
Conversely, in ‘Buy and Make (Indian)’ cases, several Indian companies may tie up with the same foreign vendor and submit separate bids. A provision has been made in this chapter to deal with such situations. Such cases will not be treated as ‘single vendor’ cases, which invariably spelt doom for many acquisition programmes in the past. In fact, DPP 2016 makes it clear that the retraction of RFP in ‘single vendor’ cases will be more of an exception than the rule.
Chapter III deals with ‘Make’ projects, which entail indigenous design and development of prototypes of futuristic systems by Indian vendors in collaboration with foreign companies. There will now be two categories of such projects: those funded by the MoD, and others that are self-funded by the developers.
Funding of projects by the MoD has been increased from 80 to 90 per cent. The balance 10 per cent will also be reimbursed if the RFP for the product is not issued within two years of the successful development of the prototype. The development agencies will also be able to get a mobilisation advance of 20 per cent of the estimated cost of development. Self-funded projects undertaken by Indian industry will also result in the entire cost of development being reimbursed by the MoD if the RFP is not issued within two years of the successful development of the prototype.
To bring the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) into the loop, projects with an estimated cost of development of up to INR 10 crore under the first category and INR 3 core under the second category will be earmarked for them. These projects will be opened to others only if MSMEs do not evince any interest.
Products developed under the ‘Make’ category will be procured subsequently through ‘Buy (IDDM)’ route. The success of this measure would depend to a large extent on the criteria adopted for the selection of ‘Development Agencies’ for prototype development and the efficacy of the project-specific Integrated Project Management Teams (IPMTs). These criteria have not been notified as of now.
An Annual Acquisition Plan (AAP) for Make projects would be notified by the MoD. But this will help only if the information contained therein helps industry in building a business case for investment in prototype development.
It may be recalled that earlier DPPs also talked about sharing the future needs of the Armed Forces with the industry by releasing a Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap (TPCR), covering details of the acquisition plans for a period of 15 years, so that the industry could build up its capabilities to meet the requirements. It is anybody’s guess whether the TPCR notified in April 2013 achieved that objective. DPP 2016 reiterates the need for a TPCR, but does not indicate if any changes are contemplated in its format to make it more useful for the industry.
Chapter IV lays down the procedure for Shipbuilding, while Chapter V prescribes the Fast Track Procedure (FTP). There does not seem to be any significant change in these chapters, except that FTP now will also be applicable to “cases where undue/unforeseen delay, due to reasons beyond the control of the acquisition set up, is seen to be adversely impacting the capacity and preparedness of the regular and special forces.” It is difficult to visualise how this will play out.
Fingers crossed
One will have to wait for the remaining parts of the DPP to be notified to be able to form a view about its efficacy. For, it is not known as of now how many important issues like blacklisting of firms, regulation of the role of agents, protection of Intellectual Property Rights, etc. are going to be tackled in the future.
More importantly, the best of policies and procedures can come to naught because of indecisiveness in decision-making. Unless one is missing something here, there is little in DPP 2016 that addresses the problems which beset decision-making in the MoD.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
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The famous think tank who behind the stronger military relationship between India and US, once again wrote a column focusing the Indian Air force’s low number of operational fighters. He wrote this column with the proper inputs input ex IAF officials like AM Mathershwaran, and Indian Navy official like Adm Arun Prakash.
He comes with good points by showcasing how bad is the Indian air force, and what are the options left to revamp the modernization program. He not only blamed the low squadron number, he insisted the problematic force structure along with crippled acquisition and modernization programs. where rival forces Pakistan and China is in full swing to modernize their air inventory.
China and Pakistan field about 750 advanced air defense/multirole fighters against the IAF’s 450-odd equivalents. The airfield infrastructure limitations in Tibet, however, prevent China from bringing all of its air capabilities to bear against India. Yet after 2025, China could be able to deploy anywhere between 300 and 400 sophisticated air craft against India, in addition to the 100 to 200 advanced fighters likely to exist in Pakistan by then.
The IAF’s likelihood of reaching its 2027 goal with a high proportion of advanced fighters is poor. It is stymied by serious constraints on India’s defense budget, the impediments imposed by the acquisition process, the meager achievements of the country’s domestic development organizations, the weaknesses of the higher defense management system, and India’s inability to reconcile the need for self-sufficiency in defense production with the necessity of maintaining technological superiority over rivals.
All three tiers of the IAF are currently in trouble. The Tejas Mark 1 is handicapped by significant technological deficiencies; the prospects for expanding the MMRCA component to compensate for the Tejas’s shortcomings are unclear; and the IAF’s reluctance to proceed fully with the PAK-FA program could undermine its fifth generation fighter ambitions.
The IAF should revisit some aspects of its current approach. It should be cautious about expanding the Tejas acquisition beyond six squadrons and consider enlarging the MMRCA component with the cheapest fourth-generation-plus Western fighter available. India should also reassess the decision to develop the AMCA indigenously and avoid weakening the collaboration with Russia on the PAK-FA program.
India should expand its investments in advanced munitions, combat support aircraft, electronic warfare, physical infrastructure, and pilot proficiency all current strengths while being realistic about its domestic capacity to produce sophisticated combat air craft. Indian policymakers must especially guard against the temptation to prioritize indigenous design and manufacture over the imperative of providing the IAF’s able pilots with the best fighters available.
Like China, the IAF possesses various combat support platforms, but its airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) and its aerial refueling aircraft in particular are still too few in number to support effective air operations on a sustained basis around the Indian subcontinent. The IAF operates a small number of medium UAVs for tactical reconnaissance and maintains some armed drones, such as the Harpy, for the suppression of enemy air defenses.
When the number of aircraft actually operational on any given day is accounted for, the IAF’s numerical superiority over the PAF is less than two-to-one, way below the advantageous ratio necessary to underwrite the IAF’s obligations against both Pakistan and China and representing a considerable degradation in comparison to the 1980s, when the IAF enjoyed close to a three-to-one superiority over the PAF.
With all PAF F-16s likely to be eventually brought up to the Block 52 standard and equipped with the C5+ version of the potent AIM-120 A2A Missile, the force will have acquired a formidable BVR air combat capability.
If the PAF’s plans come to fruition with the acquisition of additional F-16s and new fifth generation
Chinese J-31s—something Islamabad is working frantically to procure—the Pakistani air arm could end up with a decent three-tier multirole force a decade or so from now. Based on discussions taking place between Pakistan and China and between Pakistan and the United States,
the PAF in the not-too-distant future could operate some 40 J-31 stealth fighters at the high-end; some 100 F-16s armed with among the best U.S. beyond visual- range air-to-air missiles and other advanced air-to-ground munitions, and possibly complemented by a smaller number of Chinese J-10s in the middle; and as many as 250 JF-17s at the low end.
Even the least capable fighter in this lineup, the JF-17, is an effective combatant: it is capable of all-weather operations against both air and surface targets, its aerodynamic performance compares favorably with that of the Indian Tejas, and the later units of its class will likely be armed with advanced Western sensors, weapons, and defensive systems.


