WFAT3e
So far, there are two reviews of WFAT3e posted to Amazon.  That was pretty quick, and I greatly appreciate the effort that went into making that review available.

If you've got a copy of WFAT3e and are considering writing a review, here's what I'd like to humbly ask...please consider doing more than just reiterating the table of contents.   After all, this book isn't just the second edition with some new info added...this is a companion book that should be on your bookshelf right next to the second edition.  In writing this edition, I took out stuff that hasn't really changed (PE file format, etc.) and instead included stuff specific to Windows 7, such as Volume Shadow Copies, and a bunch of new file formats.  I added an entire chapter just on Timeline Analysis, as well as one on Malware Detection.  In the first chapter, I went into more detail regarding what I consider to be core analysis concepts...so getting your thoughts and feedback on those would not only be interesting for me, but also be very valuable for other potential readers who look to your review to help them make up their minds.

Addendum: Keith's review is posted here.  Thanks so much for sharing your review!  Corey's review is posted here. 

Registry Analysis
Speaking of books, I've received a couple of emails asking me when a second edition of Windows Registry Forensics would be available.  While it's much too early to have a second edition at the moment, it's not too early to start thinking about it.  So, I thought I throw this out to the community...is a second edition something that would be of interest?

If so, what would you want to see added or modified in this second edition?

DFIRSummit
The agenda for the SANS Forensic Summit 2012 has been posted and it looks like this year's summit is going to be another outstanding event for DFIR folks.  I've attended all of the summits, which started in 2008, with the exception of last year's event.  These are always really great events, combining quality material and presenters with some excellent networking opportunities.

This time around, I've been selected to give the second keynote presentation on Wed, 27 June, an honor that I greatly appreciate and am humbled by.

For my presentation, I plan to use my CfP material, something I put together that I call, "Intro to Windows 7 Forensic Analysis".  I'll try to pack as much practical, 'you can use this right now' knowledge into the hour that I have available.  Keep in mind that the keynote will be at 8am...for me, that's almost lunch time, but I'm aware that many are still deep in REM (get it...R.E.M.??) sleep at that time of the day.

This year's event has a number of notable DFIR luminaries on the agenda, and the presentations cover a range of topics, including Windows 8, Mac OSX, Android memory analysis, effects of "The Cloud" on the industry, and there's even a SANS 360 event on the agenda.  Chris Pogue (@cpbeefcake) will be presenting "Sniper Forensics v3".

So, keep your eyes open for new developments regarding this event...if you're on Twitter, the hashtag is "#DFIRSummit".

IOCs
I've had a couple of posts recently on IOCs (most recent one here, earlier post here).  Unfortunately, it doesn't look like they've gone over too well...there hasn't been much in the way of discussion.  That's too bad...I can see how properly developed IOCs can be extremely useful, particularly when it comes to sharing threat intelligence.

Good IOCs can be shared by folks within the digital analysis community in order to share information.  Do we really think that things like RAM scrapers and keystroke loggers are isolated only to PCI engagements?  I hope not.  In some cases, I don't think that keystroke loggers are even looked for, because they aren't "on the radar" for the particular analyst.  This may be due to a number of factors...lack of experience, fatigue, too many cases piled up, etc.

Also, I can see some significant value in sharing IOCs across security specialties.  Let's say that you're a malware analyst, and you find something interesting, and decide to share the file name, hash, and interesting output from 'strings'.  Okay, that's great, but you've got a sample on your analysis system and an opportunity to share the data you've already collected with others, such as host- and network-based analysts.  Don't think one sample may be too terribly interesting?  How about if by adding that one sample to an aggregate across a number of samples, trends being to develop?

Something that may be a little bit more concrete for folks, and may turn into an actual IOC, popped up on ForensicArtifacts.com recently thanks to John Lukach.  Apparently, you can run the iCloud Service that you find on iPhones and iPads on Windows...so, if you're working an issue that involves data exfiltration, this may be something that you'll want to look into.

Reporting
I read this post from the HackerAcademy this morning, and I have to say, I agree wholeheartedly!  I started out in infosec performing vulnerability assessments and pen tests, and across the board, I'd rather work with someone who was 80-85% technical, but could produce a deliverable, than someone who was 100% technical, but couldn't (or wouldn't) write.