Source:- Life of solider
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And here's the DRDO-Tata Wheeled Armoured Platform (WHAP) in action at DefExpo.



Heavy Mobility Vehicle 6*6 negotiating an obstacle during Defexpo 2016 at Goa





Scandinavian Vikings showcasing aerobatic maneuvers during Defexpo 2016 at Goa





"Defence Minister, Shri Manohar Parrikar visiting the DRDO pavilion during Defexpo 2016 at Quitol, Goa today."

India received $222 billion in investment pledges at the “Make in India Week” in Mumbai last month. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s signature initiative, to transform his country into a “global manufacturing hub,” is catching fire.
Modi announced his “Make in India” plan in September 2014, shortly after coming to power in a landmark election, and selling the initiative around the world has been the easy part for the reform-minded, charismatic leader.
Foreign direct investment into his country is on the verge of overtaking that of both the United States and China. That’s not too surprising because Modi’s got a great story to tell. India, after all, is by far the most promising of the BRICS.
The countries represented by the first two letters, Brazil and Russia, have contracting economies and face intractable problems across-the board. The “C,” China, is heading into a debt crisis as growth stalls and money flees. South Africa, the “S,” is limping.
The “I,” however, is roaring ahead. India has the highest growth rate of all the BRICS—the IMF predicts 7.3% GDP growth this fiscal year and 7.5% next year—a relatively stable and open political system, and a near-perfect demographic profile.
If you can remember only one projection about the world, make it this one: the U.N. tells us that India will become the planet’s most populous country in 2022. Some believe that will happen even sooner, perhaps 2020. Whenever that occurs, it will be the first time in 300 years—and perhaps all recorded history—that China will not hold the world’s population crown.
By mid-century, India’s workforce—people aged 15-59—will number 1.05 billion. Indian leaders, therefore, need to figure out how to keep them all employed. Modi’s solution is Make in India.
It is not as if Modi’s plan is novel. In East Asia, it has been tried, with great success, in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and China. Malaysia prospered with its factories, and Vietnam and Bangladesh are now taking that route.
The question the Indian prime minister faces, therefore, is whether he is too late to the manufacturing game.
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Pakistan on Friday protested to India after arresting a man suspected of being an Indian spy, sparking a new diplomatic tiff between the nuclear-armed neighbors.
The man was arrested during a raid in the southwestern province of Balochistan, Pakistani media reports said quoting local security officials, calling him an agent with India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) intelligence agency.
A Pakistani foreign ministry statement described the incident as the “illegal entry into Pakistan by a RAW officer and his involvement in subversive activities in Balochistan and Karachi”.
It said the Indian High Commissioner had been summoned by the Foreign Secretary so he could convey his “protest and deep concern”.
Balochistan, Pakistan’s largest but least developed province, has been battling a years-long separatist insurgency that the army has repeatedly claimed is “terrorism” promoted by states hostile to Pakistan such as India.
Pakistan’s Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan said the arrest showed that a “foreign hand” was behind unrest in the province.
He said a detailed investigation was under way and the government would also seek help from Iran, which borders Balochistan.
Karachi, a city of 20 million and Pakistan’s economic hub, is also frequently hit by religious, political and ethnic violence.

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