By itself, writing helps (or should help) us organize our thoughts.  We can start out by writing up a quick analysis plan, and use that as a guide, adding reasons for why we deviated from that plan.  From there, we should be keeping case notes, which have our analysis goals written out right at the top of the page, to keep us on track and on point throughout the analysis.  Finally, when we get to the actual reporting phase, we should have a template that we use, so that by the time that we're finishing up our actual analysis, everything we've written thus far pretty much lets the report write itself.

When performing your analysis, if you don't document something, it didn't happen.  When reporting, you have to keep in mind why you're being paid all the money by a customer...if they could do this work themselves, they wouldn't be paying you.  So...do you give them a three page report (one of which is the cover sheet) that basically says, "we didn't find anything", or do you show them what you did?

Another aspect of reporting is to archive information about the work that's been done by your team.  I was once on a team where our manager told us to put our reports up on a protected file server.  Over time, I found that I was the only one doing this...after every engagement, part of my close-out procedures checklist was to put a copy of the report on the server in the proscribed manner, and securely wipe the data and report off of my analysis system.  Since I wasn't the only one doing analysis work, I believe that a great deal of valuable corporate knowledge was lost because other analysts refused to share their experiences and findings.   We don't all look at or tackle problems in the same way, and someone may have experiences that would greatly benefit your current efforts...if they'd shared them.  Sharing those experiences by posting the reports to the server meant that you could view the final product without having the other analysts do any additional work.

A while (over 2 yrs) ago, I posted a sample report to the Files section of the Win4n6 group.  This report was based on analysis of a sample image downloaded from the Internet.  Of course, I can't be expected to post actual customer reports, and this was the best way I found to go from concept to practice.  I hope that someone who reads it finds it useful.

I attended the SANS Forensic Summit yesterday...I won't be attending today due to meetings and work, but I wanted to provide some follow-up, thoughts, etc.

The day started off with the conference intro from Rob Lee, and then a keynote discussion from Chris Pogue of TrustWave and Major Carole Newell, Commander of Headquarters Division the Broken Arrow Police Dept. This was more of a discussion and less of a presentation, and focused on communications between private sector forensic consultants and (local) LE. Chris had volunteered to provide his services, pro bono, to the department, and Major Newell took him up on his offer, and they both talked about how successful that relationship has been. After all, Chris's work has helped put bad people in jail...and that's the overall goal, isn't it? Private sector analysts supporting LE has been a topic of discussion in several venues, and it was heartening to hear Maj Newell chime in and provide her opinion on the subject, validating the belief that this is something that needs to happen.

There were a number of excellent presentations and panels during the day. During the Malware Reverse Engineering panel, Nick Harbour of Mandiant mentioned seeing the MS DLL Search Order being employed as a malware persistence mechanism. I got a lot from Troy Larson's and Jesse Kornblum's presentations, and sat next to Mike Murr while he tweeted using the #forensicsummit tag to keep folks apprised of the latest comments, happenings, and shenanigans.

Having presented and been on a panel, it was great opportunity to share my thoughts and experiences and get comments and feedback not only from other panelists, but also from the attendees.

One of the things I really like about this conference is the folks that it brings together. I got to reconnect with friends, and talk to respected peers that I haven't seen in a while (Chris Pogue, Matt Shannon, Jesse Kornblum, Troy Larson, Richard Bejtlich), or have never met face-to-face (Dave Nardoni, Lee Whitfield, Mark McKinnon). This provides a great opportunity for sharing and discussing what we're all seeing out there, as well as just catching up. Also, like I said, it's great to discuss things with other folks in the industry...I think that a lot of times, if we're only engaging with specific individuals time and again, we tend to loose site of certain aspects of what we do, and what it means to others...other responders, as well as customers.

If someone asked me to name one thing that I would recommend as a change to the conference, that would be the venue. While some folks live and/or work close to downtown DC and it's easy to get to the hotel where the conference is held, there are a number of locations west of DC that are easily accessible from Dulles Airport (and folks from Arlington and Alexandria will be going against traffic to get there).

Other than that, I think the biggest takeaways, for me, were:

1. We need to share better. I thought I was one of the few who thought this, but from seeing the tweets on the conference and talking to folks who are there, it's a pretty common thread. Sharing between LE and the private sector is a challenge, but as Maj Newell said, it's one that everyone (except the bad guys) benefits from.

2. When giving presentations, I need to spend less time talking about what's cool and spend more time on a Mission Guide (a la Matt Shannon) approach to the material. Throwing legos on the table and expecting every analyst to 'get it' and build the same structure is a waste of time...the best way to demonstrate the usefulness and value of a tool or technique is to demonstrate how it's used.

Thanks to Rob and SANS for putting on another great conference!

Follow-ups
Foremost on Windows (Cygwin build)

I'll be at the SANS Forensic Summit tomorrow, giving a presentation on Registry and Timeline Analysis in the morning, and then participating on a panel in the afternoon. Over all, it looks like this will be another excellent conference, due to the folks attending, their presentations, and opportunities for networking.

I talk (and blog) a lot about timelines, as this is a very powerful technique that I, and others, have found to be very useful. I've given presentations on the subject (including a seminar last week), written articles about it, and used the technique to great effect on a number of investigations. In many instances, this technique has allowed me to "see" things that would not normally be readily apparent through a commercial forensic analysis tool, nor via any other technique.

One of the aspects of Windows systems is that there a wide range of data sources that provide time stamped events and indicators. I mean, the number of locations within a Windows system that provides this sort of information is simply incredible.

To meet my own needs, I've updated my toolkit to include a couple of additional tools. For one, I've created a script that directly parses the IE index.dat files, rather than going through a third-party tool (pasco, Web Historian, etc.). This just cuts down on the steps required, and the libmsiecf tools, mentioned in Cory's Going Commando presentation, does not appear to be readily available to run on Windows systems.

Parsing EVT files is relatively straightforward using tools such as evtparse.pl, and Andreas provides a set of Perl-based tools to parse EVTX (Event Logs from Vista and above) files. As an alternative, I wanted to write something that could easily parse the output of LogParser (free from MS), when run against EVT or EVTX files, using a command such as the following:

logparser -i:evt -o:csv "SELECT * FROM D:\Case\File\SysEvent.EVT" > output.csv

Keep in mind that LogParser uses the native API on the system to parse the EVT/EVTX files, so if you're going to parse EVTX files extracted from a Vista or Windows 2008 or Windows 7 system, you should do so on a Windows 7 system or VM. The output from the LogParser command is easily read and output to a TLN format, and the output from the script I wrote is identical to that of evtparse.pl. This can be very useful, as LogParser can be installed on and run from a DVD or thumb drive, and used in live IR (change "D:\Case\File\SysEvent.EVT" to "System" or "Application"), as well as run against files extracted from acquired images (or files accessible via a mounted image). However, keep in mind that LogParser uses the native API, so if sysevent.evt won't open in the Event Viewer because it is reportedly "corrupted" (which has been reported for EVT files from XP and 2003), then using evtparse.pl would be the preferable approach.

The next tool I'm considering working on is one to parse the MFT and extract the time stamps from the $FILE_NAME attribute into TLN format. This would undoubtedly provide some insight into the truth about what happened on a system, particularly where some sort of timestomping activity has occurred (a la Clampi). This will take some work, as the full paths need to be reassembled, but it should be useful nonetheless.

I spent all day last Tuesday in downtown DC attending the SANS Forensic Summit...it was totally awesome and well worth every second I was there.

First, a HUGE thank you to Rob Lee for setting the Summit up and inviting me and all of the other speakers, and an only slightly-smaller thank you to all of the folks who attended and made the Summit the success that it was!

Now on to the Summit itself...

Presentations
Richard
Richard Bejtlich gave the keynote address which was very entertaining. Richard is a dynamic and informative speaker, and has some very well thought-out and articulated views, and he's definitely someone worth listening to, even if you don't necessarily agree with everything he says. Unlike Ken Bradley, I don't work for Richard, so I can say anything I want! ;-) Seriously, though...Richard is truly one of the thought leaders in the industry, and definitely someone worth listening to.

Kris Harms
Kris had some great things to say as an incident responder for Mandiant. As a responder, for me, it's great to see other folks in the industry, listen to their presentations, and talk to them about what they're doing, and how they're addressing those problems that we all run into. Many times you'll pick up things that you didn't know, and other times you'll get validation regarding some of the things you're doing when you get a chance to see how others are addressing those same challenges. Kris and the Mandiant crew have a great deal of experience with APT, or advanced persistent threat, so if you get a chance to pick Kris's brain on the subject, do it.

Jamie and Peter
Jamie and Peter, both also from Mandiant, had some great things to talk about with respect to memory analysis, with a specific focus on malware detection. If you haven't really looked at it, you should definitely consider looking at Memoryze and AuditViewer.

Brendan
Brendan's presentation on analyzing Windows Registry hives extracted from a memory dump was a great piece of work! My (top)hat's off to Brendan on the work he's done to extend the work put into tools such as Volatility and RegRipper. Who knew you could grab a memory dump from XP, and the using open source tools, extract the password hashes which you can then crack using your tool-of-choice?

Panels
The panels are a summit/conference format that Rob uses to great effect. I first encountered this sort of technique at Aaron's OMFW last year, and Rob has included it at the Summit. Several folks from a particular field (I was on the IR panel) each give short presentations, and then the floor is opened for questions which Rob filters so that things keep moving. This is a great way to do two things; first, to really push through some varying views in a short period of time, and second, to open up discussions that continue between individuals later, during breaks or even over email after the summit is over.

PodCast
Ovie and Bret were nice enough to invite me, as well as Rob Lee, Ken Bradley, and Jesse Kornblum to take part in the live recording of the CyberSpeak podcast, which was a LOT of fun...as I'm sure you'll be able to tell when you listen to it.

Hey, don't listen just to me...Chris and Matt have posted their impressions of the Summit, as well.

Tips
One of the things I picked up from Kris Harm's talk was a great tip on a means for doing differential analysis of volatile data. Most of use are familiar with the use of pslist to get process information, and how to analyze the information that we receive. I tend to combine that information with the output of tlist, as well as other tools (netstat, etc.) to develop an overall picture of what was happening on the system. What I picked up from Kris is that grep()'ing through the output of handle.exe, you can look for "pid:", which provides you with yet another means of locating processes. The same technique can be used for malware detection, by looking for mutants/mutexes (mentioned by both Kris, and his cohort over at Mandiant, Peter Silberman) using something called the "least frequency of occurrence" (thanks, Peter!).

I'm really looking forward to getting to the SANS Forensic Summit tomorrow! This is a great place to meet, listen to some great presentations, and to chat with folks from various fields (LE, FTE, corporate consultant, etc.) in the industry. My hat's off to Rob Lee for pulling this fantastic event together!

Per the Summit agenda, I will be on the IR panel in the morning, and then giving my Registry Analysis presentation at 1pm, right after lunch. When I was teaching at TBS while I was on active duty in the USMC, we used to call this "the death hour", so I'm going to address this urge to nap after lunch with several live demos, as well as a surprise at the end of the presentation!

But that's not all! There's more! Check out who else is attending...Mandiant is well represented at the conference, and Chris Pogue will be there, as will Eoghan Casey. Chris and Eoghan are fellow Syngress authors, so be sure to swing by the Syngress table at the Summit, get a copy of their books, and then hunt them down to have them sign them for you!

There's a rumor that Troy Larson of Microsoft will be there as well...but I have to tell ya, while I've heard the guy's name and been told that he's been on conference calls, I've never actually seen the guy! As far as I know, Troy is the yeti of the forensics community! ;-) Hopefully, he'll turn up sometime before the live recording of Ovie and Bret's Cyberspeak podcast.

While I only plan to be at the Summit on the 7th, there are a LOT of great speakers and panelists who are going to be there, and this is definitely an event that anyone who can attend, should! Without question! Where else are you going to be able to have so many giants of the forensics community together in one place, from various areas (corporate, federal gov't, LE), and covering so many pertinent topics (memory analysis, courtroom preparation, etc.)?

And if you have a Captain Picard fetish and have a "thing" for bald men, this is THE place to be in DC! ;-)

Folks, let's not forget that the SANS Forensic Summit is coming up! Check out the list of speakers, presentations, and panels...this conference is going to be great!

Also, I spoke to the marketing folks at Syngress, and they are going to have a table at the Summit (graciously provided by Rob Lee) where they're going to have books available. Now, the way cool...no, wait...the WAY COOL thing about this is that several of the authors are also speakers at the Summit! So, if you don't have Chris Pogue's book, get it and get it signed by none other than Chris Pogue himself! Eoghan Casey's going to be there, too!

Finally, I have pristine copies (one each) of Windows Forensic Analysis (first and second editions), as well as Perl Scripting for Windows Security. I am going to bundle all three of them together and provide them as a give-away following my presentation at the conference.

BTW...the presentations from the 2008 SANS Forensic Summit are archived here! Take a look!

PS: I had a meeting yesterday and got there a few minutes early...I was meeting a friend for lunch and took a minute or two to walk through a nearby bookstore. Guess what I saw on the shelf? I'll give you a hint...I went to the Computer section, and was browsing in the area where they keep the books on security and forensics... ;-)

I know, interesting post title, right...just couldn't come up with anything witty...sorry.

Well, Rob Lee ran us (me, Chris Pogue, and David Hull) through the SANS Essential Incident Response WebCast yesterday, and two out of three panelists agree that Cory Altheide is THE indispensable incident response tool! The mini-panel was a lot of fun and I hope folks listening to it take it as a harbinger of things to come this summer at the Summit.

Speaking of conferences, I ran across SecureArtisan's comments (day 1, day 2, day 3) from attending the CEIC Conference. It appears that there were some interesting presentations, some of which may have been interesting in title only. Reading through his comments, I have to agree with some of them from my own experiences, as this is why I've stopped trying to attend some conferences. What have you seen?

Also, I wanted to share some comments (posted with the author's permission) I've received lately from folks regarding tools...the first is from Brian Perkins, who said:

I just wanted to drop you a quick note regarding a recent success story using your FRUC client and the FSP Server. One of the data points I collect is autorunsc.exe –a. With this collection of data I was able to identify the malicious software in a matter of minutes even before acquiring an image. I have made great use of your FRUC client and server to the point that it serves as my first tool to deploy for Incident Response, and it now sits at the core of my Forensic Investigation Protocol . Getting the volatile data first and then the static data (hdd image) second is my order of priority. Using your tools has made my time well spent when as we all know how efficient a tools performs depends upon its success. Now I going to let Reg Ripper have a go at the hives!

If you remember, the FSP is one of the tools available on the DVD that accompanies the first edition of Windows Forensic Analysis (and yes, it is on the DVD with the second edition, as well).

The second comment is from Ian Hutchison, and has to do with the rp.pl Perl script that I mentioned in a previous post; Ian asked for a copy and ran it after I sent it, and this is what he had to say:

I ran this and it chewed threw 114 restore points in less than a second. That would have taken me hours if not days to do manually, and seriously messed with my sanity.

I want to thank both Brian and Ian for their comments, and for allowing me to post them. While it's nice to see comments like this out in public view, more than anything else, these comments show that there are folks out there looking for answers in other areas of a system or an image aside from just the file system, and moving beyond the traditional, purist approach to computer forensic analysis.

I'll be participating in a SANS mini-IR panel webcast today at 1pm, EST, along with Chris Pogue and David Hull. Our intrepid host is Rob Lee, Mr. SANS-Forensics himself! This webcast is a bit of a taste of what's to come at the SANS Forensics Summit this summer, so be sure to check it out and participate!

Be sure to check it out!

Rob Lee has updated the SANS Forensic/IR Summit information, as well as the agenda. Chris Pogue of TrustWave will be joining us in the IR panel, the first panel of the summit. Chris is a co-author of Unix and Linux Forensic Analysis, so be sure to bring your copy to get it signed!

If you've got only one chance to go to a conference, the Summit is THE one to attend in 2009!

Rob Lee has posted the agenda for the SANS Forensics and Incident Response Summit, to be held 7-9 July 2009 in Washington, DC.

I attended the first summit in Oct, 2008 and I have to tell you, it was one of the best conferences I've been to! It was extremely well organized with a lot of great speakers and great information, and provided ample opportunity for folks to mingle, ask questions, etc. My hope is that this year's summit will surpass the first one by orders of magnitude, as this kind of summit/conference/gathering is sorely needed.

This year's line up includes a keynote from Richard Bejtlich, followed by a presentation by Kris Harms, and then an IR panel discussion. This year, Rob's following a similar agenda (different content) as he did with the first summit, which IMHO was very successful.

I'll be presenting on the topic of Registry analysis, and with only about 50 minutes, I'll be ripping through the basics to get to the guts of why we need to do Registry analysis in the first place. Of course, I'll be talking about RegRipper, JT's regslack.pl (which has been HUGELY beneficial in a number of engagements) as well as how to run RegRipper plugins against the hive files stored in Windows XP System Restore Points...automatically!

There are also going to be presentations and panels addressing forensic tools and techniques, given by some of the folks who have developed and use them on a regular basis.

Also, look for Bret and Ovie to record their CyberSpeak podcast live at the Summit!

Hey, if you've got to be in DC on 7 July 2009, THIS is where you need to be! ;-)

The SANS Forensic Summit, a first-of-its-kind event for incident responders and forensic analysts, is over and I have to give a hearty and whole-hearted thanks to Rob Lee for chairing the event and bringing everyone...consultants, practitioners, and yes, even vendors...into such a unique forum. The combination panel and presentation format provided a great opportunity for attendees to interact with speakers in ways other than just listening to their presentations.

Speaking of which, there were a number of exceptional presentations throughout the two days. Rob talked about using TSK's fls and ils to generate file system timelines, which led me to think that it wouldn't be too great a stretch to add the same sort of capability to RegRipper, and have the Registry data included in the timeline information. The guys from Verizon gave a great presentation on their incident statistics, and the Mandiant presentation illustrated some interesting artifacts from a real-world examination.

One prevalent theme throughout the summit was that there was a lot of folks "calling the baby ugly". As humorous as that may sound, that was the euphemism for being up-front and letting folks know, yes, we have a problem. At least one of the issues identified that both Richard Bejtlich and I (and others) seemed to agree on was that the need to protect data is no longer the driver for incident response...if it ever truly was. Currently, legislation (state notification laws) and regulatory oversight (PCI, HIPAA, etc.) are the drivers for incident response.

Also, a common thread from the consultants to the admins in the audience seemed to be, help us help you. At one point during a panel, Rob Lee asked something along the lines of, how soon should someone who's been breached call for help, and my response was "before it happens." Seriously. Get someone on-site before you have find a breach, and have them look at your response plan and capabilities, and help you bring them in line with what's needed for your business. Think of the first folks to deal with a breach or some other incident as EMTs and folks like me as doctors and surgeons...if you find someone who needs help, are you going to stand around and watch the guy die, or do you want to know what you can do to (at the very least) contain the issue until you can someone with a greater skillset on-site to assist?

All in all, it was a great event, very beneficial to attendees and speakers alike. Rob did a great job pulling together talent such as Richard Bejtlich of GE and TaoSecurity fame, AAron Walters, Mike Poor and Tom Liston of InGuardians, Lance Mueller, Eoghan Casey, Bret Padres and Ovie Carroll, as well as Kris Harms, Wendi Rafferty and Ken Bradley from Mandiant, and Monty McDougal. Jennifer Kolde was there representing the FBI, as was Matt Shannon...F-Response is and was a huge hit. I was talking with a couple of folks who attended the summit and when the topic of F-Response came up, you could see the light come on in their eyes as they realized the potential that could be realized through a product like this.

It was also great to be able to talk with folks like Jeff Caplan, and (me being really bad with names) Doug and the guy from Ford.

One of the big take-aways that I got from the summit is the fact that folks like the speakers (consultants, in most cases) and attendees (admins, etc.) face a lot of the same problems with respect to incident response...namely, how to preview and triage systems, and how to do so in an enterprise environment.

I'm hoping to be invited to and be able to attend the next SANS Forensic Summit, in July 2009!

See what others thought:
AAron
Matt from F-Response

As the SANS Forensic Summit draws nigh, I've been preparing the demos for my presentation, Secrets of Registry Analysis Revealed. In addition to this presentation, I'll will also be participating in some panels. I've seen the current program, and there's even a panel on volatile data, which I think is very topical and very much needed. Also, Richard Bejtlich will be giving the keynote speech on the second day.

Part of my presentation will include demos (yes, Rob told me I can't just talk the whole time...) of RegRipper and rip.exe (CLI version of RegRipper), as well as a new tool I call ripXP. Before I say anything else about this, I have to say that ripXP was an idea that Rob had several months ago...he told me something like, "hey, wouldn't it be cool if you wrote a tool like RegRipper, only it would also run the plugin against the hive files in the XP Restore Points?" So, in my copious amounts of free time (HTML really needs a sarcasm or smart-@$$ tag), I put together ripXP.

Okay, so what IS ripXP? RipXP is similar to rip.exe, in that it is a CLI tool and that it uses the same plugins as RegRipper and rip.exe. You give ripXP (as command line arguments) the hive file, the directory where the Restore Points reside (more on that later), and a plugin to run. Once you have all this, ripXP will then:

-> Access the hive file and guess what kind (SAM, System, NTUSER.DAT, Software, or Security) hive file it is (if it's an NTUSER.DAT file, it will attempt to retrieve the user's SID

-> Compare the type of hive file to the hive file that the plugin was written for; that is, if you pass it a System hive file, it won't let you run a plugin meant for an NTUSER.DAT file (just like rip.exe, ripXP includes the "-l" option so you can list all available plugins)

-> Run the plugin against the hive file you selected

-> Access the System Restore RP directories, and run the plugin against the appropriate hive

All this happens automatically, and the output goes to STDOUT, so all you have to do is redirect the output to a file.

Oh, yeah...when ripXP accesses an RP directory, it also displays the Description, Type, and Creation Date of the Restore Point.

Okay, so besides being totally, AWESOMELY, AMAZINGLY cool...so what? Well, for the demos, I'm using Lance Mueller's practical images, so the number of RP directories is limited. However, in a real examination, a tool like this would allow you to see a historical progression of data. I've used only a couple of the plugins in my testing thus far, such as userassist, acmru, and a couple of others. But look at the MountedDevices key, or any of the MRU listings in the NTUSER.DAT file...this would allow you to see a historical progression over time of how the data changed.

Also, consider a Restore Point created one day, and then the following day, some data within that key was deleted by the user. Those historical artifacts would still exist in the hive files in the Restore Points, and would not only be accessible, but would also be visible sequentially.

Finally, like rip.exe, ripXP can be deployed within a batch file, and you could even create/use a Perl script to create that batch file, based on a standard methodology. Oh, yeah...the RP directories. So, you have an image...raw dd, split raw dd, EWF, whatever. What I did was open the image file in FTK Imager and export the RP directories to another location; in my case, D:\test\XP1. Then, because I wanted to use them easily and repeatedly, I burned them to CD, so I now access them as E:\XP1\RP1, RP2, RP3, etc. What I need to do is test them for use with SmartMount, and other tools like it. Yes, this will make the command line a bit longer, but it should work just fine. (Addendum: Testing using a mounted image is complete and extremely successful!)

Anyway, this will be one of my demos. If you're going to be at the Summit, be sure to stop by when we talk about Registry analysis.

Rob Lee let me know that the SANS Computer Forensics and e-Discovery with Rob Lee site is up, and looking around, it's pretty interesting. If you go to the Community section, there's a blog, links to other resources, but perhaps the most interesting is the Downloads section. This is where you find the SANS Investigative Forensic Toolkit (SIFT) workstation VMWare appliance.

I downloaded SIFT and got it up and running in VMWare Workstation (you can use VMPlayer) in no time. From there, I was able to map my host XP system to the available shares that Rob had already set up (i.e., "hack" and "images").

The VMWare appliance also comes with PTK from DFLabs already set up and ready to run. Rob also provided a neat little "cheat sheet" that you can download and keep nearby and handy when you're logged into and working in the appliance.

I know that this isn't specifically about Windows IR or forensics, but it does allow you to easily use the Linux (in this case, Fedora) platform to perform some modicum of analysis.

Don't forget about the SANS Forensic Summit in Oct, in Vegas!

The recent Best Western issue illustrates an important point, which was mentioned in many of the posted articles on this issue...

Compliance != Security

In the face of compromises or any other potential/verified breach, a quick response is essential. You don't know if you have sensitive data (PCI, PHI, PII, etc.) leaving your network, and your first, most immediate and natural reaction (i.e., disconnecting systems) will likely expose you to more risk than the incident itself. Wait...what? Well, here's the deal, kids...if a system has sensitive data on it, and was subject to a compromise (intrusion, malware infection, etc.), and you cannot explicitly prove that the sensitive data was not compromised, you may (depending upon the legal or regulatory requirements for the data) be required to notify, regardless.

So...better to know than to not know...right?

What you need to do is quickly collect the following items:

1. Pertinent network (i.e., firewall, etc.) logs
2. Network packet capture(s)
3. Full or partial contents of physical memory
4. An image acquired from the affected system

Of course, this assumes a great deal...that you have a CSIRP in place, that you've already identified systems that store/process sensitive data, and that you've got the tools and training to collect any of this data. Some of it is fairly trivial...collecting firewall logs may simply be as easy as a call to your NOC. Collecting packet captures is as simple as having a Windows laptop with Wireshark installed, or Linux laptop. Tools for dumping the contents of RAM have recently taken a surge forward, and acquiring an image from a live system (can't shut that server down??) is as straightforward as getting a copy of FTK Imager.

Remember to DOCUMENT everything you do! The rule of thumb is, if you didn't document it, you didn't do it.

What other tools are available? In the case of Best Western, as well as any other organization with remote systems (located in distant data centers or storefronts), something like F-Response may prove to be extremely valuable! If you're not sure about F-Response and don't believe the testimonials, give the Beta Program a try. With the Enterprise Edition of F-Response already deployed (or simply pushed out remotely as needed), getting the data you need is amazingly straightforward!

So why do all this? Why go through all this trouble? Because you will likely have to answer the question, was sensitive data leaving my network? The fact of the matter is that you're not going to be able to answer that question with nothing more than a hard drive image, and the single biggest impediment to doing the right thing (as opposed to something) in a case like this is time...when you don't have the tools, training or support from executive management, the only reaction left is to unplug systems and hope for the best.

Unfortunately, where will that leave you? It'll leave you having to answer the question, why weren't you prepared? Would rather have to face that question, or actually be prepared?

If you want to learn what it takes to be prepared, come on by the SANS Forensic Summit and learn about this subject from the guys and gals who do it for a living!

Resources
CSO Online - Data Breach Notification Laws, State by State
SC Magazine - Data Breach Blog

Do we need another SANS cert? I don't think it's so much about us...it's what SANS wants.

I was reading TaoSecurity this morning and ran across this link to the recent SANS newsletter...

Does anyone on your staff do an excellent job of cleaning out PCs that have been infected by spyware and other malicious software. We are just starting development of a new certification (and related training) for Certified Malware Removal Experts and we are looking for a council of 30 people who have done a lot of it to help vet the skills an dknowledge required for the certification exam and classes. Email cmre@sans.org if you have a lot of experience.

I looked at this and thought...hhmmm...why create a new certification for skillsets that admins should already have? After all, malware detection is really just an advanced form of troubleshooting...which all admins should be knowledgeable in, right? I mean, when you have trouble with your car, do you examine it (ie., look at the gas guage and determine you're out of gas) or do you just abandon your car on the side of the road and get a new one?

Of course, there is a school of thought that believes why should you certify someone to run "format c:\", then fdisk, then re-install the OS? Ugh. I don't know which is worse...thinking that "slash and burn" is an acceptable solution, or certifying something like this.

Thoughts?